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Abstract 
This thesis examines what determines, using the new institutional economics 
approach, the development of the micro-insurance sector in less developed 
countries, and what is its role for economic growth in such countries? It is further 
subdivided into explicit research questions, which includes: is it the insufficient 
compatibility between formal and informal institutions (e.g. lack of trust, etc.) that 
hinders the development of micro-insurance in Nigeria below what had been widely 
predicted by the academic community? And what has to be done institutionally to 
make this industry an active contributor to economic growth, that lives up to the 
potential this sector has due to its ability to satisfy clients’ values and demand?  To 
investigate these questions, an extensive theoretical review of both new institutional 
economics and (micro) insurance literature is carried out to demonstrate how the 
quality of institutions impact on the development of (micro) insurance sector and to 
provide the necessary background for three distinct studies carried out in this thesis 
with a particular focus on Nigeria. 
The first study uses probit regression analysis to investigate the hypothesised 
effect of societal norms to the likelihood of an individual to enrol into micro-
insurance products. A key finding from the primary data administered in Nigeria 
shows that informal institutional variables such as risk aversion, trust, religion and 
individual responsibility and choice have significant effects on the decision of 
individuals to enrol into micro-insurance product. 
The second study uses three different panel methods of Pooled regression, Fixed 
effect and system generalised method of moments (GMM) to investigate the impact 
of institutional quality on the relationship between micro-insurance development 
and size of informal economy 34 sub-Saharan African countries from 2000 – 2014. 
The finding shows that by controlling for institutional quality, positive development 
of the institution of micro-insurance contributes to reducing the size of the informal 
economy.  
The third and concluding study uses Vector error correction model (VECM) to 
investigate the short and long term impact of functional micro-insurance industry on 
18 
economic growth. The finding from the 17 years’ cross-sectional data provides 
evidence that micro-insurance has both short and long term positive impact on the 
economic growth of Nigeria as well as other less-developed countries.  
 
Keywords: Micro-insurance, New institutional economics, Risk, financial 
inclusion, informal economy, economic growth, Nigeria, less-developed countries. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Overview of the study 
1.1 Introduction 
Every person or institution in the world has to deal with risk of different forms 
and degrees, which exposes to losses or an adverse deviation from the desired 
outcome that is expected or hoped for. So in everyday life, we try to minimize the 
adverse impacts of these risks with different risk prevention instruments. The 
instrument we employ for the management of the risk we face, could emanate from 
or depend on our access to family, market, social network, membership into 
groups/bodies or public authority (Neubourg, 2009). Nevertheless, there is a 
systematic approach to the management of risk known as insurance; and it involves 
the transfer of an individual’s risks to an insurer, who agrees, for a consideration 
(called the premium), to assume to a specified extent, losses suffered by the 
individual (insured).  
However, it is the poor individuals who tend to live in a social environment 
(household, local community, country) that is underdeveloped and does not offer 
such a risk-transferring mechanism, (even if it would be possible); and it is this very 
idea of an insurance for the poor in poor social environments that is the subject of 
analysis in this thesis. Most times, it is the level of organization of public life that is 
too low to easily develop functioning institutions in an insurance industry that can 
remain stable over an extended period of (possibly turbulent) times.  
Institutional instability, as will be explained below in chapter 3, equally 
precludes the development of functioning insurance industry. Also, even where there 
is a functional insurance industry, the volatility in the flow of premiums in the 
industry makes it difficult for insurance firms to fulfil the promises of their policies. 
This institutional gap is particularly noteworthy, as the ability to manage risk and 
take risk is at the basis of economic growth development: investments are the 
precondition to an increase in productive assets, and yet they contain the risk of not 
producing the rate of return needed to pay back loans; innovations are the foundation 
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of the kind of technological change that gives rise to qualitative, intensive economic 
growth (see Alwyn Young 1992). 
To make matters worse, in most of the countries where the population of the 
poor is significant, there is no functional social security that can help minimize these 
risks they face. It is these circumstances of the poor in non-rich societies that 
motivate or even force individuals to revert to informal mechanisms to cope with the 
costs arising from negative risks materialising. The characterisation of informality 
in this is rooted in the fact that those mechanisms are organised at an individual or 
at best social community level – a level that is (i) typically not regulated by the law 
and (ii) usually not large enough to benefit from the ability to diversify/pool different 
kinds or materialisations of risk. Amongst the informal mechanisms, there is the 
solution of using productive assets if any, informal credit arrangements, family and 
mutual support networks. While not discarding the role of these forms of informal 
risk mechanisms to alleviate some of the risks the poor face, the vast majority of 
scholars agree that alone, they do not cover all risks low income families are facing, 
especially in case of repetitive shock (such as flooding, drought, earthquakes, 
epidemics) that affect the entire community (Alwang et al., 2001; Holzmann et al., 
2003; Dercon, 2005; Cohen and Young, 2007; Dercon and Kirchberger, 2008; 
Alderman et al., 2006; Pan, 2008; Gunning, 2010). It is generally agreed upon by 
these authors that those informal arrangements are inefficient, insufficient and 
unreliable.  They tend to result in low returns and to cover only a small portion of 
the loss (Churchill, 2006). 
Sequel to this lack of access to the kind of insurance that is typically available 
in most of the non-poor economies (called henceforth “conventional” insurance 
insurance services or government-sponsored social security services, as well as the 
insufficient nature of the informal mechanisms, the notion of micro-insurance 
emerges as an alternative instrument of risk management and social protection for 
low-income people. Along with other forms of micro-institutions, like micro-
finance, the instrument of micro-insurance is often used by different development 
groups (such as micro-finance units, communities, government agencies, and private 
insurance companies) to alleviate the hardships that arise when a negative risk 
materialises, and the costs become larger than the individual is able to carry alone. 
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Such a solution can help to reduce poverty and thereby serve as an instrument of 
economic development: insurance opens up the possibility to assume risk, the basis 
to economic growth and development (as argued above) and is a complement to the 
famous idea of micro-finance. In place of the kind of social security system that is 
so characteristic of developed countries, the institution of micro-insurance presents 
an opportunity for the state to offer her citizens, especially low-income households 
a viable and mutually affordable alternative form of government-clients’ funded 
social security services. Insurance firms, the third party in this system, can apply the 
micro-insurance institution as an innovative strategy of tapping into a huge low-
income market that remained unserved by conventional insurance services 
(Churchill 2006). 
Regrettably, in most less-developed countries, the micro-insurance industry has 
performed way below expectations in terms of economic growth and development 
(Loewe, 2006; McCord et al., 2013). In contrast to the prediction by scholars 
(Churchill, 2002; ILO-STEP, GTZ, 2006; Lloyd, 2009), most of the low-incomers 
in these nations still prefer to remain uninsured even in the face of a high uncertainty 
environment with all the clear indication that one form of risk or the other will befall 
them.  They still prefer the above-explained weaker mechanisms like informal 
arrangements in the management of their risks. Also, contrary to the prediction of 
the above-mentioned scholars, most insurance firms, as well as governments of these 
nations, seem to lack the motivation, yet, to use micro-insurance as a profit-
generating tool. Based on a global estimate of 1.5 - 3 billion micro-insurance 
prospects among the low incomers (Lloyd, 2009) and a potential gross premium of 
up to US$40 Billion (Swiss Re, 2010), the slack in the development of this industry 
is not to do with the ability of individuals to afford a micro-insurance policy. Rather, 
the reasons may lie in three factors: first, the willingness of low-income households 
to take out the available policies given the weak institutional set up; second, the 
strains that government regulations impose upon insurers in the development of 
meaningful new policies targeted at micro-insurance customers; and third, the fact 
that less-developed countries’ state budgets are particularly constrained, so that their 
governments have to make painful prioritization between policies that all may assist 
economic development (Stephan et al., 2005). Other problems hindering the 
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development of the micro-insurance sector in less-developed countries include (and 
will be further discussed and analysed in this thesis): moral hazard, adverse 
selection, correlated risks, high transaction cost, and the low size of the insurable 
premium (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Arrow, 1963; Rowell and Connelly, 2012). 
Biener and Eling (2011) also highlighted other issues inhibiting the growth of the 
sector as including non- compliance with standard insurance conditions such as 
information asymmetry, small risk pools, and insufficient risk evaluation.  
The assumption that the development of the micro-insurance sector is hindered 
by both institutional weaknesses (formal and informal) and market failures suggests 
that this thesis should use for its analysis of the research question the new 
institutional economic framework. The chosen method follows similar approaches 
taken by the academic community (see Cook, 1995; Dorward et al., 1998; 
Ensminger, 2000) when searching for the causes of the poor performance of micro-
insurance in less-developed regions. To provide a case in point and to allow the 
thesis to go beyond a purely theoretical analysis to tap into empirical fieldwork 
(assessing the reasons on a deeper level, even if strictly speaking case-specific), this 
thesis focusses on an instructive less developed country, Nigeria. This country 
already started to develop some form of a micro-insurance and still is a long way off 
being able to offer the poorer fraction of society a widely accepted, trustworthy and 
functioning insurance system against risks, such as health-insurance, life-insurance, 
and agriculture-related insurance policies.  
This theoretical framework is particularly adept for this research, in as much as 
the new institutional economics (NIE) offers a sufficiently holistic research 
approach. It provides a framework that embeds important theoretical approaches 
such as sociological theory, transaction cost theory, property right theory, contract 
theory, and principal-agent theory (Krause, 1996). The application of these theories 
under the umbrella of the NIE in the study of micro-insurance performance in 
Nigeria creates the opportunity to look at the different institutional and market 
problems that have impeded the development of the micro-insurance sector in 
Nigeria. As a country with over (200) million population and an estimated 70 million 
prospective micro-insurance clients (Diaz et al. 2013), the inability to attract more 
than one percent of the population into any form of insurance coverage (NAICOM, 
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2017), present a practical case for the study of the relationship between the 
development of micro-insurance and the institutional structure of the country. 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
The purpose of this research is to apply NIE theory to the study of the 
determinants of micro-insurance development in less developed countries and its 
role for economic growth of such countries with special focus on Nigeria. To achieve 
this aim, the project has the following distinct objectives: 
 To identify an appropriate theoretical framework by means of an extensive 
review of micro-insurance (to be discussed in chapter 2) and new 
institutional economics literature (to be discussed in chapter 3) so as to 
demonstrate how the quality of institutions and behavioural pattern of the 
relevant actors in an economy impact on the development of (micro) 
insurance sector.  
 To provide the necessary background information on how government 
regulations over time, the behaviours of the insurance actors, and the 
prospects have affected the historical development and challenges in the 
sector to identify drivers and hindrances for the micro-insurance sector (see 
chapter 5). 
 To develop and empirically test a number of hypotheses drawn from the 
selected theoretical framework by means of various statistical techniques 
such as probit (see chapter 6), generalized method of moments (GMM) (see 
chapter 7), and multivariate analysis (see chapter 8). 
 To evaluate and discuss the empirical results, outline the key directions for 
future research, and elucidate the commercial and public policy implications 
of the study. (see chapter 5 -8). 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This research project is composed of eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the 
main ideas, overarching hypothesis and sets the agenda for the study. It does this by 
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preparing the ground for the research questions and hypothesis, the scope and 
significance of the study.  
Chapter 2 reviews the theories of (micro) insurance and discusses some gaps 
identified in the literature, which serves as motivation for this study. The chapter 
looks at the different forms and classification of insurance products. It compares 
micro-insurance with conventional insurance, as well as certain characteristics of 
insurance services. Further, it explores both the demand, supply, and distribution 
side of (micro) insurance services. 
Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical and conceptual frameworks for the study. It 
discusses the relevant ideas in NIE and how they can be applied in the study of 
micro-insurance development. The theories discussed in this chapter include 
sociological theory, transaction cost theory, property right theory, contract theory, 
and principal-agent theory.  
Chapter 4 discusses the methodological aspects of the research. This includes a 
detailed description of information on hypothesis; the sampling framework and 
techniques applied; the research instruments, the measurement of variables, the 
validity and reliability of the data used; as well as the different analytical approaches 
adopted. 
Chapter 5 provides the kind of background information on the Nigerian context 
that is needed to dig deeper into the analysis of the slow development of a real 
existing micro-insurance sector. This includes how government regulations changed 
over time, a description of the behaviours of the insurance actors, prospective 
customers, and the people as a whole, and how they have affected the historical 
development and challenges in the Nigerian insurance sector.  
Chapter 6 uses probit analysis to test the hypothesized effects of societal norms 
to the likelihood of an individual to enrol into micro-insurance products. A key 
contribution of this chapter is an attempt to predict the impact of risk aversion, 
religious barriers, trust and individual orientation towards the decision of an 
individual to enrol into micro-insurance in Nigeria. As control variables, selected 
indicators of formal institution and personal characteristics were included to have a 
better understanding of what influences the decision of an individual in Nigeria to 
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enrol into micro-insurance. This analysis uses fieldwork data that had been generated 
in the framework of this thesis by the author. 
Chapter 7 uses panel data from official sources on 34 sub Saharan African 
(SSA) countries, to study the impact of institutional quality on the relationship 
between micro-insurance development and size of informal economy in less-
developed nations. The study was carried out using OLS regression, fixed effect 
models (FE), and generalized method of moments (GMM) models. The key 
contribution of the study is the finding that micro-insurance, in the short term, is not 
developed enough to reduce the size of informal economy in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). However, when the quality of institutions is controlled for, the story changes: 
micro-insurance becomes an innovative means of including into the formal economy 
the un- and under-served poor who operate in the informal economy and thereby 
reducing the size of informal economy. 
Chapter 8 concludes the research by analysing the impact of micro-insurance 
development on economic growth. It uses Vector error correlation model (VECM) 
to carry out an investigation on a 17 years’ cross-sectional data to predict the short 
and long term impact of functional micro-insurance industry on economic growth. 
It also discusses the theoretical, commercial and policy implications of the findings 
of the thesis. One key contribution of the study to the available knowledge of the 
scientific community on the issue of micro-insurance is that micro-insurance has 
both short and long term positive impact on the economic growth of Nigeria as well 
as other less-developed countries.  
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Chapter 2 
2. Theories and concepts of (micro) insurance. 
2.1 The poor and risk.  
Risk describes the possibility that an uncertain event happens. Uncertainty is 
omnipresent and cannot be altered by humans, whereas risk can be either taken or 
(to some extent) evaded or covered/hedged against losses of value in some way or 
other. For this thesis, risk is defined to be associated with losses of value (not a 
positive risk of earning from an unforeseen event). Some individuals are more risk-
prone and others more risk-averse. Individuals to different degrees search for ways 
to cover the risk they are willing to take, i.e. to limit their vulnerability to risk and 
uncertainty, and that gives rise to the idea of insurance. Insurances estimate the 
probability of an uncertain event taking place and the values at risk due to the risk-
taking of insured individuals: if an uncertain event happens, the size of the damage 
depends on the amount of risk taken. For the vulnerability of the individual, the 
distinction between risk and uncertainty is irrelevant: if an uncertain event happens, 
the damage in value terms occurs because the uncertain event took place. 
Vulnerability to risk and the inability to cover the risk of losses in values are 
fundamental causes of poverty and underdevelopment (World Bank 2000, Islam, 
2007). When negative risks materialize, their value-implications can damage the 
well-being of the individual being affected by the negative event, and this is 
especially relevant for the poor. It not only leads to losses of income but also 
potentially to losses of productive potential, forcing victims to dispose of productive 
assets. Such a chain reaction, also known as the poverty-vulnerability vicious cycle, 
could result in lower productivity, lower-income, and higher vulnerability in the 
future. Alderman et al. (2006) in their study of the long-term effect of childhood 
malnutrition in rural Zimbabwe found children affected by civil war and drought 
shocks in the 1970s and 1980s incurred a loss of about 14% of their lifetime income. 
Not only that, the expectation of such shocks causes a behavioural change and 
motivates the most vulnerable to invest their resources in low-yield, low-risk 
activities to protect themselves against those shocks. This, however, depresses the 
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potential income below what it would be if they were not exposed to shocks. For 
instance, rural Indian households prefer to allocate a large proportion of their land 
to safe traditional varieties of rice and castor than high yield but high-risk crops 
(Morduch, 1995). Hence, the world bank sees risk as a trigger of a decline in well-
being and is manifested by shocks (World Bank, 2001). 
Dercon (2005) classified risk based on the scope (micro and macro). He saw 
risks affecting a specific individual or household as idiosyncratic risks, which 
belongs to the micro-level, while macro-level or covariate risks include those that 
affect the entire nation or a specific community. Nevertheless, most times, there is 
no clear boundary, as most risks may comprise both. Among the different forms of 
risk that can lead to depression of potential income of household or communities, 
especially that of the poor, according to the Strategies and Tools against Social 
Exclusion and Poverty  global programme (STEP, 2006) of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) includes: 
 Natural risk such as drought, flood, erratic rain, crop pest, a fire that can 
cause loss of assets, (such as loss of work premises and tools). 
 Environmental risks, which include problems associated with deforestation, 
pollution, etc. 
 Health-related risks such as sickness, child delivery, epidemics. 
 Life cycle risks, such as old-age and death. 
 Economic risks such as business or harvest failure, unemployment, loss of 
properties, death of livestock. 
 Policy-based and institutional risk such as a lack of legislation to protect 
workers, insufficient public services (e.g. lack of health care facilities or 
inappropriate public health care policy), taxation. 
 Political and social risks (e.g. theft, crime, and related loss of properties, gang 
activities, and civil war). 
The effect of these risks on income or level of consumption can lead to multiple 
impacts on its victims: health-related risks such as illness, when they occur, can lead 
to devastating effect on the individual’s income and the well-being of the 
31 
individual’s dependents (e.g. family). Also, some of these risks are interlinked with 
a snowball of effects. The occurrence of one risk may increase the chances of other 
risks occurring. For instance, a natural risk like drought can cause harvest failures 
or weaken and kill cattle used as a buffer stock by farmers in many less-developed 
countries. This type of risk may result in depression of household income, which in 
turn can trigger malnutrition and as an effect of this adverse health effects. 
Households, especially in developed nations, employ a portfolio of mechanisms 
to manage their risks and smooth consumption. Neubourg (2002) in his Welfare 
Pentagon’s paradigm, identified five core institutions (family, market, social 
network, membership institutions, and public authorities) that households use to 
generate income, smooth consumption or manage risks. He saw households as 
unequal in their livelihood portfolio, which determines their point of welfare 
production within the 5-dimensional welfare space. For instance, access to one 
institution of the welfare pentagon (e.g., financial market) means that households 
may not have to rely on others (e.g., membership institution or family) to manage 
risks. Also, households can depend on the different social policy instruments by the 
public authority when the other pentagon channel(s) fail (market failure, family 
failure, social network failure). Though the risk management or consumption 
smoothing portfolio between developed nations are not the same in size and 
effectiveness in ensuring that the underserved are properly catered for, it is still far 
better developed than what is presently obtainable in most less-developed nations.  
Hence, less-developed nations account for most of the households and 
communities worst hit by these forms of risks. Unlike their counterparts in 
developed countries, these communities and families most often work in the 
informal economy of an unregulated market with unsafe working conditions. With 
a high rate of illiteracy and remoteness of where they live, far away from public 
social services, they may not be aware of their social entitlements or even benefit 
from prevention or health education programmes. Again, because of the 
unpredictable nature of their earnings, with no appropriate tools to manage the risks, 
these people are less resilient to the shocks associated with risks. Most of them have 
small if any assets to rely on; they do not have access to insurance; they cannot afford 
costly preventive measures etc. Climate risks loom large in less-developed countries 
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because the households rely heavily on agriculture without the same level of risk-
management mechanisms or portfolios that are available in developed nations. For 
instance, weather-related uncertainties, plant disease, and crop pests create harvest 
risks for all farmers, but technologies available for reducing such risks, such as 
irrigation, pesticide, disease-resistant varieties are less available in less-developed 
nations (ILO-STEP, 2006).  Hence, the adverse effects of uncertainties on 
households in less-developed countries tend to be stronger and may even be life-
threatening much more often than in the developed world. A recent study of poverty 
in India found out that the poor are 4.5 times as likely to be affected by tuberculosis 
as the rich (World bank, 2001). The effect is even more severe on women. Jhabvuala 
and Sinha (2006) saw women in less-developed nations being more vulnerable and 
insecure than their male counterparts. They saw women as less educated, less paid, 
and constrained by reproductive demands, which exposes them to health and job 
security risks. Dercon and Kristnan (2000) reported similar results on the women in 
poor Ethiopian households. 
Bedevilled by institutional instabilities and lack of functional risk management 
mechanisms the poor in less-developed nations tend to rely on informal risk coping 
strategies. The absence of well functional legal institutions that can guarantee the 
fulfilment of contract and the lack of suitable collateral assets on behalf of 
individuals forces them to rely on informal mechanisms such as depleting productive 
assets if they have any, informal credit arrangements, family and mutual support 
network. For instance, in their study on the structures of social protection landscape 
in Ethiopia, Hailu and Northcut (2012) found that as a form of informal risk coping 
strategy in the absence of functional formal options, relatives living in other areas 
transferred cash or grains to drought victims or the victims migrate temporally to 
their families who reside in other areas. Another risk coping mechanism employed 
by these households is diversification of economic activities such as farming in 
different locations or on different types of crops even when specialization on one 
kind of crop will be more profitable (and yet riskier). Hence, they pay a high price 
for such risk management by fore-going the gains from specialization (Collier and 
Gunning, 1999).  
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In severe cases, these households are forced to reducing food intake or 
withdrawing children from school, which in turn worsens their situations. Foster 
(1993), in his study on the effects of risks on the poor households in Bangladesh, 
shows that child growth was affected during and after the severe floods in 1988. 
Similarly, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), in their study on south India, find that 
children’s education is interrupted in case of income shocks, which itself resulted in 
lower accumulation of human capital. In Nigeria, people who experience risk shocks 
also seek for solutions in religious houses. Under the belief that their misfortunes 
are linked to some supernatural powers, they turn to their pastors, Imams and high 
priests in seek of a solution to their problems.1 
Lloyd (2009, p9) articulated some of the informal risk coping strategies 
employed by these households as including: 
 Informal risk-sharing arrangements 
 Conservatism (i.e., avoiding risky activities) 
 Self-insurance through savings reduced expenditure (including withdrawing 
children from school) and acquiring additional work 
 Emergency credit from family or moneylenders 
 Liquidation of assets 
 In some countries, selling children into bonded labour 
These informal strategies have their mechanisms, and the question emerges as 
to why they are usually criticised as being sub-optimal to the formal risk 
management institutions prevailing in developed countries? The answer for the vast 
majority of scholars is that those informal mechanisms alone do not cover all risks, 
the low income families are facing, especially in case of repetitive shock or 
significant scare collective shock (such as flooding, drought, earthquakes, 
epidemics) that typically affect the entire informal institution-community (Alwang 
et al., 2001; Holzmann et al., 2003; Dercon, 2005; Dercon and Kirchberger, 2008; 
                                                 
1 It is worth pointing out that, some of these religious men see this as an opportunity to get rich. 
They brainwash these victims of shocks with all sorts of lies and at the end, leave them in much more 
precarious situations than before.  
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Alderman et al., 2006; Pan, 2008; Gunning, 2010). It is generally agreed upon by 
these authors that those informal arrangements are inefficient, insufficient and 
unreliable: they result in low returns and tend to cover only a small portion of the 
loss (Churchill, 2006). Even when they suffice in solving the impact of the risk 
shocks, they still have a long-lasting negative effect on the victims. For instance, 
where informal institutions may prevent children from suffering from malnutrition 
by the use of transfers from extended family members, but the negative impacts on 
other, unresolved effects (like schooling) will be permanent (Alderman et al., 2006). 
Similarly, in his study on Ethiopia, Pan (2009) compared the effect of the use 
of livestock as consumption smoothing to that of actuarially fair insurance. He found 
a substantial long-run impact of the use of livestock, which exposes households to 
high volatility and lower growth because the livestock themselves are subject to 
considerable risks and may lead to smaller savings in situations of increased risks 
(see also Gunning, 2010). Dercon (2005) reports that in a sample of rural households 
in Ethiopia, ten years after the famine, cattle holdings were still only two-thirds of 
what they were just before the famine of the mid-1980s despite many reasonably 
good harvests. The study summarizes that the main reason for this permanent impact 
appears to be the high cost to rebuild herds since their contribution to the farming 
system is still as high as ever. 
Hence, the provision and selection of appropriate risk protection and coping 
mechanisms is a vital device to reduce vulnerability amongst the poor, and thereby 
assist in providing a means out of poverty. This does not result in a rejection of 
informal mechanisms as counterproductive - the design of formal institutions must 
take into account existing informal mechanisms while acknowledging the different 
forms of risks that households, especially in less-developed nations, face. Churchill 
(2006) identified micro-credit, micro saving, and micro-insurance as a potential 
financial instrument that could be used to keep the poor away from the poverty trap 
by providing greater economic and psychological security, reducing exposure to 
multiple risks and cushioning the impact of disasters. While there are other formal 
instruments of risk protection and coping mechanisms, these three micro-
instruments, which belong to the family of micro-finance, represent a promising 
instrument especially for poor households in less-developed nations where fully 
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fletched, market-based financial institutions are not very strong. Microfinance 
instruments offer more flexible techniques for different risks and opportunities (such 
as the risk that results in small losses, risks with high predictability of occurring, 
possibly due to a high frequency of occurrence) for those without access to financial 
services through established channels like conventional banking or conventional 
insurance (Karmakar 2009).  
According to Hintz (2009), Micro-finance rose to prominence as a result of 
increased attention of the development and business experts with a view on the need 
to reinvent the approach to development, social protection, and risk management in 
the wake of the Asian financial crises. It presents an exciting approach which 
corresponds to the donors’ preference of market-based solution and corporate 
awareness of the potential fortunes at the bottom of the pyramid. It follows in line 
with some of the already available preventive and coping informal risk mechanisms 
employed by poor households when faced with shocks. This way, formal 
instruments to assist economic development go hand in hand with informal 
mechanisms already applied by the population. For instance, in many less-developed 
nations, including Nigeria, low-income households were paying fees to informal 
deposit collectors for guarding their savings without expecting any form of interest 
on their deposits (Rutherford, 1999). This behaviour of the poor, which is in contrast 
to the traditional consideration of the low-income households as unbankable, drove 
many NGOs and development experts to initiate the Micro-finance revolution 
through Microcredit programmes (Armendariz and Morduch 2005).  
Micro-credit was coined initially to refer to institutions like the Grameen Bank 
of Muhammad Yunus. The focus here was on poverty reduction and social change. 
With this came the recognition that households can benefit from access to financial 
services more broadly defined and not just credit for small enterprises. The 
experience of micro-credit changed the general impression that the poor households 
have no money, but instead, it showed that when provided with the right access and 
product, they represent good business. Today, Micro-Finance, in its three primary 
forms, appears in many institutions such as NGOs, cooperatives, credit union, 
specialized microfinance banks, commercial insurance, etc. (Hintz, 2009).  
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The three primary forms of microfinance are all channelled towards the 
reduction of poverty and provision of financial services to the un- and underserved, 
but their suitability to the different risks and challenges that the poor face, differs. 
Churchil (2006) identified savings and credit as a more flexible technique suitable 
for various risks (and opportunities). On the other hand, for significant losses that 
poor households cannot cover on their own, he saw micro-insurance as a more 
efficient means of accessing protection than if households try to protect themselves 
independently by use of informal instruments.  
Before the thesis turns to analyse the formal institution of micro-insurance, a 
review of the theory of insurance helps to develop the criteria against which to 
analyse micro-insurance. 
2.2 The theoretical framework of insurance. 
The idea of micro-insurance as a suitable instrument for managing risk is based 
on the assumption that it provides better options in the absence of a functional 
financial institution for poor households, especially in the less-developed nations. 
Micro-insurance tries to play the major role of risk transfer, which insurance does 
for the clients, who in turn pay a premium as the cost of protection against specific 
uncertainty (Haiss and Sümegi, 2006). This role of micro-insurance is following the 
understanding that it presents a better solution to risk management than the informal 
mechanisms used by these households. Since micro insurance’s design follows that 
of formal insurance, it would be essential to point out the economic reasons why 
people may choose to buy insurance when faced with different forms of risk. 
Generally, the study of insurance demand uses expected utility theory to explain 
households’ decision of whether or not to purchase insurance, because it highlight’s 
the household’s risk aversion and desire for income certainty (shoemaker, 1982). 
Other theories can also be used to analyse insurance demand and understand low-
income households’ insurance enrollment decision-making concept. Among the 
theories and concepts used by scholars to analyze household’s decisions towards 
insurance are consumer theory, state-dependent utility, status quo bias, endowment 
effect, regret and disappointment paradigm, prospect theory and theories related to 
trust and social capital (Schneider, 2004; Nyman, 1999; Manning and Marquis, 
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1996; Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Kahnemann et al. 1991; Salkfeld et al. 2000; 
Begg et al, 2000). This chapter will briefly look at some of them. 
Consumer theory assumes that households, given their preference and budget 
constraints, if perfectly informed seek to maximize their utility. Hence, consumption 
options and changes in prices and income influence how much of different goods 
rational consumer will buy (Begg et al. 2000). In reality, though, we cannot measure 
the preference of households. Hence we ignore chances of mistake and instead infer 
that the decision they make gives them the most satisfaction or utility given their 
budget constraints. In line with this theory, we expect that households will choose 
insurance instead of the uncertainty of being uninsured or other substitutes to 
insurance, such as informal risk mechanisms. That is, a price increase of a substitute 
for insurance more than that of insurance, or a decrease in the price of insurance 
premium is expected to raise the insurance demand as it presents a better utility 
option to households. For instance, Phelps (1973) in his investigation on the 
determinants of health insurance demand on families in the US, finds a positive 
relationship between insurance demand and user fee level –with high fee resulting 
in lower demand and a higher level of illness. His results show a consistency with 
consumer theory that insurance is a common good.  
However, this theory does not portray all the characters of insurance, which 
involves a factor of uncertainty about the unknown future. The approach also 
assumes that people are rational in their decision-making and adequately informed 
of the options available to them. However, this is not always the case, especially 
among poor households because of obvious reasons. Sequel to this, other theories 
on decision making under uncertainties are generally used to describe insurance 
demand instead of utility alone (Cameron et al. 1988). 
Due to the limitations of consumer theory in explaining why households insure 
or remain uninsured, decision-making theories such as expected utility theory 
advanced by Von Neumann-Morgenstern is used to analyze the reason why people 
may choose to insure or stay uninsured. This theory assumes that people are risk-
averse and make a choice between taking a risk that has different utility implication 
on their wealth. Risk aversion makes people seek for the reduction or elimination of 
the uncertainties of the future. Hence, it determines the extent to which they are 
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willing to pay a premium that exceeds the sum of actuarially equivalent or self-
insurance outlays. (Mossin, 1968; Brown and Churchil, 1999).  Therefore, the 
household that chooses to enrol in insurance prefers to incur a little loss in the form 
of insurance premium in other to reduce the uncertainty of a more significant loss in 
future (Manning and Marquis, 1996) and thereby level out their income over the two 
different states – significant loss or no loss. In the same way, a risk-averse poor 
household is expected to prefer the loss of small premium to the loss of entire wealth 
through drought or fire.  
However, psychologists argue that expected utility theory does not correctly 
account for all the factors that may influence the choice of people to demand 
insurance. Additional considerations need to be included, such as the societal context 
about prudent behaviour, the prospect of gains or losses (Shoemaker 1982). For 
instance, people buy insurance not only because of risk aversion motive but also 
because of the possibility of extra income (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). The poor 
who cannot usually afford the cost of health care would be motivated to buy 
insurance and enjoy utility level above their income level. Or in a situation where 
having insurance would secure them loans from lending institutions, the poor would 
buy insurance, not because of the certainty it offers but the possibility of extra 
income from the loan. 
On the other hand, the wealthy household may choose not to enrol in health 
insurance because the magnitude of the expected pay-off is not good enough for 
them. Instead, the wealthy might prefer to pay user fees or opt for private insurance 
where they will get expensive care (Nyman 1999). Manning and Marquis (1996) in 
their estimation of insurance demand shows that enrollment into insurance is not 
only affected by the risk aversion behaviour, level of income or premium, but also 
by the expected pay-off households will receive when sick. (Manning and 
Marquis,1996). Similarly, Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), in their prospect theory, 
state that When people enrol in micro-insurance, they are more concerned about the 
prospect of gains or loss and not the level of uncertainty. Hence, people insure from 
a gain perspective, not from the standpoint that insurance reduces uncertainty. They 
may decide not to insure if they consider the risk involved less costly than the 
insurance premium. 
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Another strand of insurance theory is the state-dependent utility theory, which 
suggests that the state of the household also affects the choice to insure or not to 
insure. For example, even though people may have different preferences and degrees 
of risk aversion, the state of their environments such as their unique culture, or the 
state at which they decide on insurance will mainly determine their choice of action 
(Douglas and Wildavski, 1982). For instance, Wasaw and Hill (1986) in their 
investigation on the effect of the Islamic religion on demand for insurance, find that 
religious belief prevents them from insurance enrollment more than the individual’s 
risk aversive tendency. A nursing mother will usually enrol her new child into 
comprehensive health coverage if her family have a history with a preexisting health 
condition. Another good example is the insurance people take when they are 
boarding flight or as a condition for getting a specific service (Einser and Strotz, 
1961).  
On the other hand, Slkfeld et al. (2000) suggested that people prefer the status 
quo instead of the unknown, especially when the status quo is manageable. With the 
status quo being the inefficient informal mechanism, the poor, illiterate household 
may be afraid to enrol for insurance because of the complicated and unknown nature 
of the new package.  In these conditions, regardless of the individual’s degree of 
aversion to risk, it is expected that the preference will depend on other subjective 
factors. So strictly speaking, expected utility causes individual’s choice only when 
there is control for the state of nature because what appears to be a constant utility 
may not have the same value to individuals in all states of nature. 
Despite the seeming disagreement regarding the motive for insurance, the 
different strands of reasons all agree on the fact that households enrol in insurance 
when their preference or utility is in agreement with benefit maximization. The 
implication for the low-income household is that micro-insurance when properly 
designed and targeted, will lead to the alleviation of their plight and ensure economic 
growth.  
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2.3 The meaning of micro-insurance. 
The growth and success of microfinance as a means of providing savings and 
credit to low-income households brought with it another idea of tapping into the 
already existing scheme to provide insurance coverages to the poor (Churchill 2002; 
Armendariz and Morduch 2005). How do you offer, given the lack of functional 
financial institutions, risk coverage to the low-income households excluded from 
formal financial services? How do you make sure that these risks do not consume 
the small credit they receive? Micro-insurance appears in a way, as an 
unconventional response to such concerns.  Many development experts saw it as an 
opportunity to integrate insurance services into micro-savings and lending, 
especially for the un- and underserved poor, in a way that will ensure a reduction in 
transaction costs and alleviation of information asymmetries. For instance, to protect 
their loaned capital, provide coverage for clients’ risks, and ensure stability in the 
consumption level of their clients, Grameen bank introduced the concept of 
insurance for their low-income clients. Through this scheme, and with the use of the 
already built database of the clients, they were able to assist the clients with 
smoothing of their consumption as well as creating a backup plan in case of clients’ 
death or other reasons that may prevent their clients from meeting up with a 
repayment of the loan. Also, it came as a better-organized substitute to the already 
existing forms of informal risk mechanism in some of the less-developed regions 
such as Africa. Berg (2011) linked its origin in Africa to informal risk-pooling 
groups such as friendly societies and funeral associations.  
Nevertheless, the concept of micro-insurance is not a new phenomenon. In 
developed countries like Germany and UK, the absence of adequate risk mechanism 
especially for the working low-income groups led to mutual pools, friendly societies, 
and co-operative insurance schemes (Dror and Armstrong, 2006). For instance, 
Plater (1997) reports that in the 18th to the 19th century, civil societies and co-
operatives in Uk provided risks coverage such as life insurance for the working class 
who do not have conventional insurance. In such cases, local knowledge and scale 
economies in the processing of risk information further helped to reduce the cost of 
the coverage, lower the premium and control problems such as adverse selection and 
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moral hazard. This movement led to the amalgamation of some of these small groups 
with larger insurers in the 20th century.  
The different functions of micro-insurance to low-income people means that 
many people see the concept differently. For the development experts, it is a possible 
means of assisting poverty reduction by taking away one incarnation of the poverty 
trap – risk. On the other hand, commercial insurers see it as a way of reaching a 
sizeable under-served market. Donors see it as a market based- solution to 
development problems, which can be used to fill the gap in both the corporate and 
government services, especially to the un- and underserved poor. Regardless of how 
these entities view the concept, they all seem to agree that it represents a suitable 
tool for the low- income household deprived of formal institutional services. In 
essence, it has the same purpose as traditional insurance, which is to allow customers 
to transfer their risks and purchase with premium, the security they need to live their 
lives or grow their businesses.  Hence, the international association of Insurance 
supervision (IAIS) described it as a form of insurance that is designed by different 
entities for the low-income people but runs by general insurance practices (IAIS, 
2012).  
The focus on low-income households distinguishes micro-insurance from 
conventional insurance because it is still run in accordance with all basic principles 
of conventional insurance. Churchill’s (2006) description of micro-insurance 
highlight’s the similarity of the concept to conventional insurance save for the target 
market. He saw it as the protection of low-income people against specific risks in 
exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of 
the risk involved. In other words, it is an attempt to provide for the low-income 
households a suitable alternative to insurance, which is potentially one of the major 
institutions that can provide a defence against social and financial exclusion for 
people whose coping strategies are failing.  The necessity of this alternative is due 
to the absence of the three necessary conditions for the creation of an insurance 
market such as solvent demand, relevant supply and stable governance that will 
ensure that contracts are enforceable. 
But how can one develop a kind of quasi-insurance that will effectively perform 
the functions of insurance under all basic principles of conventional insurance given 
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the non-functional institutions, low-income and higher probabilities of risks in most 
of the target market?  
2.4 The two faces of micro-insurance. 
There are different meaning to the concept of micro-insurance to different 
people. While the commercial see it as a way of reaching large under-served 
markets, development economics see it as a potential means of assisting poverty 
reduction by taking away one incarnation of the poverty trap. Churchill (2006) 
characterized it as a two-faced Greed Goddess of Janus because of its twofold 
function as economic development and a social protection instrument.  
Churchill (2006) employed Prahalad’s twelve principles of innovation for 
‘bottom of the pyramid’ strategy to show how micro-insurance can serve as a 
platform for extending insurance coverage to the un- and underserved. Using the 
bottom of the pyramid strategy, Prahalad (2004) proposed that the low-income 
market represents a significant untapped opportunity for value creation. He 
identified twelve common principles that can be used to facilitate the production of 
goods and services tailored to the need of the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ low-income 
people, which he identified as comprising two-thirds of world’s population. He 
argued for a mindset change from seeing the low-income households as in need of 
help and hand-outs to seeing them as resourceful potential consumers with 
tremendous opportunities available to them.  
The twelve principles include: 
 Focus on quantum leaps in price-performance 
 A hybrid solution, blending old and new technology 
 Scalable and transportable operations across countries, cultures and 
languages 
 Reduced resource intensity through eco-friendly products 
 Radical product redesign from the beginning as marginal changes to existing 
western products will not work 
 Creation of logistic and manufacturing infrastructure 
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 Deskill services work 
 Educate semiliterate customers in product usage 
 Products must be able to work in difficult environments, including noise, dust, 
unsanitary conditions, abuse, electricity blackouts, and water pollution 
 Adaptable user interface to heterogeneous consumer bases 
 Distribution methods designed to reach both highly dispersed rural markets 
and highly dense urban markets 
 Focus on broad architecture, enabling quick and easy incorporation of new 
features 
Borrowing from the twelve principles, Churchill (2006) saw it as a framework 
for the more active involvement of the commercial insurers in transforming the 
bottom of the pyramid as a viable market. It potentially can help to change the long-
held beliefs, assumptions, and ideologies about low-income household’s behaviour 
towards insurance and provide clues on less-developed products and services for 
them (Churchill, 2006).  
Prahalads’s (2005) bottom of the Pyramid strategy offers a limited frame for 
understanding the variety of micro-insurance practice beyond market-based 
relationships. It does not cover other types of micro-insurance that are not purely 
commercial, such as those implemented under government subsidy or donors’ 
sponsorship. These are the types of micro-insurance that development experts view 
as an instrument to fill the gap that the generally weak and cash-strapped social 
protection system cannot fill (Schuck, 2005; Churchill, 2006; McCord et al. 2006; 
Heydel et al. 2009). However, with the partnership of different entities, low-income 
households can be convinced to pay small premiums for these forms of micro-
insurance as an alternative to the missing social protections.  
By definition, social protection involves a variety of government policies and 
programs, which help to reduce poverty and vulnerability by diminishing people’s 
exposure to what can be doubtlessly termed socially unacceptable risks, while 
enhancing their capacity to protect themselves (Churchill and Matul, 2012; Norton 
et al:, 2000; Moser, 2001). According to Hintz (2009), social protection means the 
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protection of those who fall temporarily or persistently under a level of livelihood 
that can doubtlessly be deemed acceptable. However, government in most of the 
less-developed nations, especially in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) and South Asia, 
where the coverage of statutory social protection is between 5 and 10 percent of the 
working population, continuously find it difficult to provide its members with social 
security such as (Moser 1998:365; Gacia and Gruat, 2003; Churchill 2006; Hintz, 
2009): 
 Unemployment and disability benefits 
 Universal healthcare 
 Maternity benefits 
 Old-age pensions 
 Protection for children and the disabled 
 Workfare programs 
 Social funds 
 Public microfinance programs 
 Emergency aid 
Since the 1970s, the social protection policies of several countries in sub-Sahara 
Africa have focused on emergency food aid, famine relief, and humanitarian 
assistance. Nevertheless, in countries like Zambia, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria, 
Barrientos & Hulme (2008) identified a continuous shift from emergency aid focus 
into more permanent social protection programs such as the spread of aid-financed 
pilot cash transfer schemes targeted at the poor and the most vulnerable. Despite this 
registered government efforts, there is still a global shortfall in social protection, as 
more than half of the world’s population have no access to the social security system 
(Barrientos and Hulme, 2008). 
2.5 Micro-insurance and traditional insurance. 
Micro-insurance is similar to traditional insurance for middle and high-income 
communities. Their similarity comes from their aim of allowing consumers to 
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transfer their risks and purchase the security they need to live their lives or grow 
their businesses (Swiss Re, 2010).  The two also draws on the same generally 
accepted practices of insurance such as actuarial pricing, reinsurance, and claim 
handling. However, the classification of low-income insurance as micro-insurance 
according to Churchill (2010) does not refer to the size of the risk carrier nor the 
scope of the risk as perceived by the clients, rather, as illustrated in the following 
key characteristics, ( See also below table) there are fundamental structural 
difference between the two. Among the many ways, the two differ, according to 
Churchill (2010) are in the size of premiums, coverage limits, product features, 
distribution, policy administration, and target customers. 
Table#2.1: Traditional and Micro-insurance. 
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and conditional benefits, micro-insurance should ensure simplicity in terms of 
product design, underwriting conditions, premium collection, policy language and 
claim handling (Swiss Re, 2010; Churchill, 2010). 
2.6 Demand and supply of micro-insurance 
As earlier stated, the potential revenue generation of around up to US$40 billion 
from the industry according to Swiss Re (2010) has quintupled the number of the 
insurance company that supplies micro-insurance from 7 to companies over the last 
ten years. This shows the constantly growing demand in the market and companies’ 
change in investment attitude towards micro-insurance. However, this initial foray 
by insurance companies into the market have focused on downscaling existing 
formal insurance products instead of products that reflect the needs of the customers. 
This lack of adequate market research has resulted in a massive gap between the 
current figure of around 135 million or 5 percent of low-income people in less-
developed countries using micro-insurance products and the potential clients 
estimated by Lloyd’s of London (2009) to be around 1.5 to 3 billion. So, while there 
is a very persuasive argument for the developmental and commercial perspective of 
micro-insurance, the difference, according to Churchill (2010) between the current 
and prospective client figure calls for critical questions: 
 Do low-income people want insurance coverage, and if so, what type of 
products are the most important to them?  
 Is it appropriate to try to persuade insurance sceptics that premium payments 
are an appropriate use for their finite resources?  
 For which segments of the market might insurance be an effective means for 
managing risks, and for which risks? 
Churchil (2006) summed up the micro-insurance demand research thus: 
“Research (on micro-insurance demand) can be carried out at three levels, 
each dealing with a particular aspect of market demand: understanding 
client needs, including their current risk-management behaviour, product-
specific research and an analysis of the overall potential market” 
(Churchil, 2006, p29). 
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The above questions or levels of research will go a long way in helping to 
understand the potential clients’ needs, options, and resources for coping with risks 
and an ability to respond to these needs with products.  When Faced with shock, 
poor people are forced to rely on a range of options, in the absence of precautionary 
or ex-ante risk management instruments like financial, physical, social, and human 
assets. Churchill (2010) identified these options as including accessible savings, 
emergency loans, and micro-insurance and linked the demand of micro-insurance as 
an effect of the suitability or unsuitability of the alternatives to the many shocks that 
the poor face when considered from a range of social or economic factors:  
“There are three categories of risk-managing financial products: liquid 
savings accounts from which clients can draw down to reduce the effects of 
economic stress; emergency loans; and micro-insurance, which might 
include coverage for death, illness, disability, theft and possibly drought or 
disasters. To explore the circumstances under which low-income persons 
or households might prefer one to the others, it is necessary to consider a 
range of social and economic issues including: Alternative coping 
strategies; Type of risk; Planning propensity; Poverty level; Cash flow; 
Social conditions; and Education, biases and risk tolerance” (Churchill, 
2010, p1-2). 
Churchill argues that micro-insurance providers must analyze these options 
available to the poor people to identify the type of risks micro-insurance is most 
suitable for; to effect improved profitability through reduced loan losses and replace 
the need to draw down savings. Also, discussed ten specific reasons why the demand 
of micro-insurance is difficult to measure and saw the review of these risk 
management strategies as a means of understanding the necessary attributes for the 
design and delivery of micro-insurance products. (Churchill, 2002; 2006) 
On the importance of insurance comprehension and how trust can positively or 
negatively affect the perception of the customers, McCord and Roth (2006) saw the 
diminishing attraction of micro-insurance as a reflection of the lack of understanding 
and the intangible nature of micro-insurance products. He submitted that while the 
poor are aware of their risks and know what they want to mitigate, the ignorance and 
unawareness of micro-insurance benefits generates mistrust amongst the population 
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and produces an aversion to its uptake. In the same thinking, McCord et al., (2013)   
identified unawareness about micro-insurance as the single hindrance of micro-
insurance in a majority of the countries and maintained that spread of awareness and 
familiarization of the concept of insurance would increase its penetration. One can, 
therefore, conclude that many low-income people are insurable in that they have 
assets and livelihoods to protect, and sufficient incomes to pay premiums. However, 
most do not have insurance, as they are unfamiliar with the concept of insurance as 
a risk management tool. Designing matching products to their needs and educating 
them on its potential benefit is the demand-related challenge facing the insurance 
providers.  
It is clear from the above demand perspective that there is a huge demand for 
micro-insurance by the poor. In addition to the call for insurance products that match 
people’s desire, there is also the need to look at the channel that is used to deliver 
these micro-insurance products. McCord and Roth (2006) identified seven 
characteristics of a right channel as including those that: 
 Service regular transaction with low-income people 
 Offer convenience and excellent customer service 
 Enjoy the trust of their clients 
 Have a large volume of customers that are potential policyholders 
 Be trustworthy to the insurer 
 Have a secure and efficient system to collect and deliver premiums 
 Provide transparent information on the cost of insurance services, coverage, 
and other performance ratios 
Recent events in the delivery of micro-insurance have exposed the shortfalls of 
both the commercial, public, and non-government insurers in matching the demand 
of micro-insurance products with the proper delivery channel. The nature of the 
potential clients for micro-insurance products entails socio-economic insurance 
characteristics and geographic locations that are generally different from the 
traditional insurance market. Public institutions and commercial companies usually 
face severe problems in reaching and serving the target group because of these 
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differences. On the other hand, non- governmental organizations (NGOs) and self-
help groups lack the know-how and the business contacts needed for stable and 
reliable micro insurance arrangement (Loewe, 2006).  Brau et al. (2011) captured 
some of the dilemma faced by commercial insurers in the delivery of micro-
insurance: 
”Insurers, while covering the actuarially fair premium, must be able to 
charge a loading cost that will cover all the costs. Marketing and 
distribution expenses (including premium collection), loss administration 
costs, general overhead, building technical reserves, and profit. All of this 
while making sure that the loading charge does not make the insurance 
policy unattractive or outrightly unfair to the policyholder. This is no easy 
feat given the size of the policies. Micro-insurance needs to be able to 
provide policies that they can sell in high volume and at low loading to be 
successful. Few of the micro-insurance programs directed at the poorest 
are sufficiently profitable on a standalone basis. Many are linked to other 
financial services (e.g. credit like linked to micro-insurance institutions)” 
(Brau et al. 2011, p29). 
Most commercial insurers that moved early into the industry did not carry out 
the needed research on the nature of the market. Instead, they just downsized the 
regular insurance to this low-income environment only to find out that it is far more 
effective to design specific products based on a deep understanding of the 
peculiarities of the market ( Biener & Eling, 2011). Many authors and scholars have 
tried to research the problems militating against the smooth penetration of the 
market, especially in the less-developed market. Biener &Eling (2011) identified the 
following as the impediments to micro-insurance: information asymmetry, size of 
insurance premium, public policy, and randomness of loss occurrence, loss 
exposure, legal restrictions, maximum possible loss, and cover limit. They 
concluded that finding a solution to these problems could be of enormous benefit in 
designing a sustainable business model for economic development and poverty 
alleviation. Churchill, in his article ‘insuring the low-income market: challenges and 
solutions for commercial insurers’ captured the difficulty faced by commercial 
insurers thus:  
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“Products generally available from insurers are not designed to meet the 
specific characteristics of the low-income market, particularly the 
irregular cash flows of households with breadwinners in the informal 
economy. Other key product design challenge includes inappropriate 
insured amounts, complex exclusions and indecipherable legal policy 
language” (Churchill, 2007, p405). 
                 He called for a different approach to product design and delivery that 
will reflect the characteristics and geographical locations of the target market. Loewe 
(2006) saw a partnership between commercial insurers, government and non-
government organizations (NGOs) and self-help groups as the right delivery strategy 
that can be used to maximize the potentials or minimize the weakness of inherent in 
the delivery channels. While identifying the NGOs as superior in product sale and 
product service due to their closeness to the target market, he also submitted that 
they, unlike commercial providers of insurance, lack the know-how, the resources, 
and business contacts needed to stable and reliable micro-insurance delivery. The 
author also saw as complementary, the comparative strength of the two parties, and 
concludes that each should concentrate on the task that it does better than the other. 
He identified top-down, bottom-up, and linkage as the three approaches available 
for the needed partnership and singled out linkage as the most promising approach 
(Loewe 2006, citing McCord, 2001).   
 In line with the linkage approach identified by Loewe, insurers have started 
engaging with government bodies, social enterprises, public donors, NGOs and 
foundations in their attempt to design this sustainable model for micro-insurance 
delivery. Through this approach, a commercial insurer can collaborate with a local 
based NGO, foundation, or government body and hence, take advantage of the 
existing networks and memberships of the local organization. On the other hand, the 
local organization or group could function as an extension of a commercial insurer 
at the community level that provides financial support (Loewe, 2006).  
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2.7 Micro-insurance supply chain 
The micro-insurance supply chain is an essential process in the understanding 
of the distribution channel, for those looking to deliver insurance policies to low-
income people. A range of player and institutions are involved in the micro-
insurance supply chain (See figure#2), with channel offering different advantages. 
They include insurance regulators, risk carriers (commercial insurers, cooperative or 
mutual insurers, and community-based insurers), administrators, delivery channels, 
technology platforms, and related service providers (such as health facilities or 
funeral organizations). Due to the nature of the low pricing, operations have to most 
efficiently and cost-effectively, reach as many customers as possible. Hence, 
insurers need to find low-cost channels that can reach clients in large numbers. The 
channel also needs to be capable of selling to those with no experience of insurance 
(Chandani 2009). 
Among the innovative ways of delivering micro-insurance services to clients, 
Lloyd (2009) listed the following: 
 The partnership between commercial insurers, MFIs, and other delivery 
channels 
 Regulated insurers that serve low-income clients directly, most times with 
separate agents 
 Healthcare providers offering a package, which includes both insurance and 
healthcare services 
 Community-based organizations (CBO) that pool risks and funds of members 
 MFIs that offer insurance to their clients and act as risk carriers themselves 
 Government subsidized insurance schemes. 
Reinsurance. 
Reinsurance companies are the actor in the supply chain of insurance (e.g., 
Swiss Re, Munich Re, Interpolis Re) that plays an essential role in protecting 
institutions and clients from catastrophic and irregular losses. In the case of micro-
insurance, many of the world’s leading reinsurance companies roles include, 
providing support in product development, in particular for index-based insurance; 
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ZKLOH ,QWHUSROLV 5H LV UHLQVXULQJ KHDOWK FRYHUDJHV &KDQGDQL  :LWK WKH
H[SDQVLRQRILQVXUHUV¶XQGHUZULWLQJFDSDFLW\DQGZLWKWKHNQRZKRZDQGH[SHUWLVH
RI WKH UHLQVXUHUV LQVWLWXWLRQV KDYH WKH VHFXULW\ WR H[SORUH D EHWWHU DSSURDFK DQG
SURGXFWGHVLJQIRUWKHLUSURYLGHUVDQGSROLF\KROGHUVDGHTXDWHO\

)LJXUH7KHVXSSO\FKDLQRIPLFURLQVXUDQFHILJXUHVKRZLQJNH\SOD\HUVDQG
WKHLUSRVVLEOHUROHVLQDVXSSO\FKDLQ
6RXUFH5RWKHWDO
6RIDUWKHUROHRIUHLQVXUDQFHLVOLPLWHGWRRQO\LQVXUHUVWKDWDUHUHJXODWHGE\
LQVXUDQFHODZVDVPRVWPLFURLQVXUDQFHLVVWLOOUDWKHUEDVLF7KH\DUHUHOXFWDQWWR
UHLQVXUHPLFURLQVXUDQFHSURYLGHUVEHFDXVHRIODFNRIPDQDJHPHQWFDSDFLW\DPRQJ
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providers, limited volumes, limited understanding of the risks themselves, and a 
perception that the market is not viable. This reluctance by reinsurance bodies is 
likely to change as products become more sophisticated, and market penetration 
increases. Its contribution has been essential for the development of products 
schemes, research, analysis of data, and thoughtful insight into the target market 
(Chandani 2009). 
Insurers 
Insurers, together with the reinsurers, are the risk carriers who perform the role 
of delivery channels and administrators of insurance policies. They include 
commercial insurers, cooperatives or mutual insurers, and community-based 
insurers (including mutual health organizations, funeral societies, NGOs, and 
informal Schemes). The fundamental role of the insurers is to settle claims, carry the 
risk, and set premium prices. Joint product development with distributors is also 
common, who in several cases, initiate the collaboration. Insurers can be regulated 
or unregulated. In most cases, unregulated schemes are informal and small, 
represented by Community-based organizations (CBOs) and Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). CBOs are classified as unregulated because laws other than 
insurance-related ones regulate many of them. Also, they are not-for-profit and 
voluntary organization, formed at the local level by low-incomers who are uninsured 
and come together to contribute towards their most concerned risks. 
Examples of community-based organizations include mutual insurers, trade 
associations, funeral parlours, and local associations.  NGOs usually collaborate 
with donors and governments to provide core service to the community outside of 
their insurance practice, such as enterprise development, health service provision, or 
advocacy for a particular group or association. They partner with commercial 
insurers to offer different forms of micro-insurance packages, including life, funeral, 
and health insurance to their members (Chandani 2009). 
    

7DEOH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Regulated insurers can be either cooperative and mutual or commercial. A 
cooperative and mutual insurer can generally be defined as member-based 
organizations regulated under an insurance or cooperative law. Chandani (2009) 
listed the shared principles between the two as including limited return on equity; 
democratic control; continued affiliation of their founding members; promotion of 
health, safety, and loss prevention to reduce the cost of insurance, and policy 
influence of the insurance industry.  Also, unlike commercial insurers that are owned 
by investors, their members or customers own them. According to International 
cooperative and mutual insurance federation (2008), there are 200 cooperatives and 
mutual insurers in 72 countries and four regional association registered under their 
umbrella. Their ownership structure differentiates the two: policyholders own 
mutual insurers while members or larger second-tier cooperatives may own 
cooperatives. In some jurisdictions, they may differ in how they are regulated.  
A commercial insurer is a profit-making legal insurer regulated under a 
cooperative act or insurance law. They are traditionally focusing on middle and high-
end markets, but are recognizing the potential opportunities among low-income 
consumers. According to Roth et al. (2007), commercial insurers cover at least 38 
million people in the 100 most impoverished countries of the world. Most of the 
product or services they supply are those that are less risky, easier to manage, and 
more likely to generate profit.  With the introduction of different intermediary 
delivery channels, (such as a partnership with micro-finance institutions (MFIs), 
trade unions, retail stores, NGOs, and cell phone networks), they have enhanced 
their efficiency in serving the low-income market with different forms of micro-
insurance product.  
Delivery channels 
The delivery channel is perhaps the main key factor for the success of micro-
insurance. It is used to bring products to clients for whom micro-insurance may be 
fundamentally new. Due to the nature of low pricing in micro-insurance, operations 
have to reach as many customers as possible in the most efficient and cost-efficient 
way. Hence, keeping in mind the geographical areas often involved, institutional 
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channels such as NGOs, MFIs, churches, retailers and department stores, post 
offices, employers are used to reach a substantial number of clients at a reduced cost. 
Sometimes institutions that act as delivery channels take on the role of the primary 
insurer – an example being some MFIs which offer life insurance and keep the risk 
on their books. Countries such as the Philippians and Indians demonstrates the 
important distribution role played by MFIs. In Brazil, for example, penetration of 
micro-insurance has increased with sales channels such as utility companies and 
telecoms services. With the support of new technologies, even among low-income 
communities, mobile banking has shown to be efficient as a distribution channel, 
becoming more popular in recent years. Nevertheless, except MFIs, few delivery 
channels have an existing relationship with the poor, and their financial management 
literacy can be limited.  
Policyholders 
A policyholder can be a group or an individual. In micro-insurance, the practice 
of ‘bulk’ sales is common, so typically a policyholder would mainly be a group (i.e., 
community, village, church members) and not a person. Low-income persons with 
irregular income flow and low level of education (often self-employed or employed 
in informal enterprises) most times characterize policyholder. 
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Chapter 3 
3.  New institutional economy. 
3.1 Introduction.  
In less-developed the institution of an insurance system, there are different 
aspects according to science that needs to be critically looked at, such as property 
right, insurance market, regulations, responsibility, social attitude, and behaviours. 
Also, to be looked at is why the sector’s performance varies in different economies 
and why it has failed to penetrate the less-developed world to the intensity that we 
know from the developed world, even though there is a vast market for it in the 
former group of countries. The theoretical approach needs to be broad enough to 
include both economic and psychological aspects to successfully analyze the 
development of micro-insurance. Suitable for this purpose is institutional economics 
because of its extensive and dynamic analytic framework which combines the 
transaction cost and psychological aspects in economic analysis. It is a school of 
thought that has two distinct traditions: old and new. Even though the theory has 
been applied in a variety of context, there has not been, to the best of my knowledge, 
enough effort to implement the institutional framework to the study of micro-
insurance development. In particular, it has not given enough focus on how the issue 
of trust, religion, culture, together with other formal rules and regulations, affect the 
performance of micro-insurance – especially in less-developed countries. 
My approach in this project will be specifically focused on the new institutional 
theories as a suitable tool for the analysis of development economics, which deals 
with cases of market failures and incomplete market -often the result of a substantive 
presence of transaction cost and information problems. (Bardhan, 1989). 
3.2 Institution. 
The word ‘institution’ has several meanings depending on the context. It could 
refer to an established organization; a building in which an organization is housed; 
or a custom, practice or rule. However, in institutional economics, the word 
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‘institution’ has been assigned a specific connotation (Groenewegen et al. 2010 ). 
The most commonly agreed-upon definition for institution economics is: a set of 
formal (laws, contracts, political systems, organizations, markets, etc.) and informal 
rule of conduct (norms, traditions, customs, values systems, religions, sociological 
trends, etc) that facilitates coordination or govern relationships between individuals 
or groups on otherwise anonymous market . It also encompasses the symbol systems, 
cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the frames of meaning for 
guiding human actions. It offers more certainty in human interactions (North, 1990). 
Institutions have an influence on our behaviours and hence on outcomes such as 
social interactions, economic performance, efficiency, and economic growth and 
development. (North, 1991). To show how institutional evolution determines 
economic performance, North (1990) maintained that: 
“History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, 
but because the present and future are connected to the past by the 
continuity of a society’s institutions. Today’s and tomorrow’s choices are 
shaped by the past. And the past can only be made intelligible as a story of 
institutional evolution” (p. vii). 
The above definition of institutions suggests that they can take many forms such 
as peoples’ belief on how to treat each other, practical (trading) rules about the use 
of currencies and quality standards. It includes implicit understandings and 
contractual agreements between business partners or between employer and 
employees, to defined rules enacted by the government. Language, customs, norms, 
etiquette, legal rules, and standards, such as systems of weights and measures, are 
thus all considered to be institutions (Groenewegen et al. 2010). 
Eaton et al. (2008) categorized the operation of institutions into two levels – the 
macro and micro. The micro-level deals with the institutional arrangement or the 
governance structure. It represents a set of rules or agreements governing the 
activities of a group of people with a certain objective. Williamson (1993) saw it as 
an arrangement between units that govern how its members cooperate or compete, 
such as in contracting or market. The macro-level on the other side deals with the 
institutional environment or the rules of the game. It consists of the broader socio-
economic framework within which different arrangements take places, such as 
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market transaction or organization. It dictates the behaviour and performance of 
economic actors by setting the fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules. 
To emphasize the dependency of economic performance on the strength of the 
institutional environment, Dorward et al. (2004), made a connection between a weak 
institutional environment and poor economic performance. They pointed out that 
weak institutions causes rent-seeking behaviours, which lead to wastage of 
resources, inhibits technological development, and access to the market. What then 
follows is a tin market with high transaction cost and risks, high unit costs for 
infrastructural development, and low level of equilibrium trap. 
  
3.3 Institution and organization 
It is useful to distinguish between institutions and organizations. North’s (1990) 
differentiation of institution and organization is helpful in this respect: 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In 
consequence, they structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social, or economic. Conceptually, what must be clearly 
differentiated are the rules from the players. But the objective of the team 
within that set of rules is to win the game. Modelling the strategies and the 
skills of the team as it develops is a separate process from modelling the 
creation, evolution, and consequences of the rules.” (p. 3-5). 
The above explanation by North (1993) indicates that a fruitful interaction 
between institutions and organization is a necessary condition for economic change. 
Organizations which can be referred to as the players of the game arise through 
partially coordinated behaviours within the institutions. These organizations 
according to North (1993) can be grouped into four distinct bodies: political bodies 
(political parties, the Senate/parliament, a city council, a regulatory agency); 
economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, and cooperatives), social bodies 
(churches, clubs, athletic associations etc.), and educational bodies (schools, 
colleges, vocational training centers etc.).  
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To show the connectivity between the institutions and the organization in 
effecting economic change, North (1993) states that changes in social norms 
sometimes brings about an alteration in the perception of what represents the best 
exchange structure. This alteration is fundamentally caused by the learnings and 
experiences of the actors in the organization, who continually engage in learning to 
survive, in line with the incentive structure embodied in the institutional matrix. The 
rate of economic changes is then determined by the speed and direction of the 
changes in the institutional matrix. It reflects the ongoing ubiquitous evolving 
perception of the actors characterized by network externalities, complementarities 
and economies of scope among the organizations.   
My concern in this thesis, following in the line of North claim, is to analyze 
how institutional change and a change in the belief system which underpin the 
mental models of actors in the insurance industry are essential for the development 
of the sector.  Insurance is driven by feelings (not rationality), itself governed by 
culture – this is particularly important for health and other forms of insurance in less-
developed countries because here superstition and religious norms sometimes are 
deemed more important than complicated explanations and uncertain predictions by 
scientific school-medicine. Furthermore, it is also the intention of this thesis to 
explore the impact of formal institutions such as government regulations and 
organizations on the development of the micro-insurance sector in Nigeria.   
3.4 Neoclassical Approach 
The neo-classical theory is probably the most widely used concepts in economic 
analyses. Even though the paradigm is based on stark assumptions that are often at 
a striking variance to reality (especially in less-developed nations) in any account of 
necessary abstraction, its explanations and predictions are still frequently used as 
reference-points for analyses using more realistic bodies of assumptions. And this 
makes perfect sense because there is a trade-off between the ability to explain and 
predict in a coherent model-world and the “truthfulness” when measured against 
reality.  
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However, the traditional economic analysis, often based on neo-classical 
economic theory, is off the mark when it comes to representing how markets operate 
in less-developed countries. In abstracting from culture and psychology, those 
theories and models may be able to explain with some purposes sufficient precision 
market mechanisms in developed markets with -on average- half-decently rational 
(representative) market-agents. In any case, however, they fail to (adequately) 
explain the nature of and the role institutions play in influencing economic 
phenomena. (Harriss and Hunter,1995). In its simplest form, the theory regards 
goods as homogeneous and entirely relies exclusively on market-determined prices 
for information on deciding what to buy or sell. At the core of its axiomatic setting 
is the individual actor who makes rational decisions to maximize his subjective 
welfare, given his preference structure and external constraints on the set of available 
options. In this abstraction, it posits the existence of instrumental rationality enabling 
individuals to make a completely informed decision based on perfect information 
and resulting in Pareto optimal conditions ( where no one will be able to be better 
off without making someone worse off). 
In its pure model, there is no need for institutions since utility considerations 
drive the exchange.  In more elaborate versions, neoclassical economics recognizes 
that property rights are also transferred in exchange and money is needed as a means 
of payment, which requires the state to act as both an external guarantor of property 
right and the money supply. (Harriss and Hunter, 1995).  Menard and Shirley (2005) 
summarized the neo-classical assumption thus:  
 “The standard neoclassical paradigm viewed the economic system as 
adjusting supply to demand and production to consumption automatically, 
under the coordination of the price mechanism. Neoclassical economists 
long treated the firm as a black box, a production function that turned 
inputs into outputs, responding to changes in relative prices and available 
resources in ways that maximize profits. This system worked under certain 
simplifying assumptions such as the assumptions that information is 
perfect, individuals are rational wealth-maximizers with stable 
preferences, and exchange is instantaneous and cost less.” (p. 5). 
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North (1993) identified two fundamental assumptions of neoclassical theory as 
being ‘instrumental rationality’ and the assumption of scarcity (which necessarily 
leads to a competition). Old institutional tradition according to the works of Veblen, 
Commons, Mitchell, Ayres and their followers, rejects much of the neo-classical 
precepts on instrumental rationality. Instead, they focus on economic outcomes as a 
product of entities like large corporations operating in a complex environment of 
social, economic, and legal institutions. While the new institutional economics 
builds on, modifies and extends the assumption of scarcity that underlines 
microeconomics, it abandons the instrumental rationality, which relegates 
institutions to a secondary role in neo-classical economics. 
3.5 Institutional economic approach 
One of the implications of the above rationality assumption of neo-classical 
economics is that it relegates ideas and ideologies and isolates the economy from 
social factors and polity. Similarly, it relegates institutions to a secondary role in the 
economic analysis and analysis that leads to the formulation of government policy. 
As a consequence, neo-classical models are often viewed as operating in an 
institutional vacuum. (Katterle,1991). Challen (2000) summarized this thus: 
“The role of institutions goes well beyond that of supporting markets.  A  
vast range of decisions for resource allocation is made under institutional 
arrangements other than those provided for private decisions and market 
trading. A view of economic behaviour that fails to recognize and explain 
this diversity of institutions is incomplete” (p. 4) 
It is my intention, in line with the above-highlighted limitations of the 
neoclassical model as a suitable approach to micro-economic issues of economic 
development, to use the institutional, methodological framework for the analysis of 
micro-insurance. As indicated above, there are two main views of institutional 
economics with some common features that distinguish them from neo-classical 
economics. Both, according to Rutherford (2001), rose in reaction to the lack of 
institutional content in the core of neoclassical theory and have the common theme 
that institutions, matter a great deal because of the essential factors such as culture, 
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values, etc., it introduces into the analysis. They highlight the importance of 
knowledge about how institutions shape economic behaviours and outcomes and are 
themselves shaped by factors of many fields such as the economic and political 
spheres, ideologies, culture, etc. 
Because these factors are changing over time, this also explains why both 
traditions quite accurately acknowledge the evolutionary nature of institutions. In 
his famous critique of man as a lightning calculator of pleasure and pains, one of the 
old traditional institutional economists Veblen (1919), points attention to the 
limitations that emanate from the inert and mechanistic picture of the agent in 
neoclassical theory. He rejects the continuous, marginally adjusting agent of 
neoclassical theory, and instead, stresses the role of inertia and habit: “the situation 
of today shapes the institutions of tomorrow through a selective, coercive process, 
by acting upon men’s habitual view of things, and so altering or fortifying a point of 
view or a mental attitude handed down from the past” (Veblen, 1919, p. 144). Engle 
et al. (2007) pointed out that the human mind is not a problem-solving machine but 
relies on routines, rules, and roles when deciding what to do in a given situation. The 
issue with the insurance industry in less-developed nations is partly traced to various 
past policies and actions of the government, the insurance firms, and clients in the 
economy. It is important to understand these previous policies and activities in the 
industry, and how it has inhibited (or enhanced) the progress of the sector before any 
positive changes can be seen. 
Aside from their common theme, both have significant differences in 
methodology, in the theoretical and analytical tools being used, as well as in the 
basic orientation towards the market and business institutions. The approach of old 
institutional economics according to Langlois (1989) is often referred to as 
‘methodological holism’ while the approach of new institutional economics belong 
to the paradigm-family that is based on ‘methodological individualism’, meaning 
that the individual is at the centre of attention, not the society. While the old 
institutional economics is concerned with  unregulated markets, new institutional 
economics is concerned with the overregulation of markets., but in both cases, the 
orthodox economics is thought to be abstracting too far in its hypothetical, 
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theoretical world to be able to sufficiently explain and predict those aspects of reality 
that the theories focus upon (Rutherford, 1989). 
Another difference between new and old institutional economics is that, where 
the latter attempts to replace neo-classical economics, the formal generally identifies 
itself as an attempt to build upon, modify and extend the range of neo-classical 
thinking by explaining the institutional factors traditionally taken as given, such as 
property right and governance structures (Rutherford, 1989). It thereby reopens 
orthodox economic thinking to sociological reasoning and paves the way for an 
interesting cross-fertilization between these long-alienated disciplines (Zimbauer, 
2001). 
The preference, in this thesis, for new institutional economics over old 
institutional economics is not due to any deficiency in old institutional economics, 
but due to a degree of paradigm incommensurability. The central unit of analysis in 
old institutional economics is power while that of new institutional economics 
remains the individual and how to examine the institutions that shape interactions 
between individuals such as contracting. This places new institutional economics 
closer to neoclassical economics on the methodological spectrum. By taking 
neoclassical theorizing as a point of departure and working its way towards 
sociological, political, and cultural approaches, it offers a more structured approach 
to the analysis of insurance sector and its challenges in Nigeria.  
3.6 New institutional economics 
Williamson (1971) originated the term ‘new institutional economics’ to 
describe a movement in the 1970s which originated from the works of new 
institutionalists. (Coase, 1937; Hayek, 1937, 1945; Chandler, 1962; Simon 1947; 
Arrow, 1963; Da; Williamson 1971, 1975, 1985; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Macneil, 1978; Holmström, 1979; and others). It represents a relatively new 
multidisciplinary field that includes aspects of economics, history, sociology, 
political science, business organization, and law. 
New institutional economics fits into neo-classical theory because its 
constitutive criterion is the governance-mechanism of ‘competition,’ emanating 
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from the assumption of the scarcity of products, services, and resources. It views 
economics as a theory of choice subject to constraints (budget constraint, available 
knowledge, and technology); it uses price theory as an essential part of the analysis 
of institutions and sees changes in relative prices as a major force inducing a change 
in institutions. In addition to modifying the rationality postulate, it introduces 
institutions as a critical constraint and analyzes the role of transaction costs as a link 
between institutions and costs of production. It builds on the economic theory by 
incorporating new, additional ideas (i.e., institutions) and alternative ideas (not 
perfect rationality) into the analysis.  
There are different complementary theories that make up the new institutional 
economics, such as transaction cost theory, property right theory, and agency theory. 
These perspectives acknowledge the neo-classical individualism and assume 
maximization of utility, but they do diverge in relaxing rationality to so-called 
'bounded rationality' and add 'opportunism' in its negative connotation (shirking). 
3.6.1 Property right 
Property rights, according to Furubotn and Richter (1991), are mainly defined 
as the right to use, derive an income from, and sell an asset. Before new institutional 
economics, most economists assumed away the cost of transferring this right from 
one set of hands to another. In his attempt to show the importance of new 
institutional economics to the efficacy of the property right, North (1981) stated that 
the theory of the state and other institutions is essential because it specifies and 
dictates the efficacy of the property right, which causes growth or stagnation and 
economic growth.  
One may be curious to know the connection between the state and the property 
right. Many reasons point to the fact that the control of property right is very hard. 
A good case in point is intellectual property right:  Many pending litigations between 
parties, difficulty in measuring the negative and positive externalities, the existence 
of patent clusters, etc. are few of the examples. Also difficult is how to quantify the 
value of research and development efforts that are targeted at generating marketable 
innovations and the costs of blocking another research with a patent to an initial 
inventor (Stephan et al., 2005)
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New institutional theory is therefore concerned with the creation of an economic 
structure that ensures a balance between the dilution or concentration of the property 
right and the consequent transaction costs and externalities incurred. It predicts a 
tendency to automatically form an efficient allocation of the property right within 
certain institutional bounders (Geraldi, 2007). 
The concept of diluting or concentration of property right is an important 
instrument that can be used by institutions and organizations to affect the needed 
changes and improvement in the performance of agents in the insurance industry. It 
could be used to confer or divide rights to agents, and thereby improve the 
management and supervision of the agents in the industry. It also provides an avenue 
for the cultivation of trust in both the activities of the insurer and the clients because 
of the presence of the regulatory body with the right to punish or award benefits to 
offending or offended parties respectively. 
3.6.2 Transaction costs 
Coase (1937) in his paper on ‘the nature of the firm’ explained that the 
boundaries of organizations depend not only on the production technology but also 
on the cost of transacting business. He saw the decision to organize transactions 
within the firm as opposed to on the open market as an attempt to reduce the cost of 
the exchange. The open market mechanism entails certain transaction costs: costs of 
negotiating contracts, monitoring performance, discovering prices and getting to 
know trading partners (Obinska-Wajda, (2015) citing Parada, 2002 and OECD, 
1993). Within the firm, the entrepreneur can reduce these ‘transaction costs’ by 
internal coordination of these activities. However, even when internally coordinated, 
every mode of economic organization incurs costs. For instance, internal 
coordination of transactions comes with other forms of costs, such as the problem of 
information flow, incentives, monitoring, and performance evaluation. 
Coase observed that the internal coordination of transactions is not governed by 
price mechanism but rather, by entrepreneurial coordination, which is different from 
profit maximization through the price mechanism. In line with the internal 
coordination of transaction, which ensures conditions of a competitive market for 
factors of production, Coase asked why there are any market transactions if the 
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organization can reduce the cost (Coase, 1937).  He maintained that since 
entrepreneurs can reduce transaction costs by coordinating activities related to 
contractual commitment internally, it is worth applying the same measure on a larger 
scale. Transaction cost theory then is concerned with the study of the transactions 
costs involved in the concentration and dilution of property rights, and the optimal 
design of organizational interfaces between market and hierarchy. It includes the 
costs of running the economic system. 
According to Coase, as the firm’s internal transaction costs increases, the 
entrepreneur fails to make the best use of the factors of production and incurs 
additional transaction costs. He argued that the introduction of institutions to 
coordinate this transaction on a larger scale is the logical answer to the problem of 
transaction costs (Obinska-Wajda, 2015 citing Coase, 1937). Williamson added to 
Coase three ideas that indicate when business functions should be organized within 
the firm either by buying out the partner or by in-sourcing the function and not 
working with a market-partner: they include. (i) When transaction costs, using the 
market, are high because of information asymmetry and where internal management 
of information is cheaper; (ii) where opportunistic behaviour can become strong due 
to asymmetric information and can be prevented by internal coordination; (iii) and 
where investments (into assets) are specific to another market participant 
(Williamson, 2000). The nature of the firm, then, is determined by the relative costs 
of organizing transactions under alternative institutional arrangements through 
outsourcing and insourcing of business functions. 
In application to the insurance sector in a less-developed economy characterized 
by uncertainties, information asymmetries, and trust issues, it will prove to be pivotal 
to introduce an institutional arrangement that will decrease the transaction costs of 
insurance. It is amongst the central hypothesis of this thesis, a hypothesis that will 
be tested in the analytical section of the thesis, that a conducive institutional 
arrangement will also be able to ensure the enlargement of the risk pool through the 
inclusion of the poor at a cheaper policy premium. This, in turn, increases the welfare 
of the poor and leads to overall economic growth. 
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3.6.3 Agency theory 
The agency theory is concerned with the delegation problem that arises between 
the principal and the agent in economic exchange. It explains the relationship 
between principals and agents or buyers and supplier as it has to do with delegation 
and performance of tasks. (Obinska-Wajda, 2015 citing Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
theory begins with Berle and Mean’s (1932) identification of the ‘separation of 
ownership and control’ in the large firm. According to Geraldi (2007), the salary 
managers are the controllers of the firm because: 
  The principal (owners) has less information than the salary workers 
(agents) concerning how to accomplish the task, which leads to the hidden 
information problem. The principal cannot observe the negotiations, 
intentions, and activities of the agent – leading to an action problem. 
Agents and principal tend to have a conflict of interest, as both strive for 
this individual maximum gain. (Geraldi, 2007 citing Berle and Mean 1932). 
The manager may use his discretion to maximize his profit from this hidden 
information and action at the expense of the principal’s value. This shirking of 
responsibility by the agent is a form of behaviour that, if incentivised by the 
institutional arrangement, results in moral hazard. It includes all behaviours of the 
agent that are not in conformity with the contract or agreement entered with the 
principal. For example, when an insurance firm fails to promptly indemnify a client 
who experienced losses.  Hence, to control the actions of the agent, the principal 
incurs agent cost by employing all the needed mechanisms to reduce the moral 
hazard on the part of the agent. These mechanisms usually include outcome-oriented 
contracts, incentive programmes, and information reporting and controlling systems. 
(Geraldi, 2007).   
With the use of outcome-oriented outcome and incentive programmes, the agent 
would not want to act against the principal’s interest even when there is an 
opportunity to do so because it will not match the principal’s expected outcome. The 
agent is also disincentivised from aberrant activities with the application of 
monitoring mechanism by the principal. The application of information system 
mechanism helps to curb the adverse selection that can happen as a result of the 
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principal’s inability to verify the agent’s claim. It helps the principal to make an 
informed decision and not depend on the words of the agent who is inclined to 
maximize personal benefit even at the expense of the principal. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) classified the agency costs that ensure that the 
principal and agent relationship is mutual into three types. They include the 
principal’s costs, the agent’s costs, and the alternative costs. The principal’s costs 
involve the costs of the mechanisms employed to monitor the agent’s actions. The 
costs incurred by the agent to win the trust of the principal or ensure that the principal 
is compensated in the case of failure to deliver on the target objective is called the 
agent’s costs. The third type of costs covers the costs incurred by the principal 
because of the agent’s failure to meet the expected interest or objective (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
3.7 New institutional economics and insurance 
The below paragraph from North (2000) provides a good introduction to this 
section, which is aimed at looking at the relationship between new institutional 
economics and the performance of micro-insurance in less-developed nations: 
“The cost of transacting, to put it in its bluntest form, is the key to economic 
performance. When I go to third world countries and look at how they 
perform badly and examine how factor and product markets are really 
working, in every case, be it capital, labour or product markets, one 
observes that the cost of transacting is high. The cost of transacting results 
in the economy performing badly because it is so costly for human beings 
to interact and engage in various kinds of economic activities that the result 
is poor performance and poverty and so on. Where this takes us, of course, 
is to try to understand why the cost of transacting is so high…” (p 37).’ 
Earlier in this chapter, I established the impossibility or difficulty in using neo-
classical economics to explain situations where market failure and incomplete 
markets exist as a general rule (because of higher transaction costs and information 
asymmetries) in less-developed countries. Such occurrences could be attributed 
partly to the absence of many of the institutional or formal rules of behaviour that 
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are taken for granted in developed countries which render market exchange less risky 
and less costly.  Having explored new institutional economics and how it tries to 
tackle the above mentioned economic problems, one is inclined to apply for the 
framework in analyzing the market failures and incomplete market in the insurance 
industry of less-developed nations, in this thesis, obviously especially Nigeria. 
Therefore, the focus of this session is to emphasize the suitability of new institutional 
economic theory, using Oliver Williamson’s framework, in the analysis of the 
development of micro-insurance industry in less-developed countries such as 
Nigeria. This is because of its suitability in describing the full range of relevant 
institutions, and the relationship between them, and then to identify the subset of 
institutions upon which research in the new institutional economics has focused.   
Under the framework of new institutional economics and based on transaction 
costs, Williamson (2000), stated that an appropriate legal and political environment 
leads increases the confidence level of investors towards insurance activities and 
thereby increase the demand and supply for insurance products.  In other words, the 
performance of an economy (in this case, micro-insurance) is the result of underlying 
institutional arrangement (North 1990). He identified four interrelated levels of 
social or institutional analysis. The below figure provides an example of how 
Williamson’s framework can be applied to micro-insurance development, with 
emphasis on selected cases of policy initiatives relating to each of the four levels. 
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opposition to life insurance, as many religious people believe that a reliance on life 
insurance results from a distrust of God’s protecting care. Until the nineteenth 
century, European nations condemned and banned life insurance on religious 
grounds. He also stated that religious antagonism to life insurance remains in several 
Islamic countries.  In a similar vein, Patel (2004) noted that Muslims around the 
world are commonly faced with low-income levels, and lack of access to the social 
security system, healthcare, education, sanitation, and employment opportunities.  
Nevertheless, Yusuf (2006) corroborated the positive effect of the Islamic religion 
on the development of micro-insurance by finding causality between the success of 
an interest-free insurance scheme in the region and the religious beliefs of the people. 
Omar (2007), in his assessment of consumer’ attitude towards insurance patronage 
in Nigeria, found out that the poor performance of the industry is due to the lack of 
trust and confidence in the insurance companies.   
The second and third institutional level includes legal and political 
environments of the society. Williamson (2000) believes that a good governance 
system is expected to decrease transaction costs and develop micro-insurance 
contracts in society. Legal rules are particularly important for the insurance sector 
because of vast information asymmetries which lead to opportunistic behaviour, and 
it is expected that this industry will develop more if those insured feel protected by 
the legal system and that enforcement of the law is implemented. Moreover, the 
soundness of this legal environment depends on the control of corruption, which can 
significantly affect trust in the micro-insurance sector, due to long-term engagement.  
The role of institutions and institutional arrangements concerning the micro-
insurance market is often underestimated. For example, the mistrust that exists in 
the insurance industry, which has contributed heavily to the poor performance of the 
industry in Nigeria has been blamed on the presence of fake insurance agents and 
the inability of the regulatory bodies to effectively enforce the rules on erring 
agencies (Diaz et al., 2013). According to Williamson (2000) level 3 institution, 
there is the need for the establishment of governance entities saddled with the 
responsibility of providing solidity to the framework established by level 2 
institutions. i.e., the need to ensure that insurance reforms in Nigeria, such as MDRI 
are equally matched with bodies or organizations that will deal with the ‘play of the 
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game.’ Stephan et al (2005) pointed out the importance of strong institution such as 
competition law as a dynamic and efficient tool that supports economic 
development. While it could be inferred from the Acts establishing the MDRI that 
the body is responsible for providing the needed supervision and enforcement of the 
fines to erring actors, its neglect of this second part of their role and sole 
concentration on achieving N1 trillion premium income has resulted in little or no 
improvement in the industry. In line with the findings of Kronthaler and Stephan, 
(2007) on the importance of competition law for economic development, Azfar 
(2006) noted that perhaps even more important than is the quality of law 
enforcement such as competition policies which regulates competition laws.  In all 
likelihood, it is the enforcement of good insurance laws, rather than their mere 
existence, which encourages clients to trust others with their premiums. Both good 
laws and their reliable enforcement are needed to augment the effectiveness and 
efficiency (efficacy) of markets. In fact, law enforcement has a much more 
significant effect on the development of the micro-insurance industry than the mere 
existence of insurance laws. For instance, in an economy where law enforcement is 
strong, the level of trust among parties in a transaction is expected to be higher than 
where law enforcement is weak (Azfar, 2006).  
In his fourth level of analysis, Williamson (2000) attempts to explain indicators 
such as optimal allocation of resources and price optimization. On the same idea, it 
focuses on how the political instability and the poor quality judicial system (more 
extended legal proceedings, corruption, and injustice for insurance holders), causes 
an increase in transaction costs, investment risk and decreasing rate of incentives for 
long term investments in the micro-insurance sector. Hence this level deals with the 
day to day operation of the economy given the institutional dictates at the other three 
levels. That is, how the micro-insurance stakeholders react towards the industry 
given the nature of the rules or its applications. At this level, the analysis moves 
from the structural to the individual. That is, on the assumption of rationality, 
individuals calculate their utility and make decisions on variables such as decisions 
on demand, supply, and investment, based on the signals that the prices convey.  For 
example, the insurance agents influenced by a perceived benefit, and in an attempt 
to convince the prospects to enrol into their products, tend to promise what the 
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insurance, in the end, will not be able to do. Likewise, for individual micro insurance 
users, influenced by a potential benefit, they use their informational advantage to 
report losses that never happened, especially when they feel the company cannot 
verify the authenticity of their claim or when there is no written penalty for 
fraudulent behaviours (Yusuf T.O., 2009). Again, the transaction cost of acquiring 
and managing the micro-insurance product influences an individual’s willingness to 
participate in the industry. For example, the opportunity cost of time involved in 
going to the insurance agent, the time required to acquire information and 
communication, as well as monetary expenses may influence the poor not to 
participate in the industry.   
Yusuf T.O (2009) pointed out the difficulty of detecting and preventing fraud 
in the Nigerian insurance industry as a result of the information asymmetric and 
inadequacy of the insurance regulations to address the dimensions and dynamics of 
insurance fraud. According to him, the available guideline or regulation merely 
scratches the surface and has no impact on the issue of fraud control. This is on the 
understanding of the classical deterrence theory that legal threats are most effective 
when potential offenders perceive a high likelihood of apprehension and believe that 
the impending punishment will be certain, severe and swift. 
3.8 Conclusion 
Compared to the neo-classical economics method, a new institutional 
economics approach to micro-insurance development broadens the scope for 
analysis by integrating institutions and institutional arrangements. Relaxing some of 
the assumptions (such as unbounded rationality and information availability) while 
retaining others (such as the concept of efficiency – vis-a-vis minimizing transaction 
costs) means that a new institutional economics approach is able to deal with a broad 
range of phenomena, not limited to economic considerations but including social 
and political factors as well.  
From an epistemological viewpoint, the new institutional economics approach 
is eclectic. It draws upon knowledge from a range of schools of thought, not only in 
economics but across other related disciplines as well. This diverse nature of new 
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institutional economics links closely with its dynamism. It recognizes the non-static 
nature of many phenomena of interest, and so it is not constrained by the tools and 
methodologies of any single analytical approach. This is particularly useful for 
analyzing the complexity involved in micro-insurance development in most less-
developed countries. 
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Chapter 4 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
From the theoretical reviews of chapter 2 and 3, the assumption that the micro-
insurance sector is riddled by both institutional weaknesses and market failures 
suggests that this thesis should use for its analysis of the research question the new 
institutional economic framework. The chosen method follows similar approaches 
by the academic community (see Bharden, 1989: Cook, 1995; Dorward et al., 1998; 
Ensminger, 2000.) when searching for the causes of the poor performance of micro-
insurance in less-developed regions. To provide a case in point and to allow the 
thesis to go beyond a pure theoretical analysis by tapping into empirical fieldwork, 
assessing the reasons on a deeper level even if the strictly speaking case-specific, 
this thesis focusses on an instructive less developed country, Nigeria, which already 
started to develop some form of a micro-insurance, and still is a long way off being 
able to offer the poorer fraction of society a widely accepted, trustworthy and 
functioning insurance system against risks, such as health or agricultural-related 
insurance policies. 
 
This theoretical framework is particularly adept for this research, in as much as 
the new institutional economics (NIE) offers a holistic research approach. It provides 
a framework that embeds important theoretical approaches such as sociological 
theory, transaction cost theory, property right theory, contract theory, and principal-
agent theory (Krause, 1996). The application of these theories under the NIE in the 
study of micro-insurance performance in Nigeria creates the opportunity to look at 
the different institutional and market problems that have impeded the development 
of the insurance sector in Nigeria. As a country with over (200) million population 
and an estimated 70million prospective micro-insurance clients (Diaz et al. 2013), 
the inability to attract more than one percent of the population into any form of 
insurance coverage (NAICOM, 2017), present a practical case for the study 
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researching into the correlations between the development of micro-insurance and 
institutional structure under the generally given market failures of micro-insurance 
markets. Hence, by adopting the new institutional economic approach, the thesis 
attempts to make contributions towards the answering of the main research question:  
What determines, using the new institutional economics approach, the 
development of the micro-insurance sector in less developed countries, and what 
is its role for economic growth in such countries?  
And the subordinated explicit research questions (or tested hypothesis) are:  
(i) It is the insufficient compatibility between formal and informal 
institutions (e.g. lack of trust, etc.) that hinders the development of micro-
insurance in Nigeria below what had been widely predicted by the 
academic community”, and  
(ii) (ii) What has to be done institutionally to make this industry an active 
contributor to economic growth, that lives up to the potential this sector 
has due to its ability to satisfy clients’ values and demand? 
 
In line with the above research questions and hypothesis, this chapter provides 
detail of the research methodology adopted for the study. It explains the instruments 
used to justify the claim that institutions contribute to diverse reform experiences 
and economic performances of (micro) insurance sectors. Such instruments also help 
to emphasis the influence of informal institutional norms on developmental and 
reform policies adopted in the industry. The rest of the chapter is structured in the 
following way: section two lays out what is needed from the theoretical framework 
of the NIE for the analysis. In section three, the details to the methodology of an 
empirical fieldwork study were discussed while section four outlines the research 
methodology, sources of data, and explanation of the chosen data and technique. 
Section five looks at the strategy used to ensure validity and reliability of the study 
while section 6 briefly discussed the different hypothesis treated in chapters 5 to 8 
as well as the analytical approaches adopted for the study.  
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4.3 Mixed-research strategy 
This research employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies. While qualitative research is used to gain an understanding of underlying 
reasons, opinions, and motivations of prospective micro-insurance clients, 
quantitative analysis is used to quantify and test causality patterns in attitudes, 
opinions, and behaviours (Defranzo, 2011). In line with Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
(2004), this analysis uses the mixed research strategy by combining these techniques 
in one analysis. Each method yields its contribution to answering the research 
questions, and only the combination of both methods can provide a sufficiently 
holistic picture to be able to say something meaningful about the overarching 
research question. (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
It is only this combination of the mixed research strategy that allows for an in-
depth exploration of micro-insurance development. For instance, qualitative 
research helps in the understanding of the relevant concepts of the field work-study 
and aids the design of a suitable research instrument, in this case, the questionnaire. 
On the other hand, quantitative research is used to empirically test a set of 
hypotheses that were generated from the theoretical concept and the existing body 
of knowledge on the subject matter. It is these tests by use of the data generated in 
targeted fieldwork that can uncover the implications of observed behaviours, 
opinions, and realities as it concerns micro-insurance development.  
4.3.1 Qualitative research 
The qualitative approach of the study intends to review the concepts from which 
the hypothesis is constructed (see chapters 2 and 3) as well as demonstrate how the 
quality of institutions and market failures impact on the development of the micro-
insurance sector (see the thesis structure in figure 4.1).  In particular, the focus is on 
the review of the concepts of new institutional economics, micro-insurance, and 
economic development, which will aid the statistical study by highlighting the 
theoretical assumptions, identify the gap in the literature as it relates to this study 
and generating the research questions and hypotheses of the analysis. Also, to 
complement the discovery of the pattern or causality between institutional quality 
and development of micro-insurance, the method is used (see chapter 5) to explain 
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how government regulations over time, the behaviours of the insurance actors, and 
government officials have affected the development of the sector in Nigeria.  
4.3.2 Quantitative research 
As shown in the Structure of the thesis in figure 4.1, the main analytical weight 
of the thesis lies with chapters 6, 7 and 8. The three chapters each present an own 
empirical analysis, each adding their own value to the objectives of this thesis in 
order to establish the role of informal institutional quality on micro-insurance 
development. in chapter 6, the analysis uses OLS and probit regression to highlight 
the relationship that exists between micro-insurance enrolment and selected 
indicators of societal norms such as trust, individual responsibility and choice, risk-
aversion and religion.  Another objective covered by the same method of analysis 
was the second objective, which includes the highlighting of a specific set of formal 
institution and regulations that are indispensable for the development of micro-
insurance industry in Nigeria. That is, how the presence or absence, weakness, or 
strongness of these institutions such as those concerned with contractual relations 
affects the performance of the micro-insurance sector in Nigeria. In other words, 
does the weak institutions lead to a lemon/adverse selection of both clients and 
insurers in the micro-insurance sector?  
With the use of the generalized method of moments (GMM) and the fixed effect, 
this thesis (see chapter 7) also looks at the effect of institutional quality and micro-
insurance development on the size of informal economy in Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA). That is, how the institutional quality and micro-insurance development 
attract the unregistered individuals as well as the financially un- and under-served 
into the formal institutions and thereby reduce the size of informal economy. For 
instance, would micro-insurance development provoke the participation of the 
unbanked poor farmers in the formal financial institutions? Would it lead to the full 
registration and more active involvement of the unregistered roadside businesses? 
Finally, this analysis uses a log-linear equation to investigate the impact of the 
development of micro-insurance on economic growth (see chapter 8). Vector error 
correction method (VECM) is used to predict the short and long term relationship 
between the indicators of micro-insurance and the economic growth in Nigeria.  
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Figure#4.1: Thesis structure 
Source: Author. 
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Different data are used to study different propositions formed according to the 
above objectives. To study proposition 1 - The effect of Societal Norms on the 
likelihood of individuals to enrol in various forms of Micro-insurance products.  
Data from a structured questionnaire designed and administered to the purposely 
selected respondents from different parts of Nigeria are used to see if there is a 
relationship between the probability of enrolment in Micro-insurance services and 
the social norms’ indicators. By combining relevant survey questions, four selected 
indicators of social norms and values are created in accordance with the literature. 
The task is to help determine the impact of norms and values on micro-insurance 
enrolment in Nigeria. Also, as control variables, formal institutional indicators, as 
well as personal characteristics, are incorporated into the study. 
To study proposition 2 – The Role of Institutional quality on the relationship 
between micro-insurance development and the size of the informal economy in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  In line with a similar study by Njangang (2018), panel data 
comprising 34 countries of Sub Saharan African are extracted from Medina and 
Schneider (2017) and world bank database to carry out a study on the relationship 
between the development of the micro-insurance sector and the size of the informal 
economy in the insurance market, and how this relationship changes when the 
quality of institution is controlled for.  
To study proposition 3 – How does Micro-insurance impact the economic 
growth of Nigeria?  Data from Nigerian Insurance commission, Micro-insurance 
Network, Central bank of Nigeria (CBN) and World Bank are used to carry out this 
study. This study summarizes the thesis and emphasizes the importance of less-
developed the micro-insurance industry in Nigeria. Because the analysis is based on 
a sound theoretical concept, the results, even if some of them are based on data on 
Nigeria and hence pertain to Nigeria only, can be interpreted to a more general 
application, that is to other less developed nations. 
4.4 The research method 
There are two broad categories of data: primary and secondary. The former is 
collected through the method of surveys, meetings, focus group discussions, 
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interviews that involve direct contact with the respondents. By contrast, the latter is 
pre-existing and published data that have been collected by other researchers, 
governments, or other organizations. This thesis makes use of both categories. An 
own-administered survey in Nigeria, as well as compiled data and documents 
relevant to the subjects of this study, are used.  
4.4.1 Data collection 
In addition to the self-administered survey, there are different sets of the 
secondary database used for the quantitative part of the study. They include World 
Governance Indicators Index, Economic freedom index Nigerian insurance 
commission (NAICOM), World Bank database, the Central bank of Nigeria (CBN), 
Micro-insurance Network and informal economy data by Medina and Schneider 
(2017).  
 
Figure#4.2 Map of Nigeria. 
Source: Nigerian finder. 
4.4.2 The sampling framework 
The study population is the inhabitants of the biggest black nation – Nigeria. 
So, the sample survey was conducted in the Urban and outskirts cities of Lagos, 
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Abuja, and Onitsha. The main reason for the selection of these cities was their perfect 
fit as a representation of the three major tribes, cultural and economic realities of 
Nigeria. Each of the cities represents a metropolitan city in which all classes of 
people and age, ethnic group, economic activities, and religious affiliations are well 
represented. Furthermore, there is little research done on micro-insurance, and the 
areas guarantee higher access to both sets of people who have or do not have any 
form of insurance coverages. In Lagos, for instance, there is an abundance of those 
who work in civil service, banks, and private enterprises as well as those who engage 
in agricultural or other roadside informal business activities. At the centre of Abuja 
is the seat of power in Nigeria, and there dwell the politicians, civil servants, and 
business captains. However, at the outskirt of the city dwells many herdsmen, 
farmers, and street hawkers who barely make enough for themselves and their 
families. Onitsha represents the commercial hub of the country. There dwell many 
traders. Majority of whom are operating in the informal economy. Aside from Lagos, 
it is the city with the highest number of bank and insurance firm branches in Nigeria. 
4.4.3  Sample size and sampling technique 
A sample is a small group of respondents extracted from the focus population 
of the researcher. The use of sample instead of the entire population in the conduct 
of research, according to Baradyana and Ame (2007), is to ensure efficient utilization 
of the budget and time. The sample size for the study was 230 respondents. A 
proportionate stratified sampling method was applied in selecting the sample size 
because it reduces the sampling error and provides greater or better precision 
(Sapsford and Jupp, 1996). Where appropriate, purposive or non-probability 
sampling was applied in identifying respondents to match the present demographical 
and economic characteristics of Nigeria. By controlling for people from all works of 
life, economic, and social class, this thesis intends that it will represent effectively, 
the behaviour pattern of the entire population of Nigeria towards micro-insurance.  
For instance, while the individual respondents were randomly selected, the 
respondents were predetermined following 2018 Nigerian demographical report by 
CIA, in line with the major tribes (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba), age distribution that 
falls within the active participants in insurance sector (25 and above), and religious 
affiliations of Nigerian society. (CIA, 2018). 
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of data collection and analysis employed for this study could produce reliable results. 
These elements include structured questionnaire, methodical collection of primary 
and secondary data from reputable sources and structured approach to presentation 
and analysis through tabulation of both quantitative and qualitative data each of 
which enhances reliability and rigour within the study. In the selection of particular 
or multiple research instruments for each of the research hypothesis raised in this 
study, the singular focus, based on available data, was on the accurate 
operationalization of the construct of interest. That is, on the kind of instrument that 
best helps in the study and analysis of the hypothesis reliably and validly.  
For instance, the questions contained in the questionnaire were designed in line 
with the academic literature and other publications concerning the research topics. 
Care was also taken to code responses to the questionnaire in a way that can ease the 
collection of specific and measurable responses.  Also, the selection of respondents 
was made in line with the social, cultural, and economic realities of the target 
population while confidentiality and separate administration of the questionnaire 
were used to ensure that no form of bias is contained in the study.  In the selection 
of secondary data, multiple sources were used. Among the sources is the micro-
insurance network, from which the micro-insurance coverage ratio for sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) was extracted. Others sources of data employed for this study includes 
the Nigerian insurance commission (NAICOM) database, World Bank, Heritage 
economic freedom index, etc.  
Another important characteristic of good research is validity. That is the extent 
to which the findings of a study can be generalized to other settings. According to 
Yin (2009), care should be taken to make sure that the research instrument, such as 
the questionnaire, is adequately designed to measure the intended constructs (Yin, 
2009). To meet the test of validity, The definition of the main concepts formed the 
first part of the literature review. The questions contained in the questionnaire were 
not only grounded in the literature but were also checked by my doctoral father to 
enhance its validity and suitability for the intentions of the study. Feedback from a 
series of meetings with doctoral father and peers were incorporated, and a 
preliminary test was performed on ten percent of the total sample size before the 
actual research. 
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4.5.1 Pre-testing of the instruments 
For validity purpose, a sample of the set of survey questionnaires and selected 
data was initially submitted for approval. A pre-test was conducted using the 
designed questionnaire and selected data after which necessary changes and 
additions were effected to improve the content and quality of the questionnaire and 
data, respectively.  These changes included the removal or addition of some 
variables or indicators from the collected data; and removal, reconstructing or 
addition of some questions on the questionnaire.  
4.6 Analytical approaches 
For proposition 1- The effect of Societal norms to the likelihood of individuals 
to enrol into different forms of Micro-insurance products, Logit regression is used 
to research the cross-sectional data from the structured questionnaire designed by 
the author. This is in line with Wooldridge (2013) position that Logit regression is 
used when the dependent variable is a dummy, with quantitative independent 
variables.  Hence, the model used for the study of proposition 1 is given below: 
Yi=β0+β1X1i+β2X2i+β3X3i+ β4X4i +μi 
Where: 
Yi = 1, if the respondents have any  micro-insurance and 0 if otherwise  
X1i= Religious beliefs 
X2i= Trust 
X3i= Risk aversion of the people 
X4i= Individual responsibility and choice 
X5i= Control variables 
μi= Error term 
To study proposition 2 - The Role of Institutions in the Micro-Insurance-Size of 
Informal Economy Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa, a panel data from and World bank, 
and Medina and Schneider (2017) are used to carry out the study using Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS), Fixed effect and the System of Generalized method of moment 
(GMM). Hence the proposed model following a similar study by Medina and 
Schneider (2007) and Njangang (2018) is: 
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Chapter 5 
5. Nigeria and the development of micro-insurance industry 
5.1 Introduction 
The literature review supports the view that micro-insurance reform is a process 
of institutional change, and at the heart of such reform is trust-building in institutions 
as well as the introduction of tools and policies that improve the level of efficiency 
in the sector. Part of the insights gained from the theoretical review is that informal 
institutional norms such as trust, religion, and risk perception support formal 
regulatory reforms to achieve their designed outcomes. Also, incremental and path-
dependent characteristics of institutional change shape the reform outcome. 
Therefore, it is important to look at how the perceptions and beliefs of institutions 
evolved with the (micro) insurance reforms and development, to understand their 
impacts on reform performances. This chapter is therefore aimed at looking at the 
reformations that have happened in Nigerian (micro) insurance industry and how 
such reforms have impacted both the perception of people and the development of 
the sector over the years. It will be followed by chapter 6, which will investigate the 
effect of informal and formal institutional characteristics on the development of 
micro-insurance in Nigeria. 
The rest of this chapter is structured in this way: section two looks at the broad 
country context and economic realities in Nigeria. This is followed by section three 
and four, which looks at the review of the insurance market and the regulatory 
landscape of insurance operation in Nigeria, respectively. Section five compares the 
Nigerian insurance industry with the insurance industry in selected countries around 
the globe, while section six outlines some of the problems inhibiting the sector. 
Section seven, eight and nice looks at micro-insurance in Nigeria, its potential 
market and distribution channels, respectively, before the concluding section 10.  
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5.2 Broad country context 
Nigeria is an Anglophone country in West Africa that gained her independence 
from British rule in 1960 and has finally started enjoying relative political stability 
after enduring 29 years of military rule, which lasted from 1966 to 1979 and 1983 
to 1999.   With a geographical area of approximately 351, 787 square miles, and 
current population of approximately 197 million people, the country is the most 
populous in Sub-Sahara Africa, accounting for about 47% of West Africa’s 
population (World Bank, 2019).  In terms of population distribution, around 51% of 
the total population lives in urban areas. With a median age of 19.2 years and life 
expectancy of 53 years, Diaz et al. (2013) called it a ‘populous, young, diverse 
country’ that is presently the seventh most populous in the world and growing by 
about 2.5% per year. The country consists of 36 autonomous states and over 250 
ethnic groups with English, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba the most widely spoken 
languages. Nigeria is nearly equally divided between Muslims (50%) and Christians 
(48.2 %) with the majority of Muslims mainly concentrated in the northern part of 
the country, while the Christians dominate the middle-belt and southern part (Central 
Intelligent Agency, 2013). Nigeria is rich in natural resources, such as natural gas, 
petroleum, tin, and iron. The economy is primarily based on the export of oil and 
gas, which provides 80% of state revenue and 40% of GDP.  With oil prices 
plummeting to an average of around $45 per barrel in early 2016, down from high 
of $115 in 2014, Nigeria experienced a severe drop in state budget revenue, and the 
economy drifted into recession.  
According to World Bank, the oil price is the primary determinant of the 
country’s growth pattern, driving growth to a high of 8% in 2006, a low of -1.5% in 
2016 and average GDP growth of 5.7% per year between the years of 2006 and 2016.  
The volatility of the growth caused by the volatility in oil prices imposes significant 
welfare costs for Nigerian citizens (possibly with the exception of a few) and poses 
a challenge to the government to build an institutional and policy framework capable 
of cushioning such adverse effects and, with a view on diversifying the economy, 
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supporting the growth of the non-oil economy2. The recent positive trend in 
economic growth in Nigeria supports such a broad-based institutional and policy 
framework. In 2018, the non-oil economy such as information and communication 
technology, was the main driver of growth in the country, while the oil and gas sector 
reverted to contraction after driving the economy out of recession in 2017. However, 
due to societal and ethnic conflicts, such as Boko-haram and herdsmen/farmers war, 
and adverse weather events (mainly in the northern part of the country), growth in 
the agricultural sector has neither matched government projections nor the 
population growth rate.  
The contraction of growth in the already non-labour-intensive oil sector since 
2014, coupled with the slow growth in the agricultural industry, in which 
approximately 70% of the population engages at a subsistence level, have increased 
the national unemployment rate.  The World Bank reports that the rate of 
unemployment in Nigeria rose to 2.7%, resulting in 25% of the labour force being 
unemployed in 2018 and another 20% under-employed (World Bank, 2019). It is 
worth mentioning that these figures by the World Bank may not even tell the full 
story due to lack of proper documentation, or under-documentation of the 
unemployed in Nigeria. According to Diaz et al. (2013), the absence of any kind of 
state-organised system of unemployment benefits offers no incentive to the 
unemployed to register with the unemployment agencies to thereby assist in 
producing more accurate documentation.  
 
                                                 
2 Whereas the first will lead in this thesis to the issue of micro-insurance, the second remains 
beyond the topical reach. The viability of the latter is more a question of the Dutch Disease, or more 
generally of the so-called resource curse. 


)LJXUH&ODVVLILFDWLRQRI1LJHULDQE\2FFXSDWLRQ
6RXUFH(),Q$
6HTXHOWRWKHKLJKUDWHRIXQHPSOR\PHQWZLGHVSUHDGSRYHUW\LVVWLOODPDMRU
SUREOHPDSSUR[LPDWHO\RIWKHSRSXODWLRQOLYHRQOHVVWKDQ86SHUGD\DQG
ZRUNPDLQO\ LQ WKH LQIRUPDOHFRQRP\DV IDUPHUV WUDGHUV LWLQHUDQW ODERXUHUVDQG
VWUHHWYHQGRUV$VVKRZQLQWKHDERYHILJXUHIURPWKH(),Q$VXUYH\LQRQO\
RIDGXOWVDUHLQIXOOWLPHHPSOR\PHQWLQ1LJHULD7KHVWXG\DOVRVKRZVWKDW
RI1LJHULDQDGXOWVDUHLOOLWHUDWHGRQRWKDYHDEDQNDFFRXQWDQGKDYH
DQ\IRUPRILQVXUDQFH,PHDQG$FKD

)LJXUH1LJHULDQ*OREDO+XPDQ&DSLWDO6FRUH&DUG

109 
Also, with a Gini coefficient of 0.486, and a World Economic Forum (WEF)’s 
Human Capital Index ranking of 152 out of 157, the World Bank (2012) classifies 
Nigeria as a lower-middle-income country with a weak human capital endowment. 
There is a similar classification by the WEF as can be seen in the above figure. These 
classifications are no surprise given that the country is characterised by a thriving 
oil economy and high–income elite on the one hand, but persistent poverty and low 
socio-economic development of the majority on the other hand. Furthermore, the 
country continues to battle unresolved developmental issues, which include the need 
for more diversified and non-oil sector development, address infrastructural 
problems, and build reliable and effective institutions and organizations.  
5.3 Insurance Sector 
Insurance in Nigerian traces back to the colonial era of the nineteenth century, 
when the British empire used shipping and banking to expand its commercial 
activities (Osaka, 1992). By the mid-70s, there were about 70 insurance companies 
in Nigeria, 56 indigenous and 14 foreign-owned companies. However, at this time, 
foreign insurance companies accounted for about 53% of total gross premiums and 
covered most insurable risks, while indigenous insurers accounted for only about 
47% due to their limited underwriting capacity (Chibuike & Chikeleze, 2001).  Since 
late 1970, the Nigerian government introduced new laws and regulations to 
encourage local ownership of insurance companies. As a result, today, domestic 
investors hold approximately 60% of the shareholdings of insurers operating in 
Nigeria (Osaka, 1992).  
In 2005, following reforms of the banking sector, Nigeria’s Federal Government 
along with the insurance regulator NAICOM, began a process of overhauling the 
Nigerian insurance industry. The main objectives of the new reform were: 
 To increase the low retention capacity of the industry that had stunted its 
growth and expansion. 
 To conduct a consolidation exercise to produce companies capable of meeting 
claims obligations and compete at the global level. 
110 
 To attract foreign capital into the industry so that premium growth is 
accelerated and profitability raised. 
 To encourage the industry to realize synergies from mergers and acquisitions, 
to achieve superior product innovation, deeper market penetration, and 
product distribution. (NAICOM, 2005). 
Under the new reforms, new capital requirements were stipulated for insurance 
underwriters. For example, the required minimum capital for life insurers was 
increased from N150 million (USD$0.4 million) to N2 billion (USD$5.5 million), 
and composite insurers (licensed to carry out both life and no-life insurance) were 
required to operate life and non-life business segments as separate entities (Obaremi, 
2007). The bid to meet the guidelines resulted in a spate of mergers and acquisitions 
in the industry-leading to a reduction in the number of firms from 104 to 71 post-
consolidation, consisting of 43 non-life insurance underwriters, and 26 life insurers. 
Also, in 2010, the central bank of Nigeria (CBN) required banks to divest from non-
banking activities, including insurance. While most banks formed economic groups 
to keep their insurance activities in a separate company, some dropped the business 
entirely.  
5.4 Segments of the Nigerian insurance industry  
As of April 2012, there were 61 companies (59 insurers and 2 reinsurers) in the 
industry, which is a large number for a market producing a total gross premium of 
NGN201billion in 2010. (Cia 2013). Out of the 61 companies that operate in the 
industry, 32 operate in non-life, 17 in life, 10 are composite insurers, and 2 are 
reinsurers. 
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better compliance with the law. To boost the capacity of the FFSN and by 
implication the trust of prospective clients on their ability to perform their duties 
when the need arises, the three bodies agreed to fund the FFSN by dedicating them 
0.3% of premiums received from the segment. While this can be expected to have 
positive effects on the contribution of fire insurance, it does not include the owners 
of buildings, as it does not target their compliance with the law. 
         General accident insurance 
From the average contribution to total premiums of 25% in 2002, General 
Accident contribution declined to 3.9% in 2016. This decline is due to the growth in 
other non-life insurance lines. Also, it could be ascribed to the fact that, unlike other 
segments of insurance, there is no compulsory regulation for accident insurance and 
most of the insurance products under this category (such as personal accident, public 
liability, burglary protection, travel insurance, cash in transit etc.), have low rate of 
renewal. 
         Marine Insurance 
Marine insurance contributes the least to the gross premiums of 7.58Bn in the 
industry, which is equivalent to 2.2% of gross premiums. Part of the reason for this 
low premium contribution is the high assets value as well as a higher probability of 
risk in the segment. Consequently, similar to the oil & gas segment, it grapples with 
insufficient underwriting capacity by local underwriters. 
5.4.2 Life insurance 
According to available data from NAICOM, premiums from life insurance have 
maintained an upward trend in growth since 2011, because of population growth and 
regulation, which imposes on companies with 5 or more employees a compulsory 
group life insurance. This growth is supported by the growing middle class, who do 
appreciate and understand the benefits of life insurance. However, with a premium 
of 30.5% of all sales, but less than 1.5 million voluntary individual policies, many 
still consider the life segment as small given the size of the country (Diaz et al., 
2013). Most life insurance policies in the market are group life coverages by 
employers with generic content and no differentiation. There is little retail sales of 
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individual life policies, an indication of the need for companies to diversify their 
portfolio by designing voluntary products. There is the belief that life insurance is a 
key driver of growth for the insurance industry in Nigeria because it increases the 
duration of their liabilities and hence makes available capital for long term 
investment and higher returns (Asinobi and Ojo 2014). 
5.5 Regulatory Landscape 
National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) is the primary regulator and 
supervisor of insurance services and providers in Nigeria. Its mission is to 
adequately supervise the Nigerian insurance industry to the attainment of high 
ethical standards. NAICOM’s statutory responsibilities and objective, as well as its 
supervisory authority,  derives from two acts. They includes the Insurance Act, No. 
1 (2003), which governs the licensing and operation of insurers, reinsurers and 
providers of related services; and the National insurance commission decree, No 1 
(1997), which establish the national insurance commission as the supervisory 
institution with the power of inspection, remedial and enforcement actions, and 
composition of fines. (International Monetary fund, 2013). 
Except for the two government-owned entities (National insurance corporation 
of Nigeria (NICON) and the Nigerian reinsurance corporation (Nigeria Re)), only 
firms incorporated as a limited liability company under the companies and allied 
matters act (1990), are allowed to register as insurers. That is, there are no mutual or 
co-operative commercial insurance providers. Prudential regulation stipulates a 
minimum upfront capital of N2 billion for life insurance firms and N5 billion for 
composite insurers. The minimum capital requirements for insurance firms in 
Nigeria are relatively high compared to other less-developed countries and above 
the range required for insurance operating countries under the Solvency I regime 
(Diaz et al., 2013). Furthermore, Nigerian insurance regulation stipulates that no 
more than 40% of the issued share capital of an insurer may be foreign-owned 
(International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
The history of the regulation concerning reinsurance of risks in Nigeria is 
closely linked with the development of the insurance industry in 1979 (Chibuike and 
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Chikezie, 2001).  Following a recommendation of the African development bank 
(AFDB), the African Reinsurance Corporation (African Re) was established in 
Yaounde, Cameroon. The representatives of the 36 member states of the 
organization of African Unity (OAU) and the AFDB signed an international 
agreement to cede a minimum of 5% of risks with African Re, as a way of reducing 
the amount of foreign exchange that leaves the country (Insurance Act No. 1, 2003). 
This was followed by the Nigerian reinsurance decree of 1977, which saw the 
establishment of Nigerian Re by the government as part of efforts to retain 
reinsurance premiums locally and reduce the outflow of insurance funds. Under the 
decree, insurers were required to cede 20% of their business to Nigeria Re 
compulsorily. Also, Nigerian Re has the right to first refusal on the remaining 80% 
before such companies could be placed with other indigenous and foreign 
reinsurance companies. However, the decree has been repealed, following the 
industry reform in 2005, which saw the privatization of Nigerian Re, with the 
government retaining a 49% stake (Chibuike and Chikeleze, 2001).  
Therefore, current insurance regulation stipulates only the 5% mandatory legal 
concession to African Re. Furthermore, reinsurance with foreign firms is subject to 
the approval of NAICOM, in which insurance firms have to demonstrate that local 
reinsurance capacity has been exhausted. Foreign reinsurance is required to have a 
minimum financial strength rating of A- (Standard and Poor’s) or A (A.M. Best). 
Direct insurers are mandated to retain at least 5% of the risks to discourage ‘fronting 
of business’, while 100% of life insurance business risks are required to be retained 
in Nigeria (Insurance Act, 2003). Many believe that the restriction on the placement 
of reinsurance with foreign reinsurance is a major factor in the slow development of 
the insurance industry (and in particular the life business segment) in Nigeria, as 
knowledge transfer opportunities provided by foreign reinsurers in terms of product 
development, and technical expertise cannot be overemphasized (International 
Monetary fund, 2013). 
The Insurance Act of 2013 permits composite insurance firms to operate in 
Nigeria. However, the life and Non-life business segments must be operated as 
separate entities under different capital requirements. The insurance Act 2003 
classifies individual life, group life and pensions, and health insurance into the life 
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insurance business category. The introduction of new products into any class or 
category of the insurance business is subject to a file-and-use approach with approval 
from the NAICOM. Brokers, agents, and corporate agents are the main 
intermediaries recognized by the NAICOM. Insurance agents must possess a 
certificate of proficiency issued in the name of the individual applicant through the 
chartered insurance institute of Nigeria (CIIN), be duly appointed by an insurer, and 
licensed by the NAICOM.  
Furthermore, only firms incorporated as a partnership or limited liability 
company under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (1990) are permitted to 
register as insurance brokers. Although insurance broking firms have no minimum 
capital requirements, they are required to maintain a professional indemnity cover 
of whichever is greater of 10 million or 50% of its annual brokerage income for the 
preceding year. The insurance act 2003 does not specify any commission caps for 
the life insurance segment; however, non-life business is subject to commission caps 
of between 12.5 – 20% depending on the line of business sold (Insurance Act No. 1, 
2003). 
5.5.1 Market development and restructuring initiative (MDRI): 
The MDRI was introduced in 2009 to improve insurance culture, market 
efficiency and increase consumer protection. The objective was to achieve a N1 
trillion Naira premium by 2012 through four key areas that include the enforcement 
of compulsory insurance, sanitization and modernization of the insurance agency 
system, wiping out of fake insurance institutions, and introduction of risk-based 
supervision. Through this MDRI, five major compulsory insurance policies were 
enforced by NAICOM. They include Motor Third Party Liability insurance, 
Builders Liability insurance, Group Life Insurance, Occupiers liability Insurance 
and health care professional Indemnity Insurance. (Asinobi and Ojo, 2014, National 
Insurance Commission, 2009). 
Several other laws are governing the insurance business directly or indirectly. 
As their impact may be only tangential to micro-insurance, I shall only list them with 
no further description. They include:  
 Nigerian Council of Registered Insurance Brokers Act (Brokers Act),  
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public confidence, which is necessary for insurance market development. Clients 
need to be sure that their claims will be paid before they will agree to part with their 
money. 
5.7 Problems of the insurance industry in Nigeria 
What are the inhibiting factors against the growth of the insurance industry in 
Nigeria? Why is the industry performing far below its potential and that of its peers? 
In defiance of National Insurance Commission's constant effort to cure and mitigate 
the challenges causing the underperformance of the insurance industry, there are still 
many challenges militating against the growth of the insurance industry. Some of 
them are briefly explained: 
Unfavourable macro-economic environment 
The main concept of insurance is that of spreading risks through a pool of capital 
that are contributed by the insured and invested in profit yielding ventures. It is 
through such investment returns that insurance firms can meet up with their 
obligations to their clients. However, such management of the insurance capital pool 
presupposes a stable economy capable of attracting long-term investments. 
However, given the financial misappropriation and indiscipline in the Nigerian 
economy, together with the volatile nature of the inflation, exchange and interest 
rates, most insurance firms are not willing to invest their money in any long-term 
ventures. Rather, they find it safer to invest in short-term ventures, even though such 
investments will yield less profit and reduce their capacity to meet up with their 
promises to their clients. Sequel to this, the government must intensify their effort 
to promote a stronger institutional framework that will enable financial service 
industry to thrive and promote operational efficiency of insurance firms. 
Lack of trust  
The insurance industry is widely mistrusted by average Nigerian given the many 
cases of genuine claim denials, fraudulent behaviours of insurance intermediaries 
and complicated clauses in the policy documents. This mistrust on the industry, 
which is amplified by the inadequate nature of the necessary institutional 
frameworks that enforces the contracts, makes it difficult to convince people to pick 
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up any form of insurance. On the other hand, the fraudulent claims syndrome by 
some of the insured forces the insurance firms to take extra control measure that 
increases the transaction cost in the industry and together with the small size of 
insured pool raises the rate of premium in the industry.  The effect is that the majority 
of low-income people cannot afford insurance products.  
Another factor that causes a lack of trust in the industry is religious barriers. 
Nigeria is a multi-ethnic/religious nation. While the Muslims do not agree with 
interest related credit and life insurance, some Pentecostal Christians see the 
insurance concept as a form of disbelief and lack of trust on God who is most 
protective and just to the righteous. Aside from that, the religious barriers in some 
parts of the country about insurance products such as life and interest related policies 
contribute in  
Inadequate access to Information Technology 
Despite being in a world where information technology seems to be ruling 
everything, many companies in the insurance industry still do not have a fully 
automated and integrated computer software system. The predominantly analogue 
system used in the industry makes it difficult for insurance companies to settle 
claims promptly as well as fight the fraudulent practices and mistakes in the 
insurance business operations. Still, many insurance firms are not yet ready to 
abandon this analogue system given the high rate of internet fraud in the country and 
many other problems connected with modern technologies. This fear of new 
information technology is evident in the recent suspension of the mobile network by 
NAICOM as a channel of insurance distribution given many cases of fraud carried 
out through the system. In the few places where these new technologies exist, it is 
still difficult for the low-incomers who lack proper education and awareness about 
the products and technologies.   
Weak Regulatory Framework 
The regulatory framework for micro-insurance operation in Nigeria is very 
weak. Even though the regulator NAICOM recently released a new guideline for the 
sector, there is still some inconsistencies and gaps in the framework, such as 
matching the rules with adequate enforcement policies. For instance, there is a need 
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for policies making some insurance products compulsory and mechanism to ensure 
full implementation of such policies. Another major omission from the recently 
released guideline is a standard premium rate on certain micro-insurance policies 
such that there is a benchmark for rates when negotiating premiums. The weak police 
and judiciary in the country make matters worse. People who seek redress from these 
organizations must, first of all, compare the cost of such to the indemnity they stand 
to lose if they decide otherwise. In most cases, the cost of such litigation, as well as 
the long-time it takes, leaves a rational individual offended with no other choice but 
to cut losses.  
Lack of skilled personnel 
As strange as it may seem, there is a huge shortfall of skilled professionals 
(underwriters, brokers, actuaries, etc.) in the entire insurance industry. Insurance 
companies inadequately train their employees. Majority of the insurance firms 
attract low-skilled personnel due to inadequate payment/commission package. Thus, 
there is always a difficulty in retaining competent employees. Many top executives 
in the insurance industry are marketers who have rose through the ranks not because 
of their strong technical background of the industry but because of their distinctive 
salesmanship and the ability to bring in more clients than the others.  Reasonable as 
that may seem, more than the ability to bring in customers, the combination of a 
good technical background and business skills should be the prerequisite for 
assuming such top executive position. May insurance sales-person out there do not 
even know about the concept of micro-insurance let alone convincing another to 
enrol in one. The insurance firms, on the other hand, are reluctant to offer adequate 
training to their sales-persons since the good ones will leave as soon as they find 
better jobs elsewhere. The result is the culture of product selling rather than 
marketing. With a singular focus on the size of the commission, most insurance 
sales-persons are ready to sell insurance policies to anybody regardless of the 
product’s suitability to the person’s need nor his/her risk profile and tendency to 
default. This is even worse on more vulnerable low-income prospects who do not 
know much about micro-insurance nor understand most clauses in the policy 
documents. 
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5.8  Micro-insurance in Nigeria 
Even though the penetration of micro-insurance has been low, the concept is not 
new to Nigeria. According to Omar (2007), Nigerian insurers have experimented a 
micro-insurance type product known as ‘industrial insurance’ (or isusu) to low-
income groups. However, such products were often hard to sustain due to difficulties 
associated with the premium collection, shallow knowledge of the concept, high 
premium charges, lack of reliable systems of claims management, low rates of 
renewal, and a generally held public mistrust of the value of insurance.  
While uptake of micro-insurance is considered low by many studies due to the 
size of the Nigerian population, EFInA reports that about 32.1 million adults will be 
interested in using micro-insurance. Sequel to their findings and a similar study by 
Access to Insurance Initiatives in 2013, the Nigerian insurance regulator (NAICOM) 
in 2018, releases a new guideline for the micro-insurance operation to establish a 
uniform set of rules, regulations and standard for the conduct of micro-insurance in 
Nigeria. The guidelines defined Micro-insurance as insurance developed for low-
income populations, with low valued policies provided by licensed institutions, run 
by generally accepted insurance principles and funded by premiums. It explained 
that Micro-insurance products are insurance products that are designed to be 
appropriate for the low-income market about cost, terms, coverage, and delivery 
mechanism. It also clarifies the scope of Micro-insurance for the operators, stating 
that the sum insured under a Micro-insurance policy(ies) shall not be more than 
N2,000,000 per person per insurer.  
The new wave of micro-insurance products ushered in by the new guideline is 
intended to provide the value for customers through alternative distribution channels 
such as leveraging on technology to improve the payments system as well as the 
increasing use of the mobile phone network platform. It is also an attempt to reach 
out to the majority of the low-incomers, especially those in rural parts of Nigeria 
with the kind of micro-insurance products that suit their specific needs. If this new 
guideline is adhered to by the (micro) insurance providers and enforcing 
organizations, one expects that such moves will have a positive effect on the 
perception of people towards the insurance firms. 
124 
Presently, according to figures from Micro-insurance Network, about 2.2 
million Nigerians are covered by one form of the micro-insurance product. This 
represents a 21 percent increase in lives covered over three years from 2014 when 
the coverage rate was 1.82million lives. The most prominent type of risk coverage 
in the market includes life, health, property, accident and agricultural-related risks. 
Some of these risks coverages are offered as bundled products; i.e., the design of 
one product with multiple coverages such as life, credit, accident and health. 
However, except those linked to credit, most of such bundled products have not 
reached significant scale. There are also a relatively high number of agriculture 
insurance products, covering a mix of crops, livestock and perils. They have also not 
achieved significant outreach. The outreach is dominated by credit-linked covers 
offered through microfinance banks (MFBs), accounting for almost 83% of lives 
covered. While credit life alone does not usually provide significant value to clients 
(though it can when well designed), most of the credit life products provide 
additional coverages. Over half a million of the 1.8 million lives covered by credit 
life were insured for benefits beyond loan forgiveness, including additional term life 
payout in case of death, hospital cash or damage or loss of microbusiness. 
In addition to these forms of micro-insurance, an additional estimated 86,000 
low-income people are enrolled in some health (micro) insurance policy through 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes (NHIS, 2017). These schemes 
are registered as associations with local governments, regulated by the National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), and led by a board of trustees that are nominated 
by members of the community and/or the community leaders. The premium 
contribution by the insured is calculated based on the financial capacity, the number 
of time service is provided, and the number of people in the scheme. However, for 
most of the policies, an average premium of NGN 1,800 (about USD 5) is charged 
per insured. EFInA Access to Financial Services in Nigeria 2016 Survey revealed 
that 31% of the adult population was interested in having health Microinsurance 
coverage, indicating rather significant demand. This means that, with just 86,000 
people currently covered by CBHIs, and another 530,000 identified as covered by 
health Micro-insurance, there is an enormous gap in outreach and potential for 
insurers to provide needed coverage (EFInA, 2018). 
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Many companies have started applying the findings of these studies and the 
stipulations of the micro-insurance guideline in their drive to capture this huge 
untapped market. Part of this drive is the initiation of an alternative distribution 
channel that reaches the targeted micro-insurance clients in selected rural areas, 
where the existing distribution channel have not reached. Nevertheless, many others 
are still reluctant to move into the low-income market, given the many challenges in 
the sector. These firms believe that, aside from the new guideline, a lot still needs to 
be done by the government officials and regulatory bodies to assure the prospective 
clients as well as insurance investors about the functionality of micro-insurance in 
Nigeria.  
In their assessment of the Nigerian insurance market, Access for insurance 
initiative (2013) listed the following as part of the things that need to be sorted for 
any meaning development of the micro-insurance industry: 
 Increasing the trust of potential clients in the industry, 
 Increasing knowledge of the concept and improvement of information 
technology,  
 Adjustment of administration practices,  
 Appropriate pricing through sourcing of actuaries versed in micro-insurance,  
 Understanding of micro-insurance clients and their preferences,  
 Different licenses for life and non-life micro-insurance products. 
Other studies have also looked at the different forms of problems inhibiting the 
development of the industry, and some of them will be briefly discussed here:  
5.9 Reason to be optimistic 
Even though the challenges facing the industry are very clear for everyone to 
see, the potentials in the sector are so huge that with the right pace, the first set of 
companies that move into the sector is expected to harvest massive clientele. In their 
survey on the insurance prospects in Nigeria, EFInA listed the following as the four 
pillars of potentials in the industry: saving behaviour, ownership of insurable assets, 
risk experience and coping strategies. The study reports that about 62% of adults in 
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Nigeria save in some way, and more than 25% of them belong in and save with an 
informal society. The report also listed emergencies, school fees, old age and 
medical expenses as the major reasons why they save. Sequel to the above findings, 
it is evident that most of these above-listed reasons for savings can be covered by a 
micro-insurance policy. By implication, if these micro-insurance firms can design 
their products in line with this purposes and invent a way of incorporating these 
trusted informal societies into their distribution network, the number of people that 
enrol into micro-insurance will increase.  
Furthermore, many Nigerians experience one form of risk or the other regularly; 
and most of these risks can be covered by micro-insurance policies. For instance, 
The EFInA survey reports that more than 50% of Nigerians have experienced the 
death or illness of a family member. Also, a good percentage of Nigerians have 
experienced asset-related risks such as theft of or damage to household property or 
agricultural crop/livestock; or car accident and business failures. The presence of 
these form of risks and many more suggest that the need for insurance is not the 
problem. Also, going by the same survey, with only 30% of Nigeria mentioning 
affordability as the reason for not enrolling into micro-insurance products when 
faced by these risks, one can assume that these needs have proportional demand. 
Instead, lack of relevant knowledge about micro-insurance products (38%) and lack 
of trust (31%), were seen as a greater reason why people don’t enrol into micro-
insurance as a tool mechanism against many of these risks. (EFInA, 2011). 
Another reason to be optimistic about the prospect of micro-insurance in 
Nigeria is the huge population of the country, estimated by the UN to be the third-
largest in the world by 2050. With this ever-growing population is an equally 
growing middle class (with an average monthly income of between N75,000 and 
N100,000 (US$480 and $645)), which according to African Development Bank 
(AfDB) accounts for 30% of the population. These class of people have the largest 
share of micro-insurance policies (EFInA, 2011) and the larger their population, the 
higher the demand for micro-insurance will be.  
High cultural and religious beliefs in Nigeria is also another factor, if well 
harnessed can bring about an upward surge in demand for micro-insurance products. 
Most people in Nigeria are religious and consequently, see their religious leader(s) 
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as an unquestionable authority whose words must be respected at all time. Therefore, 
if micro-insurance firms can target these religious leaders with the proposal to use 
their religious platforms to reach their members, one expects that such moves will 
result in an increased rate of enrollment into micro-insurance products.  
5.10 Distribution Channel of Micro-Insurance 
The distribution of commercial micro-insurance in Nigeria is mainly through 
individual agents and/or brokers, and through micro-finance institutions (MFIs). 
Insurance brokers who control a significant portion of both the life and non-life 
business segments dominate the distribution channels.  Currently, the Nigerian 
insurance industry consists of 706 registered insurance brokers, 1,668 insurance 
agents and about 870 MFIs (Nigerian Insurers Association, 2011). But the design of 
most of these distribution channels is biased towards formal employer and 
employees, while the informal market is left untouched. Also, with a very low 
premium per agent and high transaction cost as a result of the override commissions 
(ORC), which can be as high as 50% of the premium, there is the need for micro-
insurance providers to seek for alternatives distribution channels in order to achieve 
the scale required for affordability and profitability (Diaz et al., 2013).  
In a survey of Nigerian adults, De Vos et al. (2011), highlighted the potential 
channels for micro-insurance distribution. They saw the use of mobile phone 
network either as a direct and/or alternative distribution channel as a potentially 
powerful tool, which could enable micro-insurance to achieve the required scale for 
affordability and profitability, considering that approximately 60% of adults own a 
mobile phone. Diaz et al. (2013), also highlighted the success story of mobile 
payment in countries like Ghana and Tanzania, where MicroEnsure has reached 
millions of clients over a short period with mobile phone products. They suggest that 
Nigeria, in the same way, could use the extensive mobile payment network 
introduced by the CBN to develop the micro-insurance market. They opined that 
micro-insurance could ride on these services for sales, premium collection, claim 
payment, client communication and education. In contrast to these findings,  
NAICOM, forced all insurance providers in Nigeria to terminate every mobile 
network offerings by the end of 2017. Depending on who you ask, the prohibition 
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5.11 Conclusion 
This chapter is aimed at analyzing the (micro) insurance development in Nigeria 
and how the different institutional reforms through legislative acts and policies have 
affected the industry over the years. With the wealth of information from secondary 
sources such as NAICOM, EFInA survey (2010), Access for initiative survey 
(2013), etc., the many problems and potentials of the industry is analyzed so that 
micro-insurance operators can have a better understanding of the market.  Also, it is 
interesting to see how regulatory reforms which mandated some insurance segments 
is affecting the industry as a whole. Even though the market is considered huge, most 
companies seem to be comfortable with their share from the 6 mandated products. 
The focus on these compulsory insurance segments and the neglect of others, such 
as individual life and health insurance policies bears witness to this assertion.  
Even though many Acts and regulations have been introduced in the (micro) 
insurance industry, the lack of trust and knowledge about micro-insurance products 
that still exists in the market shows that much still needs to be done in the informal 
institutional reform efforts. The beliefs, cultures, religious orientations and 
perception of the people need to form the centre of all reforms for a positive result. 
Finally, regardless of the kind of regulations and Acts enacted for the economy, if 
there is no effort to improve on the enforceability of these reforms, no positive result 
will be seen in the system. 
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Chapter 6 
6. The effect of Societal norms on the likelihood of individuals to 
enrol in different forms of Micro-insurance products 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5, this thesis tried to highlight how the reformations that have 
happened in Nigerian micro-insurance industry have affected the development of the 
sector over the years. It follows from the insights gained from the theoretical reviews 
of chapter 2 and 3 that the incremental and path-dependency characteristics of 
institutional changes shape the reform outcome in the insurance industry. Also 
gained from the literature review is that informal institutional norms such as trust, 
religion, and risk perception, when they support formal regulatory reforms, will lead 
to the actualization of designed outcomes. In continuation of the study in chapter 5, 
and in line with the gained insight on the relationship between the formal and 
informal institutions, this chapter will focus on how the perceptions and beliefs of 
institutions (i.e. informal institutions), evolve with the micro-insurance 
development, with Nigeria as a case in point.  
The study will be based on the primary data obtained from questionnaires (see 
appendix 6.11) administered to a proportionately stratified sample in Nigeria. As 
discussed in chapter 43, the questions contained in the questionnaire were designed 
in line with the academic literature (see chapter 2 and 3) and structured in three main 
parts which include, personal characteristics of the respondents, perception and 
beliefs about micro-insurance and institutions in Nigeria. The rest in of the study is 
structured in the following way: in section two, the theories of informal institution 
is recapped in line with the new institutional economics review carried out in chapter 
3. Section three discusses the informal institutional variables and hypotheses raised 
for the study, while section four attempts to justify the control variables chosen for 
the study. Section five contains the research model while the contents of section six 
                                                 
3 The sampling framework, size and technique as well as the design of the questionnaire are 
discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 4 also contains the pre-testing method used before going to the field.  
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include the results, analysis and discussion of the findings. The robustness of the 
study was discussed in section seven after which comes the conclusion in section 
eight. 
6.2 Institution, Values and Norms 
Until recently, most scientists prefer not to consider informal institutional 
factors such as culture in the explanation of economic growth. Things have 
dramatically changed. For instance, Rodrik et al. (2004) claim that ‘institutions rule’ 
and argue that institutions dominate alternative explanations for long-run economic 
performance, such as economic integration. Similarly, in an attempt to highlight the 
importance of institutional factors in economic performance, Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) presented constitutional rule as having far-reaching consequences on various 
economic variables such as total production factor. These findings are important for 
the understanding of why some nations are doing very well while others are still 
stuck in the poverty trap. That is, it begs the question of why some nations seem 
stuck with ineffective economic enhancing institution while others are progressing.  
It also raises concern on the conformity of existing institutions to the dominant 
values and norms of the people. Having this in mind, this study argues that the values 
and norms held by substantial parts of a society are an important determinant of its 
institution and dictates the performance of the micro-insurance industries.  In 
particular, through selected indicators of values and norms, this study estimates the 
likelihood of an individual in Nigeria to enrol in different types of micro-insurance 
product.  
The new institutional economics has established itself as a widely accepted 
extension to the standard neoclassical paradigm. It sees institutions as commonly 
known rules that structure recurring interactions between people and the 
corresponding sanctioning mechanism. In chapter 3, this study looked at a plausible 
institutional framework by Williamson (2000), who arranges institutions into four 
levels. With the use of theories such as historical, evolutionary and sociological 
theories, he stressed in his first level of institutional model how a gradual change in 
the beliefs and opinions or norms of a population (i.e. something like its “belief 
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system), which in the words of Williamson is the institutionalization of the informal 
rules, can have an impact on economic growth (Matthews, 1986). Hence, the first 
level is concerned with the role of social capital (Putnam, 2000) in the economic 
performance of a society. Institutions are characterized by change as part of certain 
fixed relations, sometimes called the institutional matrix. This change brings about 
an alteration in the perception of what represents the best exchange structure. So, as 
experience and dominating system of values alter the perception, the search for 
better solution or learning to survive lead to an evolution of the social rooted status 
of a society (North, 1994), which in turn finds a wider application in the society in 
form of change in rules of operation and economic innovations. For instance, the 
evolution in the religion of European nations from an anti-life-insurance to somehow 
pro-life-insurance led to the development of insurance sector after dominant 
religious bodies like Roman Catholic and the Orthodox relaxed their opposition on 
life insurance in nineteenth-century (Zelizer, 1979). 
However, changes of informal institutions take place slower than in the case of 
formal institutions and therefore, can reduce the effectiveness of current formal 
institutional changes (Domjahn, 2012). The difference in the speed of change of the 
two kinds of institutions implies that for an effective institution, changes in formal 
institutions must be made in line with the scope of the accepted norms and rules in 
the society. Hence, in other words: to function effectively, the economy needs a 
coherent system of formal norms that agree in terms of goals with informal norms 
and have to be executed swiftly by the state institutions. Deviations from this will 
require a provision of a legal regulation that can act as a stimulus and motivation for 
the individuals and groups to subjectively internalize the formal norm that is so far 
alien to them. Nevertheless, this involves time and costs of meeting formal norms; 
and punishment for those who avoid them (such as creation and finance of 
monitoring and controlling organizations). Such control and monitoring mechanism 
limits the value of the property and increases transaction costs.  On the hand, a 
coherent formal institution that conforms to the social norms or informal institutions 
helps to break the asymmetry of information and creates models of repeated 
behaviour, which facilitates contract making, lowers the need to regulate many areas 
of human activity: it reduces transaction costs (Putnam 2000).   
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Therefore, for a meaningful development, of e.g. a functional micro-insurance 
sector  (or some extent of income equality that lets all participate in the sector or 
even economy as a whole), there is a need for the coordination of the economic 
activities in accordance with popular expectations or informal norms of the 
individual economies (Todaro, Smith 2002). Omar (2006) gave an account of how 
the constitutions adopted by Latin America failed to firmly take hold because Latin 
America had little experience with democratic self-government until the 19th 
century. Hence, such adopted constitutions unsupported by belief systems and civic 
virtue, could neither facilitate a stable political system nor keep peace in the region. 
In the same light, the reform of micro-insurance must be coordinated in conformity 
with the existing popular expectation of the target market.  Better still, there is the 
need for change in the informal norms or social order of less-developed nations 
concerning their perception of micro-insurance and its importance in their lives 
(ILO/STEP – GTZ, 2006). In his popular thesis concerning the Protestant work ethic, 
Max Weber (2002 originally 1904) shows that countries with a high proportion of 
Protestants were economically more successful than others because their social 
norms such as beliefs, attitudes and codes of conduct resulting from religion 
affiliation affected their economic actions in an economically positive way. This 
includes, for instance, working hard, accepting the sale of labour to employers, 
accepting principle-agent relationships, accepting the division of labour. This 
provides a show-case of a correlation between the belief system and development of 
an economy, which includes sector such as insurance sector (Pande and Urdy, 2005). 
However, how can we measure informal institutions in a way that all its concrete 
features, which affect the performance of a (micro) insurance sector, are properly 
represented/proxied for analysis?  
Regrettably, there is no general theory as to which informal institutions are 
relevant in the study of their impact on economic development. Hence, studies 
typically look proxies based on their specific interests. For instance, impact of caste 
and ethnicity (Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003), trust (Putnam, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 
1997; La Porta et al. 1997), attitude (Platteau, 2000), religion (Barro et al. 2003), 
culture (Guiso et al. 2006) etc.  In respect to the Nigerian insurance sector, to the 
best of my knowledge, only a handful of studies such as Yusuf et al. (2009) have 
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conducted a study on the impact of some of these features on micro-insurance 
development in Nigeria. In his study, Yusuf et al. (2009) looked at the impact of 
attitude on insurance services.  
Sequel to this lack of general theory on the cardinal proxies of informal 
institutions; limitation of the available data; and in line with the study by Voigt 
(2009), I have selected some of the proxies of informal institutions that I consider 
relevant to our study of micro-insurance development. In his study on how (not) to 
measure institutions, Voigt listed informal institutions such as religion, trust, 
uncertainty avoidance and individual responsibility and choice. These proxies are 
the same in the Nigerian context.  
As I have shown in my review of insurance performance in Nigeria (see chapter 
2 and 5), the sector is performing below her full potentials due to so many challenges 
that have to do with trust, corruption, religion etc. It would be interesting to see how 
this selection of (proxies for) informal institutions contributes to the willingness of 
the individuals to enrol or not enrol in different forms of micro-insurance products.  
Hence the overarching research question for this chapter is: 
What is the significance of conformity with societal norms to the likelihood 
of individuals to enrol in different forms of Micro-insurance products? 
6.3 Methods and variables 
6.3.1 Dependent Variable: Micro-insurance enrollment  
The dependent variable is a dummy variable generated from the five categorical 
variables in the questionnaire about the uptake of micro-insurance policies in 
Nigeria. The summation of the five (5) categorical variables will give a maximum 
of 5 for those who have enrolled into all the categories, and 0 for individuals that are 
not enrolled into any form of micro-insurance. Nevertheless, since we are working 
with logit and probit regression, and would like our dependent variable to be in form 
of a dummy variable (Gujatati, 2012), I will attempt to reclassify the variable into 
dummy variable between those who have enrolled and those who have not enrolled 
into any kind of micro-insurance product.  
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the economic development of a country by lowering transaction costs: increasing 
trust can, in turn, promote market efficiency and thus lead to a more prosperous 
economy. Because the state of development of markets is often lower in less-
developed countries, increasing trust can be expected to benefit economic 
development. Aside from lowering transaction cost, trust is what makes the 
economic activity possible where there is a less developed institutional system with 
the property right not being secured and court systems for contract enforcement not 
sufficiently developed (Knack and Keefer, 1997). For instance, lack of trust is seen 
as one of the major reasons why the insurance sector of most African countries, 
especially Nigeria, have not developed as could otherwise have been. Normally, 
selling products to people is not easy, let alone selling to the poor, an intangible 
product that will be delivered on an unknown date and time (or even never, if the 
insurance-case will not occur) without any guarantee from a government institution. 
In such a situation, even with the possibility of greater benefit, only high level of 
trust will allow such markets to develop (the economic perspective) and then make 
such business activity possible (the business perspective) (Guiso et al., 2000).  
By way of hypothesis 
Individuals with a high level of trust are more likely to enrol into micro-
insurance products in Nigeria. 
To test this hypothesis, this study uses factor analysis of answer to three 
questions from the self-administered questionnaire, to generate an index variable for 
trust. This is line with different papers (such as Rose and Haerpfer 1996;  Klasing, 
2011;  Tabellini, 2010; Williamson & Kerekes, 2008) that used factor analysis when 
the available variables relate to but do not directly represent the target variable.  They 
include the following: 
 a. To what extent do you trust the insurance companies in Nigeria? Please 
rank from 1-5 with 5 representing completely trust them and 1 representing 
No Trust at all. 
 b. From your experience, would you advise relatives or friends to enrol in 
voluntary micro-insurance? Where do you tend more towards - more “YES”, 
or more “NO”? 
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 c. Remember your thoughts in your decision-making process for or against 
taking out insurance: in a scale of 1- 5 with 5 representing very important, 
could you grade the below factor on its importance: lack of trust (among 
others)? 
As can be noticed in the coding of responses to the first two questions (a and b), 
high level of trust in insurance companies or agreeing to recommend insurance to 
friends and relatives is coded with high numbers on a scale of 1 to 5.  Hence, the 
higher the number, the more trusting people are, or are likely to recommend 
insurance to others, which is also considered as a sign of trust in the system. On the 
other hand, in the last question, the coding of 5 as very important and 1 for not 
important means that the higher the number selected, the higher the lack of trust and 
vice versa. Sequel to this, the code has been reversed for question 3 to match the 
direction of the first two questions, so that higher numbers will signify higher trust 
for all three questions. After that, responses to the three questions will be combined 
to create a strong indicator for the trust variable.  
This study expects to see a positive correlation between trust and the likelihood 
of people to enrol in micro-insurance. This will confirm predictions made by other 
theoretical analysis (e.g. by Guiso et al., 2000; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Fukuyama 
1995 etc.) that predicted a positive correlation between trust and different forms of 
economic activities. 
Religion 
Barro et al. (2003) believe that Religion is an important dimension of an 
informal institution because it portrays, among other things, people’s behaviour 
towards traits such as work ethics, honesty and thrift.  This is because, through work 
ethics, people are more inclined to do everything within their reach to attain a better 
standard of living. The trait of honesty among the people is likely to bring about the 
willingness to enter into a contract with insurance companies for a product that is 
not tangible as well as a reduction in the transaction cost. More specially, through 
the trait of thrift, people would be more likely to manage their limited resources in a 
prudent way, which involves making provisions for unexpected or unpredictable 
shocks.  Following Weber (2002) who supported this position by arguing that 
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religious practices and beliefs have important consequences for economic 
development, it is the intention of this study, to look at how the religious belief of 
the poor in Nigeria can impact their behaviour towards enrolment into micro-
insurance products. In other words, how does religious belief affects people’s 
perception of the concept of micro-insurance, especially life policies?   
Nevertheless, religious beliefs can also have a somewhat negative impact on the 
performance of micro-insurance. This is in line with the position of Zelizer (1979) 
who notes that religion historically has provided a strong source of opposition to 
some forms of micro-insurance product, (such as life insurance) because many 
religious people believe that a reliance on life insurance results from a distrust of 
God’s protecting care. Similarly, in a very religious country like Nigeria, many 
people are more likely to believe that only God can protect them from any form of 
risk, including sickness and sudden death. To such people, enrolment into micro-
insurance policies represents a lack of faith in the providence of God and usurping 
of the task that belongs only to Him. Therefore, it is difficult to determine what kind 
of effect religion or religious beliefs will have on the people concerning enrolment 
into micro-insurance products. The effect may be positive or negative depending on 
(a) the dominant teaching of the religion, or (b) the kind of micro-insurance product 
in question.  
Hence by way of hypothesis 
The likelihood of individuals to enrol in a micro-insurance product will 
significantly depend on their religious beliefs. 
To test this hypothesis, we shall use the response to the below question as an 
indicator of the religious variable:  
 “Remember your thoughts in your decision-making process for or against 
taking out insurance: in a scale of 1 to 5 with 5 standing for very important, 
could you grade the below factors on their importance: “INCOMPATIBILITY 
WITH YOUR RELIGION AND TRADITION.” 
This study expects that the higher the number from 1 and 5, the higher the role 
of religion in the decision of people to enrol in a micro-insurance product. This will 
be in line with the work of Lewer & Van den Berg (2007), who used religion dummy 
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as a proximate variable in the measurement of the effect of informal institution on 
trade. Their findings suggest that conformity of the trade norms with the religious 
norms will lead to a positive impact on the ability of people to partake in trade. 
Another study with a similar approach is Barro et al. (2003). 
Risk-Aversion 
This measures the behaviour of people towards the reduction of uncertainty in 
their dealings. What are people willing to do to reduce the anxiety associated with 
uncertainties in their consumptions and welfare? Are they willing to risk reduction 
in the flow of their income or to guarantee its flow stability for a premium?  The 
question is even more difficult to answer if the insurer can not ensure the supposed 
guarantee of income stability or in the case of loss, indemnity of the loss suffered.  
Bedevilled by institutional instabilities and lack of functional risk management 
mechanisms, most individuals in less-developed nations, especially the high-risk 
averse individuals, rely on informal risk coping strategies. Most times, these 
informal risk mechanisms involve higher transaction costs because more resources 
have to be dedicated to the protection against the feared risks. In other situations, 
prospective business activities with potential higher profit are sacrificed for low 
income-generating ventures that involve lesser risks.  
Individuals develop diverse strategies to maintain long term survival and 
welfare based on their behaviours towards risk. It would be interesting to know the 
kind of impact an individual’s uncertainty avoidance will have on the development 
of micro-insurance in a country like Nigeria. This is because there is a strong case 
for either way of effect (positive or negative). High uncertainty avoidance can result 
in people’s enrolment into micro-insurance to provide for the many uncertainties 
that may come their way. Likewise, due to the uncertainties that surround the 
activities of micro-insurance providers, or the lack of strong institution for contract 
enforcement, people can as well prefer not to enrol into micro-insurance policies. 
Instead, they will prefer to make use of alternative measure such as the many 
informal risk mechanisms that involve little or no uncertainty in its modus operandi 
or even involve themselves in activities with lesser risk as well as lesser profit.   
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So by way of hypothesis 
Uncertainty avoidance will have a significant effect on the likelihood of 
individuals to enrol in micro-insurance products in Nigeria. 
To test this hypothesis, the analysis uses the responses to the question C1 in our 
questionnaire, which states: 
 What would you prefer? Select only one between (a) to make all profit now 
and face possible future loss or (b) to cover yourself with insurance and make 
less profit 
The direction of the effect of uncertainty avoidance is somehow difficult to 
grasp. While it is possible that higher risk-aversion will make it more likely for 
individuals to enrol in micro-insurance product as a welfare-enhancing mechanism, 
it could also make them more likely to opt for the use of informal instruments as 
better familiar alternative measures such as community-organized contributions or 
osusu, instead of risking their little income on a micro-insurance provider that is not 
known to keep to her promises. 
Individual responsibility and choice. 
Another informal institutional explanatory variable that influences the uptake 
of micro-insurance is testing the assumption that individuals if they are rational 
concerning their awareness of their responsibility, will be aware of the existence of 
a micro-insurance option.  
This variable is important because, if people follow the norm that they are 
individually responsible for decision making and achieving their goals, it should lead 
to individual strive for economic well-being. On the other hand, if success or 
misfortunes are perceived to be largely out of the individual’s control but rather as 
determined by God, destiny or some organic entity, people may not be inclined to 
take any actions to better their lives. Hence, where there is a sense of individual 
responsibility and choice, people will strive through their decision making and action 
to provide preventive measures against anything that poses as a storming block 
between where they are and where they want to get to.  
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Furthermore, one of the reasons why micro-insurance products have not 
received the expected acceptance by the poor could be traced to the available 
informal mechanisms against risks such as dependence on relatives. In such a 
society, one could reasonably expect to see a low level of individual responsibility 
and choice. Hence, the more people pull out of the communal or family risk pool, 
the more likely they would want to have a formal measure against the risk that may 
come their way.  
So by way of hypothesis 
Enrolment into micro-insurance products is more likely where there is an 
attitude of individual responsibility and choice. 
The analysis uses the response to the question:  “In a scale of 1-4, with 4 as most 
essential, how would you rank the essentiality of government subsidy on the 
development of micro-insurance?”  For the sake of the analysis, those that answered 
1 ‚not essential‘ represents those who exhibit a high attitude of individual 
responsibility and choice, while those who select 4 (very important), represent the 
people with the lowest attitude of individual responsibilities and choice.  
Compared against the likelihood to enrol in micro-insurance, I expect to see a 
negative and significant direct effect of low-level Individual responsibility and 
choice on micro-insurance enrollment. That is, it is expected that those who exhibit 
a low level of self-responsibility and choice represented by those who expect the 
government to provide insurance subsidies will be less likely to enrol into voluntary 
micro-insurance than those who do not expect the government to provide any 
subsidy in the sector.  
6.4 Justification for control variables 
6.4.1 Formal institutional variables 
As a control variable, the analysis includes some indexes of the formal 
institution in the estimation. This is suggested by the posited connection between 
formal and informal institutional indicators in the determination of micro-insurance 
development. For instance, the presence or absence of strong regulatory and 
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enforcement bodies explains, to a great extent, the level of trust people will exhibit 
towards the micro-insurance providers. It could also be the case that available formal 
rules in the micro-insurance sector conflicts with dominant values or norms in a 
society and hence influences people not to enrol into micro-insurance policies 
(Pejovich, 1999). For this analysis, the analysis will be using the below questions 
which point to the quality of regulatory and enforcement bodies in Nigerian micro-
insurance sector. They are  
 What is your opinion about the quality of regulation on insurance firms and 
insurance practices in Nigeria? Please answer using the scale of 1 – 5, with 5 
representing I strongly agree and 1 representing I strongly disagree (i)The 
enforcement is not effective (ii) The duration of the processing time is 
acceptable 
This study expects that the two variables will have a positive influence on the 
uptake of micro-insurance. That is, the stronger the perception of the enforcement 
of insurance rules, the more likely people are to enrol into micro-insurance policies, 
or the more people see the enforcement of insurance rules as ineffective, the less 
likely they will enrol into micro-insurance. Likewise, the stronger the assumed 
institutional quality (efficient processing of the claim), the more likely individuals 
will want to enrol in a micro-insurance product.  
6.4.2. Personal Characteristics 
Personal characteristics of the individuals are the other set of control variables 
that have been chosen for this analysis. This is because it is expected to influence, 
to a great extent, the likelihood to enrol in a micro-insurance product. For instance, 
Arun at al (2008) observed that the older an individual gets, the more likely such a 
person is to enrolling into micro-insurance. Part of the motivation for this is to 
provide for the family in case of death or to be able to meet up with the increasing 
health-related bills. Other studies with similar views on age include Jehu-Appiah 
(2011), Gaurav et al. (2011), Dercon (2011). It is the intention of this study to use 
Age as part of the personal characteristics to investigate how people of different age 
groups react to micro-insurance. The questionnaire was constructed to capture three 
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wise decisions about the unforeseen danger. Other works with similar findings 
include Chankova et al. (2008), Jehu-Appiah et al. (2011) and Akotey et al. (2011).  
 
Figure#6.3. Distribution of the sample by education level. 
Source: Chart designed by the author 
A binary variable was created to represent educated and non-educated. This will 
help us to observe the behaviour of those who are educated (classified as those with 
at least secondary education) against those who are not educated.  
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6.5 Model estimation 
The Logit and Probit model is usually used in the estimation of an econometric 
framework that has a dummy dependent variable due to its simplicity and 
appropriateness (Wooldridge, 2013). For instance, the dependent variable of this 
study is constructed from the decision to enrol in the different forms of micro-
insurance contained in the questionnaire. As such, the values of our variable will 
contain a large range of positive values that falls between having no form of micro-
insurance (0) and enrolling into all the stated five (5) forms of micro-insurance.  
Faced with this kind of data, even though a linear model would be suitable for 
capturing the expected number of micro-insurance enrolled, it has the possibility of 
predicting negative enrollment for some individuals and natural log cannot be 
introduced due to the zero (0) values (Wooldridge, 2013).  
On the other hand, Logit and Probit model allows for the restriction of 
movement in the dependent variable in the interval of 0 and 1(i.e., between enrolling 
and not enrolling into micro-insurance). It also captures the non-linear relationship 
between the probability to enrol (which moves towards one (1) at a slower rate) as 
the independent variables changes.  However, due to the advantages offered by the 
probit model in terms of its normal distribution, the decision was made to 
concentrate on its model.   
Let’s denote by 𝑌𝑖
∗  the latent continuous measure of the decision to enroll into 
micro-insurance by individual i. Hence, the following latent variable model satisfies 
the classical linear assumption (Wooldridge, 2013):  
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖       (a) 
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑘 is the set of explanatory variables that encompasses the informal 
institutional variables (Religion, Trust, Uncertainty avoidance and Individual 
responsibility and choice) and other control variables (formal institutional and 
personal characteristic variables). 𝜀𝑖 is a random error term which is assumed to 
follow a standard normal distribution. 
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𝑌𝑖 , for its part, is the observed discrete variable which is determined by the 
following model:  
 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 2 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖
∗ > 0 
.
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖
∗ < 0 
 
Hence, the probability of being enrolled into micro-insurance is defined by the 
following equation: 
       P (𝑌𝑖 = 1|X) = P (𝑌𝑖
∗> 0|X)    (b) 
= P (𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘> 0|X)     (c) 
= Ф (𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘 )    (d) 
Where Ф (.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf), and 
our predicted probabilities are limited between being enrolled (1) and not enrolled 
(0). Nevertheless, probit models only provide the direction of effect (between one 
(1) and zero (0)) and not the magnitude). For instance, application of this model in 
our regression can only tell us whether an individual is more likely to enrol or not 
enrol into micro-insurance given his level of trust, religious beliefs, risk aversion 
etc., but it does not tell us the magnitude effect of these variables on the individual’s 
decision. This is because the coefficient of the probit model is different in scale to 
the coefficient of other models, such that its coefficient is approximately 2.5 times 
that of the OLS coefficient (βprobit ≅ 2.5βOLS ). Also, the coefficient of the Logit 
model is about 1.6 time of the probit model (βLogit  ≅ 1.6βprobit) (Katchova, 2013). 
Therefore, this study will resort to marginal effects to measure the impact of 
change in the independent variables on the dependent variable. i.e., the change in the 
probability of enrolling into micro-insurance by an individual given a percentage 
change in informal institutional or other independent variables. So, applying the 
marginal effect formula to the probit model (equation d), we will get the following 
equation: 
∂p/∂xj = Ф (𝑥′𝛽) 𝛽j (e) 
As can be seen in the above model (equation e), the marginal effect (that is, 
changes in probability of Y given changes in each of the independent variable Xj), 
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will still depend on the function of X. This simply means that the marginal effect of 
each of the independent variables (say trust) on the decision to enrol (or not enrol) 
will be determined by its product with the normal density function evaluated for all 
the independent variables (Gujarati, 2012). The reason is simple: the changes in the 
probability of enrolling into micro-insurance trust level changes depends not only 
on the coefficient of the trust variable but also on the level of probability from which 
the change is measured which in effect depends on values of all the explanatory 
variables (Wooldridge, 2013). 
6.6 Result, analysis and discussion of findings  
6.6.1 Presentation of the result 
The estimation of the probit micro-insurance enrollment model on Stata led to 
the result in table #1. The result confirms the strong relationship between enrollment 
into micro-insurance and the selected independent variables of informal and formal 
institution as well as the personal characteristics. Not, however, occupational status 
and gender.  
Only two of the group dummies defined are not statistically significant: one was 
created for those employed and the other for male. Moreover, the value of pseudo-
R2, which measures the good soundness of the model is as high as 0.89. This shows 
a high level of the explanatory power of the model.  In the following session, the 
implication of each of the variables on micro-insurance enrolment based on the result 
of the estimation is analyzed. 
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different economies (Giné et al. 2008; Cai et al. 2009; Dercon et al. 2011; Cole et 
al. 2013; Eling et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2013). 
Trust is a commodity insurance firms in Nigeria need. Going by the prediction 
of Lloyd (2010) and Swiss Re (2011) on the classification of people who can afford 
micro-insurance, as well as the predicted 70% of the population living under poverty 
line according to World Bank (2018), it is clear that at least 30% of the Nigerian 
population, which is equivalent to 60 million people can afford the different 
insurance products in supply. The problem is which product and insurer can be 
trusted over long-term. Past experiences and lack of necessary institutions such as 
law enforcement makes it all the more difficult for a potential customer to trust the 
insurer (Cole et al. 2013; Eling et al. 2014) with his money,  in exchange for an 
intangible good that no one knows if and when it will be delivered. 
Religion 
As can be seen from table#1, the religious barrier is negatively statistically at 
95% significance level, in the decision of an individual to enrol in micro-insurance. 
With a marginal effect value of -0.0747, we can state that religious barriers reduce 
the probability of an individual to enrol in micro-insurance product by 0.08 percent. 
In other words, belief in different forms of religion in Nigeria minimizes the 
likelihood of religious individuals to enrol in different forms of micro-insurance by 
0.08 percent.  
How does peoples’ belief in God reduce their participation in micro-insurance? 
Well, The Scripture describes God as a stronghold or fortress for the believers in 
times of danger and misfortune (Psalm 46:1). Following from this, it is no surprise 
that some religious people regard God as most important insurance coverage 
especially in a country like Nigeria where most people lack money for more pressing 
needs such as food and water. For others, it is not the issue of lack of money but 
faith, because reliance on insurance is a form of distrust of God4 (Zelizer, 1979).  
                                                 
4 I have an uncle who lost one of his legs because instead of seeking proper medical care, he 
believed that his ‘prayer warrior’ friends will heal him. After two weeks of praying and fasting, his 
condition got worst. By the time he was bundled to hospital, there was no other way than to amputate 
his leg. How can such a person who rejected readily available and affordable medical care enroll 
into health insurance? 
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Other authors have ascribed the negative correlation between insurance 
enrollment and religious beliefs to the alternative risk prevention mechanism that 
belonging to religious group offers to the religious people. According to Scheve and 
Stasavage (2006), given the material, financial and emotional support the religious 
people receive from their religious groups, they can afford to have less demand for 
formal insurance products or policies. This is evident in Nigeria, where most people 
rely on their religious groups in time of trouble and difficulty. Other studies with 
similar findings include Hungerman (2005), and Dehejia et al. (2005). Similarly, 
some authors have tried to correlate being religious and higher wellbeing in the form 
of better health and lesser need for insurance. One of such is Freeman (1986) who 
opined that the religious are more likely to control adverse health behaviours such 
as drug use, smoking or drinking. This is in line with the work of Burnett and Palmer 
(1984), who found that people who describe themselves as being religious tend to 
purchase significantly less health insurance than the non-religious people.  
Another way to explain the result is to look at it as the effect of brainwashing of 
the religious by pastors for financial reasons. For instance, imagine a situation where 
men of God threaten their congregation with an unimaginable misfortune if they fail 
to give generously to God. They are fed with threats such as ‘a man lost his family 
in an accident because he refused to give to God’ ‘a woman lost his life savings to 
arm robbers because instead of donating to the church, she decided to keep the 
money to herself’. In such situations, due to their strong religious faith, such 
congregation will be more likely to believe that as long as they stay true to their 
religious beliefs and responsibilities, which involves giving to their pastors, they 
have no business with misfortune nor the need for any formal risk coverage such as 
insurance.  
Risk-Aversion 
The result table#1 show that risk aversion with a p-value of 0.02, has a positive 
statistical significance on the decision of an individual to enrol in micro-insurance 
product in Nigeria. Specifically speaking, with the marginal effect of .0617, it 
increases the probability of a risk-averse individual to enrol in micro-insurance by 
0.6 percent more than those who are risk-takers. This result is consistent with several 
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studies on the impact of the attitude of risk aversion on the uptake of micro-insurance 
products (Schlesinger, 1981; Szpiro, 1985; Raviv, 1979; Doherty and Schlesinger, 
1983; Chesney and Loubergé, 1986). It follows from the expected utility theory in 
which demand models usually assume that individuals are risk-averse and would be 
positively influenced by insurance consumption.   
Our result shows that Nigerians are not different in this regard. Risk-averse 
individuals in Nigeria are more likely to enrol into micro-insurance products 
because, among other things, they abhor uncertainties and would rather pay risk 
premiums in exchange of certainty such as consistent harvest, good health, etc. 
(Kruse, 2004).  
However, many studies have made a case for the adverse effect of risk aversion 
on demand for (micro) insurance products (Giné et al. 2008; Giné & Yang 2009; 
Giesbert et al. 2011; Dercon et al. 2011; Cole et al. 2013). These studies claim that 
non-performance risk-uncertainty which arise from insurer bankruptcy or contract 
exclusion make people perceive insurance as a risky product itself5 (Eling et al. 
2014).  A good example is the Nigerian insurance industry, which has failed to 
develop even though the majority of people are risk-averse.  
The history of insurance industries in Nigeria as regards their failed promises to 
their clients makes insurance one of the hardest product to sell. Instead of being 
regarded as a mechanism that offers protection from the many risks people face, it 
is now often seen as an incarnation of risks, ready to explode on the faces of those 
that place their hopes on it.  
Individual responsibilities and choice 
The findings of our estimation show that the level of individual responsibility 
and choice have a significant effect on the decision of individuals to enrol in micro-
insurance products. From the figures in table#1, the variable representing a low level 
of individual responsibility and choice shows a negative impact at a 95 percent level 
of statistical significance. With the marginal effect of -.02547, we can assume that 
                                                 
5 One of the people I approached during my field trip told me he ‘would rather take his chances 
with nature than an insurance firm that is sure to disappoint’. 
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those with a low level of responsibilities and choice are about 0.3 percent less likely 
to enrol in micro-insurance products than those with a high level. This result is 
consistent with other studies on different economies (Raschky et al. 2012; Raschky 
& Schwindt 2011; Kousky et al. 2013) that see reliance on others as a militating 
force against enrollment into micro-insurance products.  For instance, in their study 
on the effect of charity on the uptake of insurance products, Kousky et al. (2013) 
concluded that such charity crowds out market-based insurance products because 
people tend to rely on the charity of others instead of making an effort to provide the 
risk coverage that they need.  
The situation is similar in Nigeria, where most of the poor would instead rely 
on help from relatives and friends as well as on the subsidies from the government 
instead of enrolling into micro-insurance. Again, the culture in most parts of Nigeria, 
which encourages communal life and responsibilities could be part of the reason why 
the idea of micro-insurance is yet to be accepted by the people. It is unimaginable to 
most of these communities that an individual who experiences misfortune would be 
left to handle to bear the burden of the misfortune alone, even with insurance 
coverage. The culture of contributing money to those who lost someone, planning a 
marriage, gave birth to a new child or lost properties to fire is very popular in Nigeria 
and makes it harder for people to see micro-insurance maybe as an increasingly 
important complement, regardless of what most literature think.  
On the other hand, for those who do not have anyone to help them in time of 
problem, or those who desire a high level of control of their life, the idea of (micro) 
insurance is well-embraced. It offers such individuals the possibility to guarantee a 
steady level of well-being in exchange for a periodic premium payment.  
  
6.6.3 Analysis of the impact of formal institutions  
As a control variable, effective institutions and law enforcement were included 
in the study as a form of formal institution. In our result shown in table1#, the probit 
values for effective institution indicates that the variable is positively statistically 
significant.  Also, the marginal effect value of 0.04058 shows that those who 
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perceive institutions in the insurance industry as effective are about 0.4 percent more 
likely to enrol in micro-insurance than others. Also, with probit value of -0.023, the 
lack of law enforcement shows a negative statistical significance with enrollment 
into micro-insurance. That is, the probability of those who believe there is a lack of 
adequate law enforcement to enrol in micro-insurance is about 0.2 percent less than 
those who think otherwise. These results conform with other studies (such as Beck 
and Webb, 2003; Kaufman et al., 2010; Lee and Chang, 2015; etc.). 
This result confirms this study’s expectation from theory that strong formal 
institutions designed in conformity with the informal institutions will have a 
significant effect in boosting the performance of the insurance sector in Nigeria. 
Also, it explains why people are not keen to enrol into any form of micro-insurance 
product given their unpleasant experience with getting the police or court involved 
in an attempt to get what is due to them from insurance firms. The lackadaisical 
attitude of the police and prolonged court cases creates an added psychological and 
emotional torture to the loss of money being experienced by these individuals. The 
worst is that approaching these organizations involves an extra financial burden on 
the people. In line with the importance of effective institutions as well as its 
enforcement, Azfar and Matheson (1999) noted that it is the enforcement of good 
insurance laws, rather than their mere existence, which encourages clients to trust 
others with their premiums. Both good laws and their reliable enforcement are 
needed to augment the market. In fact, law enforcement has a much larger effect on 
the development of the micro-insurance industry than the mere existence of 
insurance laws. 
The behaviour of insurance agents in Nigeria with regards to the method of 
insurance marketing also amplifies the result of this study. Due to the lack of strong 
regulatory bodies by the state and the insurance firms in Nigeria,6 insurance agents 
are known to employ all kinds of tricks in their approach of prospective clients. The 
matter is a result of the incentive-driven behaviour that most insurance agents rely 
on commission from sold policies to survive. This action implies that people are not 
                                                 
6 Another reasons is that insurance intermediaries believe they could get away with almost all 
sorts of lies. 
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willing to commit their hard-earned money to any form of insurance product. In fact, 
for most people, insurance companies in Nigeria ably represented by their agents 
cannot be trusted due to unpleasant past experiences. 
6.6.4 Analysis of the impact of personal characteristics 
As figured in table #1, the dummy for old age shows a positive statistical 
significant. With a marginal effect of 0.06499, it translates that being old increases 
by 0.6% the chances to enrol in micro-insurance product.  This significant and 
positive estimate of age is in line with the result of (Beck and Webb, 2003; Ito and 
Kono, 2010) which implies that with the increase of age, individuals are more likely 
to enrol in micro-insurance due to fear of the many problems that are associated with 
old age such as economic vulnerability and frequent health-related issues. Also, 
following the use of Nigerian civil war to demarcate between the old and the young, 
this result also supports the expectation that people who were born after the war are 
more sceptical about enrolling into micro-insurance given the many problems of the 
insurance industry since the war. On the other hand, the result shows that the older 
generation, who knew the insurance industry before the war when it started having 
trust issues, are more likely to enrol in the products. 
As individuals get older, they tend to depend more on others, such as their 
children and relatives for their needs. It follows that this set of people with all else 
being equal are more likely to enrol into different forms of micro-insurance as a way 
of reducing this vulnerability or dependency on others for the satisfaction of their 
needs. This can easily be related to the situation in Nigeria where life expectancy is 
as low as 55 before which sickness and physical frailty kick in. Hence, it is expected 
that the older one gets, the more likely such a person will be to enrolling into micro-
insurance (health insurance). Also, the majority of Nigerians are involved in 
informal business activities, hence have no pension in old age. Even when they 
qualify for pensions, the scheme is so poorly organized that many die with a backlog 
of pensions owed. In such situations, dependence on pension for health-related bills 
is a risk not many are willing to take. Add to that the fact that many go on retirement 
with their children still in school and still dependent on them. These realities support 
the result that age is a significant contributor to enrolment into micro-insurance 
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products and is consistent with other studies (Beenstock et al., 1986; Truett and 
Truett, 1990; Browne and Kim, 1993). 
Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) also find that age affects people’s attitude towards 
risk. In their study, they confirm that risk aversion increases significantly after age 
65 and will result in uptake of more insurance products as a way of seeking a higher 
level of certainty. Other studies with similar findings include Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (1998) and Lin (2009). 
According to the estimation results, the dummy for education is positively 
significant at 5% statistical level (0.001). With a marginal effect of 0.122, this study 
assumes that being educated makes an individual about 1% more likely to enrol in 
different forms of micro-insurance than the uneducated.  The result confirms that 
individuals with better education tend to prefer the use of micro-insurance as a risk 
prevention mechanism; this is in contrast to the uneducated in Nigeria. The result 
verifies our expectation and indicates that educational level is an explanatory factor 
of demand for micro-insurance product. It also supports previous findings that a 
higher level of education may lead to a greater awareness of the necessity of 
insurance (Beck and Webb, 2003; Browne and Kim, 1993; Hwang and Greenford, 
2005).  
Another plausible explanation of this result is that, in relation to the realities in 
Nigeria, the result supports the expectations that the uneducated will find it difficult 
to understand the technicalities of insurance policies or documents and hence would 
prefer not to enrol into such complicated products. Also, the uneducated are more 
likely not to know the concept behind such an abstract product which promises to 
indemnify him/her for a future loss that may not even happen at all. On the other 
hand, literates have more chances of knowing the principles of insurance and 
understanding the insurance documents. It is only based on this level of awareness 
that he/she would enrol in different forms of micro-insurance as it relates to his 
pressing needs. This finding is also in line with the study by Chankova et al. (2008) 
who finds that households with no formal, primary or secondary education are less 
likely to enrol into MFI or participate in the micro-finance market than higher 
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educated households. It also supports the finding of Bendig and Arun (2011) that 
education is a significant factor for the uptake of voluntary life insurance.  
The dummy for employment, even though positively correlated to enrolment 
into micro-insurance, does not show any statistical significance with a p-value of 
0.44. Nevertheless, if it were to be significant, with a marginal effect of 0.0198, we 
can assume that being employed makes an individual about 0.2% more likely to 
enrol into different forms of micro-insurance than the unemployed, but we cannot 
distinguish significantly from the effect being 0. The lack of significance in the result 
could be due to several reasons, such as the difficulty in differentiating between who 
is unemployed and who is under-employed in Nigeria. As a result, some of the 
respondents to our survey may have indicated their status as employed just because 
they engage in some kinds of unsteady informal activities through which they 
struggle to make enough to feed themselves let alone their dependents. Also, it could 
be caused by the refusal of some to classify themselves as employed (maybe to hide 
from paying tax) even though they make more profit from their informal activities 
than those employed by the government or corporate bodies.  
However, even though the significance of the result cannot be verified, it still 
matches our expectation that those who are employed will be more likely to enrol 
into micro-insurance products than the unemployed because they have a consistent 
flow of income and can afford to pay the periodic premiums. On the other hand, the 
unemployed are more consigned with how to meet up with immediate essential 
needs before worrying about the risk that may or may not happen in future.  
According to the estimation result, being a male increases the probability of 
enrolling into micro-insurance by 0.2 % (with 0.0122 being the value of marginal 
effect) compared to being a woman. However, with a p-value of 0.62, this study 
cannot significantly distinguish from the coefficient being, in fact, 0! If it were to be 
significant, the result could be ascribed to the fact that male individuals take more 
risks than women (Schneider and Diop, 2004) and hence would be more likely to 
enrol into any form of micro-insurance products. For instance, in their study on 
which gender that undertakes adventurous activity and thus in need of insurance 
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coverage, Omogbai et al. (2002) find that men are two times more likely to be bitten 
by snakes than women.  
Another way to make sense of this finding is to relate it to the fact that women 
in most less-developed countries are more likely to be unemployed or employed on 
a part-time basis due to maternity issues and child-care. Hence, they are less likely 
than men to be eligible for employer-sponsored health insurance. This view is 
supported by the work of  Dercon and Kristnan (2000), who saw women as more 
vulnerable and uncovered by any form of insurance than their men counterpart. In 
most parts of Nigeria, there is the belief that women’s place is in the kitchen and not 
in the occupational market place. This belief informs every decision concerning the 
girl child and the boy child. Hence, from childhood, the boy child is considered for 
everything before girl child, because, according to most families ‘why waste limited 
resources on somebody that will still end up in the kitchen?’ This same mentality or 
belief is also seen in the decision to enrol for insurance. With nothing to offer than 
child-bearing and cooking, the life of a female is considered less valuable to that of 
her male counterpart, even if that is her son. Hence, this culture produces the norm 
that if anybody deserves to enrol or be enrolled in micro-insurance such as health 
insurance, it should be the male.  
Another point that supports the finding on the likelihood of male to enrol in 
micro-insurance over females is the fact that insurance firms tend to discriminate 
against the female due to what they consider the high risk associated with covering 
the female. This high risk can be in the form of child-birth mortality or 
complications, which makes the female more likely to make insurance claims. 
6.7 Robustness of the Result 
The first attempt at checking the robustness of the result was to remove the 
variables that are not significant and see if it affects the significance of the model 
nor the other variables. As can be seen from Appendix (7 and 8), the removal of 
employment (employed) and gender (male_dummy) variables does not change the 
significance of the model nor any of the independent variables.  
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The second approach adopted for robustness check was to add new variables 
into the estimation. In line with the literature, Interactive dummies such as 
working_women and educated_women were added to the estimation. Also included 
were location dummies such as east and north. As can be seen from Appendix 9 and 
10, while the significance of the original independent variables remained unchanged, 
none of the new variables was significant. The implication is that the initial model 
is robust and contains all the important variables for this study. The following 
variables which were added to the estimation proved the robustness of the estimation 
as the significance of the variables in the initial model remained unchanged. 
6.8 Conclusion. 
This chapter assesses the effect of values and norms on the probability of an 
individual in Nigeria to enrol in different forms of micro-insurance products. It also 
includes the impact of formal institutional variables as well as personal 
characteristics in terms of control variables. The study concludes that formal and 
informal institutional variables, as well as personal characteristics of the individual, 
are crucial for the likelihood of an individual to enrol in micro-insurance in Nigeria. 
The findings are in conformity with the literature review of chapters 2 and 3 that 
informal institutional norms such as trust, religion, and risk perception support 
formal regulatory reforms to achieve their designed outcomes.   Sequel to this 
finding, some implication at managerial, as well as policy level can be drawn: 
Indeed, this finding helps in understanding some issues relevant to insurance 
business strategies such as the perception of people towards insurance firms, the 
relevant organizational designs and product formulations that will help in the growth 
of micro-insurance businesses in Nigeria. For instance, it will help the managers in 
insurance firms to know how to leverage people’s culture in the design of insurance 
products. It can also increase the awareness of the insurance firms with regards to 
the implications of their ability to fulfil or default on their promises to their clients. 
By highlighting the multiple effects of the actions of the insurance firms, this study 
points out that explicit strategies by insurance firms towards rebranding of their 
image as well as the creation of transparency will have a positive effect on the 
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perception of people and eventually their interest in taking out a micro-insurance 
product. 
This study also highlights the role of the state in creating trust in the industry. 
In promulgating regulations and organization in the sector, the state should ensure 
that such is in conformity with the informal institutions of the people. Such 
conformity will make the regulations acceptable to the people and increase the 
chances of their participation.  
Finally, the study exposes the types of individuals that are more likely to enrol 
for micro-insurance products. This will help the insurance firms in the screening of 
who to approach or who to target in the design of their products. 
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6.10 Appendix 
Appendix 6.1: Descriptive summary of the variables 
 
 
Appendix 6.2: OLS regression estimate 
 
 
  male_dummy          230    .5043478    .5010716          0          1
                                                                       
    employed          230    .5869565    .4934544          0          1
educated_d~y          230    .3304348    .4713956          0          1
      oldgen          230    .2434783    .4301174          0          1
lack_enfor~t          230    3.252174    1.293879          1          5
effective_~t          230    2.882609    1.321357          1          5
                                                                       
low_ind_resp          230    2.843478    1.179085          1          4
Risk_avers~n          230    .3086957    .4629628          0          1
 rel_barrier          230    .5869565    .4934544          0          1
 trust_index          230    .6328804    .1443382      .4375      .9375
enrolled_d~y          230    .2652174    .4424117          0          1
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize $ylist $xlist
                                                                                  
           _cons     .1021385   .1302802     0.78   0.434     -.154625    .3589019
      male_dummy    -.0459236   .0305636    -1.50   0.134      -.10616    .0143129
        employed    -.0355432   .0309607    -1.15   0.252    -.0965622    .0254759
  educated_dummy     .3987787   .0419179     9.51   0.000     .3161647    .4813928
          oldgen     .1002463   .0349274     2.87   0.005     .0314096    .1690831
lack_enforcement    -.0258162    .013015    -1.98   0.049     -.051467   -.0001654
  effective_inst     .0278491   .0142372     1.96   0.052    -.0002104    .0559086
    low_ind_resp    -.0614721   .0160007    -3.84   0.000    -.0930072    -.029937
   Risk_aversion      .170687   .0382059     4.47   0.000     .0953886    .2459854
     rel_barrier    -.0872647   .0373196    -2.34   0.020    -.1608162   -.0137132
     trust_index     .3601472   .1371283     2.63   0.009     .0898871    .6304072
                                                                                  
  enrolled_dummy        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
       Total    44.8217391       229  .195728118   Root MSE        =    .21909
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.7547
    Residual    10.5125607       219   .04800256   R-squared       =    0.7655
       Model    34.3091784        10  3.43091784   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(10, 219)      =     71.47
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       230
. reg $ylist $xlist
. * Regression 
. 
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Note: 103 failures and 17 successes completely determined.
                                                                                  
           _cons     -7.92792   3.570468    -2.22   0.026    -14.92591   -.9299317
      male_dummy     .3450819   .6949525     0.50   0.620       -1.017    1.707164
        employed     .5581696   .7272704     0.77   0.443    -.8672542    1.983593
  educated_dummy     3.429752   .9880852     3.47   0.001      1.49314    5.366363
          oldgen     1.826174   1.074617     1.70   0.089    -.2800357    3.932384
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  effective_inst     1.140179   .5198814     2.19   0.028     .1212297    2.159127
    low_ind_resp    -.7159008   .3442111    -2.08   0.038    -1.390542   -.0412595
   Risk_aversion     1.735316   .7470956     2.32   0.020     .2710355    3.199596
     rel_barrier    -2.101086   .8422246    -2.49   0.013    -3.751816   -.4503564
     trust_index     5.865636   2.657142     2.21   0.027     .6577325    11.07354
                                                                                  
  enrolled_dummy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log likelihood = -14.929227                     Pseudo R2         =     0.8878
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(10)       =     236.23
Probit regression                               Number of obs     =        230
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Appendix 6.5: Probit regression (2) 
 
 
Appendix 6.6. Marginal effect estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 
          _cons     -7.92792   3.570468    -2.22   0.026    -14.92591   -.9299317
     male_dummy     .3450819   .6949525     0.50   0.620       -1.017    1.707164
       employed     .5581696   .7272704     0.77   0.443    -.8672542    1.983593
 educated_dummy     3.429752   .9880852     3.47   0.001      1.49314    5.366363
         oldgen     1.826174   1.074617     1.70   0.089    -.2800357    3.932384
law_enforcement    -.6485981   .3012933    -2.15   0.031    -1.239122   -.0580742
 effective_inst     1.140179   .5198814     2.19   0.028     .1212297    2.159127
       ind_resp    -.7159008   .3442111    -2.08   0.038    -1.390542   -.0412595
   Uncert_avoid     1.735316   .7470956     2.32   0.020     .2710355    3.199596
    rel_barrier    -2.101086   .8422246    -2.49   0.013    -3.751816   -.4503564
    trust_index     5.865636   2.657142     2.21   0.027     .6577325    11.07354
                                                                                 
 enrolled_dummy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
Log likelihood = -14.929227                     Pseudo R2         =     0.8878
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(10)       =     236.23
Probit regression                               Number of obs     =        230
                                                                                  
      male_dummy     .0122818   .0244581     0.50   0.616    -.0356552    .0602187
        employed     .0198658   .0252592     0.79   0.432    -.0296414     .069373
  educated_dummy     .1220681   .0178214     6.85   0.000     .0871388    .1569973
          oldgen     .0649953   .0342296     1.90   0.058    -.0020935     .132084
lack_enforcement    -.0230842   .0090883    -2.54   0.011     -.040897   -.0052715
  effective_inst       .04058    .015092     2.69   0.007     .0110003    .0701598
    low_ind_resp    -.0254796   .0105164    -2.42   0.015    -.0460913   -.0048679
   Risk_aversion     .0617615   .0209647     2.95   0.003     .0206716    .1028515
     rel_barrier    -.0747796   .0224977    -3.32   0.001    -.1188744   -.0306849
     trust_index     .2087635   .0813272     2.57   0.010      .049365    .3681619
                                                                                  
                        dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Delta-method
                                                                                  
dy/dx w.r.t. : t ust_index r l_barrier Risk_aversion low_ind_resp effective_inst lack_enforcement oldgen educated_dummy employed male_dummy
Expression   : Pr(enrolled_dummy), predict()
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                        Number of obs     =        230
. margins, dydx(*)
174 
Appendix 6.7:Robustness check: probit regression  
 
 
 
Appendix 6.8: Robustness check: Marginal  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
           _cons     -6.54499   2.800322    -2.34   0.019    -12.03352    -1.05646
  educated_dummy     3.377098   .9174668     3.68   0.000     1.578896      5.1753
          oldgen     1.561974   .8856504     1.76   0.078    -.1738691    3.297816
lack_enforcement    -.6648675   .3023444    -2.20   0.028    -1.257452   -.0722834
  effective_inst      1.05409   .4609486     2.29   0.022     .1506471    1.957532
    low_ind_resp    -.7046987   .3136653    -2.25   0.025    -1.319471   -.0899261
   Risk_aversion     1.663962   .6615823     2.52   0.012     .3672849     2.96064
     rel_barrier    -1.859786   .7300846    -2.55   0.011    -3.290726   -.4288466
     trust_index     5.216615   2.406789     2.17   0.030     .4993955    9.933835
                                                                                  
  enrolled_dummy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log likelihood = -15.263787                     Pseudo R2         =     0.8853
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(8)        =     235.56
Probit regression                               Number of obs     =        230
                                                                                  
  educated_dummy     .1236195   .0168464     7.34   0.000     .0906012    .1566378
          oldgen     .0571764    .029158     1.96   0.050     .0000277    .1143251
lack_enforcement    -.0243376   .0094272    -2.58   0.010    -.0428146   -.0058607
  effective_inst     .0385852   .0136651     2.82   0.005     .0118021    .0653683
    low_ind_resp    -.0257957   .0098756    -2.61   0.009    -.0451514   -.0064399
   Risk_aversion     .0609098   .0181915     3.35   0.001     .0252551    .0965644
     rel_barrier    -.0680779    .020505    -3.32   0.001     -.108267   -.0278888
     trust_index     .1909555    .079069     2.42   0.016     .0359831    .3459279
                                                                                  
                        dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Delta-method
                                                                                  
dy/dx w.r.t. : trust_index rel_barrier Risk_aversion low_ind_resp effective_inst lack_enforcement oldgen educated_dummy
Expression   : Pr(enrolled_dummy), predict()
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                        Number of obs     =        230
. margins, dydx(*)
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Appendix 6.9: Robustness check: Probit (with married variable) 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.10: Robustness check: Marginal estimation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
           _cons    -11.44055   5.541007    -2.06   0.039    -22.30072   -.5803736
         married    -3.056937   1.389747    -2.20   0.028     -5.78079   -.3330831
  educated_dummy      5.83517    2.08159     2.80   0.005     1.755329    9.915011
          oldgen     2.722102   1.448818     1.88   0.060    -.1175294    5.561733
lack_enforcement    -.8686157   .3970178    -2.19   0.029    -1.646756   -.0904752
  effective_inst     1.759775   .8531289     2.06   0.039     .0876735    3.431877
    low_ind_resp    -.9435726   .4977045    -1.90   0.058    -1.919056    .0319104
   Risk_aversion     2.661747   1.192614     2.23   0.026     .3242661    4.999228
     rel_barrier     -3.49146   1.658388    -2.11   0.035    -6.741841   -.2410789
     trust_index     10.55069   4.747285     2.22   0.026     1.246177    19.85519
                                                                                  
  enrolled_dummy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log likelihood = -9.1612613                     Pseudo R2         =     0.9311
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(9)        =     247.76
Probit regression                               Number of obs     =        230
                                                                                  
         married    -.0659941   .0236636    -2.79   0.005     -.112374   -.0196143
  educated_dummy     .1259716   .0284449     4.43   0.000     .0702206    .1817225
          oldgen     .0587656   .0274819     2.14   0.032     .0049022    .1126291
lack_enforcement     -.018752   .0064316    -2.92   0.004    -.0313577   -.0061462
  effective_inst     .0379906    .014849     2.56   0.011      .008887    .0670942
    low_ind_resp    -.0203702   .0090508    -2.25   0.024    -.0381094   -.0026309
   Risk_aversion     .0574627   .0200269     2.87   0.004     .0182106    .0967147
     rel_barrier    -.0753748   .0293765    -2.57   0.010    -.1329517   -.0177978
     trust_index     .2277716   .0767932     2.97   0.003     .0772597    .3782835
                                                                                  
                        dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Delta-method
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Appendix 6.11 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. Dear Lady/Sir, first we want to find out some personal information about you. 
1. Gender.  
i. Male [  ] ii. Female  [  ] 
2. Education:  
i. Primary   [  ] ii. Secondary   [  ]    iii. Graduate [  ]   iv. Uneducated   [  ] 
3. Family status  
i.  Married/living with partner  [  ]   ii. Divorced/widowed    [  ]   iii. Single  [ ] 
4. Occupation:   
i. Student [  ] ii. Self employed[  ] iii.civil servant [  ]  iv. private employee [  ]  
v. unemployed [  ] 
5. Age: 
i. 25-45. [  ]  ii. 46-65. [  ]  v. Above 65 [  ] 
6. Location (state of residence):_____________________________________ 
7. Religion i. [  ]  Christian, ii. [  ]  Muslim, iii. [  ]   Pagan, iv. [  ]   traditionalist,  
B. Dear Lady/Sir, second, we want to learn something about your relationship with 
and possibly, use of micro-insurance 
1. What micro insurance services do you know (heard about)? What insurance did you 
take out? 
 
2 For what main reasons would you purchase micro-insurance?  Please select from 1 
– 5 with 5 for very important and 1 for Not important at all 
i. I purchase insurance To protect from future losses          
 
 
Possible insurance services  know of this Insurance contract  
taken  
i Life insurance   
ii Health (including illness and accidents)   
Iii Property (including crop, cattle, goods etc.)   
Iv Civil liability/Public Liability   
v Obligatory policies, (including car, house, 
office insurance) 
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 1[  ]   2[  ] 3[  ]   4[  ]   5[  ] 
ii. I purchase insurance To share possible losses within a group                 
 1[  ]   2[  ]  3[  ]  4[  ]  5[  ] 
iii. I purchase insurance To serve as investment opportunities                    
 1[  ]   2[  ]  3[  ]  4[  ] 5[  ]   
iv. I purchase insurance To help me meet health related bills                       
1[  ]   2[  ]  3[  ]  4[  ] 5[  ] 
v. I purchase insurance To save money for the future                                   
 1[  ]   2[  ]  3[  ]  4[  ] 5[  ] 
3 To what extent do you trust the insurance companies in Nigeria? Please rank from 1-
5 with 5 representing completely trust them and 1 representing No Trust at all 
1[  ] 2[  ] 3[  ]  4[  ]        5[  ] 
      3b: Which 3 of the following can increase trust on insurance firms? 
 i. [  ] keep promises   
ii. [  ] community tailored policies/products   
iii. [  ] Partner with trusted bodies/organizations  
iv. [  ] Publish performance for the public  
v [  ] Increase claim ratio 
4. How often did you get insurance advert from these sources? (very often =4, often =3, 
few times = 2, not at all = 1) 
And how would you grade their trustworthiness? (In a scale of 5 for very 
trustworthy to 1 for not trustworthy) 
 
 
Information sources Where I got 
information 
(1, 2, 3, 4) 
Most trusted 
source(s) 
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
i Media Advert (t.v, Radio, internet newspaper, etc.)   
ii Word of mouths from a trusted channel   
iii Company Agents   
iv From your existing insurer   
iv Others (please specify)   
 
5. From your experience, would you advise relatives or friends to enrol in voluntary 
micro-insurance? Where do you tend more towards  More YES,[  ]or More NO [  ] 
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6. Remember your thoughts in your decision-making process for or against taking out 
insurance: in a scale of 1 to 5 with 5 representing very important, could you grade 
the below factors on their importance. 
I. You don’t know the idea behind this institution. 1[  ]  2[  ]   3[  ]  4[  ]  5[  ] 
II. lack of finance;               1[  ] 2[  ]   3[  ]  4[  ]   5[  ] 
III.  lack of trust;                                                         1[  ] 2[  ]  3[  ]   4[  ]   5[  ]   
IV. Incompatibility with your religion and tradition; 1[  ]  2[  ]  3[  ]  4[  ]   5[  ] 
V. It is long, bureaucratic process                              1[  ] 2[  ]  3[  ]  4[  ]   5[  ] 
VI. I have an alternative with informal institution.    1[  ]  2[  ]  3[  ]  4[  ]   5[  ] 
8.  What mode of premium payment would you prefer for your micro-insurance 
policies   
i. [  ] Yearly  
ii. [  ] Half Yearly 
iii. [  ] Quarterly  
iv. [  ] Monthly 
v. [  ] One-time payment 
vi. [  ] Anytime you like within the year 
C. Dear lady, dear sir, now I want to ask you about your opinion on the way that 
micro-insurance works in our country 
1. What would you prefer? Select only one 
  i) to make all profit now and face possible future loss or  
  ii) to cover yourself with insurance and make less profit 
2. What is your opinion about the quality of regulation on insurance firms and insurance 
practices in Nigeria?   Please answer using the scale of 5 to 1 with 5 representing I 
strongly agree and 1 representing I strongly disagree 
i. The existing regulations are not effective.             1[  ] 2[  ] 3[  ] 4[  ]  5[  ] 
ii. The enforcement is not effective.                1[  ] 2[  ] 3[  ] 4[  ]  5[  ] 
iii. The duration of the processing time is acceptable  1[  ] 2[  ] 3[  ]  4[  ] 5[  ] 
    3.  In a scale of 1-4, with 4 as most essential, how would you rank the essentiality of 
government subsidy on the development of micro-insurance                              
    1[  ] 2[  ] 3[  ]  4[  ] 
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Chapter 7 
7. The Role of Institutions in the relationship between micro-
insurance development and Size of the Informal economy in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
7.1 Introduction 
The provision of suitable risk-mechanisms for most of the risks faced by people 
(the majority of whom are low-income earners) in less-developed regions, especially 
in sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries, has been a tall order to both the governments 
of these countries as well as actors in the risk management business. While on the 
one hand, given the many economic volatilities and lack of necessary institutions, it 
is difficult for insurance companies to carry out an accurate measurement of the 
actuarial values of many of these risks; the states in these region, on the other hand, 
find it difficult to provide a comprehensive form of social security program for their 
people and thereby make the pain of uncertainties and lack of insurance services 
severe. Given the risk-prone environment the poor in these regions find themselves 
as discussed in chapter 2, they are entrapped in a vicious circle of poverty that 
exacerbates their problems. 
In their quest for survival, most of the poor people end up in the informal 
economy. Not only do they operate their business activities in this sector; they also 
use the many risk mechanisms available in the informal sector as an alternative to 
the missing formal insurance and social protection services. Given that majority of 
the poor live in less-developed countries, it explains why most of the less-developed 
countries especially those in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) have a large average size of 
informal economy presently 38% of GDP, which is above the 34% in south Asia, 
the 23% in Europe and 18% for developed countries (Medina and Schneider, 2017). 
The enormous difference that exists between the sizes of informal economy in low-
income countries and advanced countries gives rise to the hypothesis that informality 
of institutions seems to correlate with poor economic performance while formality 
(which is a reflection of higher government capacity) tends to be paired with better 
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economic performance/higher economic development levels. This is no surprise 
given that the informal economy is dominated by people who desire to evade paying 
tax and other contributions to the state. It is also dominated by individuals who 
barely survive from the little they make given the lack of access to formal financial 
sector, and those who find it difficult to break out of poverty trap that has a strong 
grip on their communities, thereby making it difficult for them to pay any form of 
tax.   
One of the reasons why this thesis sees the notion of micro-insurance just like 
other forms of microfinance, as a tool of financial inclusion for the un and under-
served (as discussed in  chapter 2)  is because it has the potential to replace the 
informal risk mechanisms (which is inferior to both micro-insurance and the formal 
insurance sector) as well as the formal insurance sector mainly dominated by the 
employees in the formal economy and traditionally excluding the poor who most 
times operate in the informal economy(Morduch, 1999; Churchill 2006). Again, 
based on the many theories of insurance such as utility theory, prospect theory etc 
(see chapter 2), which all agree on the fact that households enrol in insurance when 
their preference or utility is in agreement with benefit maximization, micro-
insurance can be used by the state to incentivize the poor into formalizing their 
businesses and reducing the size of informal economy. For instance, governments 
can use subsidized micro-insurance products to incentivize the poor to legalize their 
business so as to benefit from the micro-insurance programs. Again, micro-
insurance introduces the poor to the financial sector which can metamorphose into 
access to loans if certain steps are fulfilled such as full business registration and 
submission of proof of tax payment. In line with the micro-finance development 
which highlighted the poor people’s ability to pay back their loans and hence more 
inclusion by commercial banks, enrolment into micro-insurance can also initiate a 
new relationship between the state, insurance firms and the poor, which will lead to 
a level of trust that can bring about more business interactions.  
In this way, the size of informal economy in less-developed countries can be 
reduced as well as offering better financial services to those who for one reason or 
the other are stuck in the informal economy. However, this goes beyond the scope 
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of the thesis: the analysis presented here is concerned with the role of micro-
insurance in driving back the dominance of informal risk mechanisms within the 
informal economy. The effect of micro-insurance on the pure financial aspect of 
finance and its role on the finance-part of the informal economy is a matter of 
analysis of the financial markets.  It is however also noted that the above negative 
connotation attached to the informal sector must not turn a blind eye to the 
undoubtedly positive effects that the informal sector can have, in particular where it 
fills a gap that the formal sector cannot fill. What remains as comparative 
disadvantages, however, is the lack of enforcement of rule of law, reliability of 
transactions, etc. as well as the tendency of the informal sector – due to its state of 
illegality – to be dominated by criminal activities. Many authors have highlighted 
beneficial aspects of the informal economy (as including its creation of some form 
of a market with its benign allocation effects where otherwise no market would exist 
(Bhattacharyya, 1993; Asea, 1996; Schneider and Enste, 2000); and its effect on 
promoting entrepreneurship (Fields, 1990; Cunningham and Maloney, 2001; 
Maloney, 2004). The expectation that this may serve as a learning platform for 
entrepreneurial activity in a socialist system (see e.g. “schools of socialism” 
(Hartwig, 1985, see also Brezinski, 2000) or even in the formal and official sector 
of a competitive market system has been desperately disappointed in the case of the 
transformation process in Central and East Europe (see exemplarily Brezinski, 
1991). 
Nevertheless, the expectation that micro-insurance can help the poor formalize 
their sources of income and alleviate their sufferings from the adverse economic 
effects of a risk materialising (e.g. illness in health insurance; income-.gaps due to 
droughts in some form of agricultural insurance; loss of income-generating assets 
(wealth) in case of a disaster in property insurance, etc.) are based on the condition 
that the necessary complementary institutions and organizations are in place and 
functioning (see chapter 2 and 3). Regardless of how determined the governments 
and other actors in the insurance sector are in promulgating a good (micro) insurance 
sector in SSA, it is probably safe to assume that such determination may neither 
improve economic welfare nor decrease the size of informal economy in the region 
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given the notorious weak state of most kinds of institutions in most SSA countries. 
For instance, Chong and Gradstein (2007) pointed out the effect of weak institutions 
on the performance of pro-poor policies as including discriminatory selection and 
lopsided distribution of who gets government-sponsored insurance policies, lack of 
judicial protection of the poor and pervasive corruption. Again, not only do customs 
like discriminatory taxation (De Soto, 1898) and trends like high and continuously 
growing birth and unemployment rates (Tokman, 2001) provide increasing 
motivation to resort to the informal economy, the harsh regulations guiding the 
processes of formalization of business do little to help motivate the fight against the 
informal economy. Conversely, where institutions are becoming stronger and less 
biased, the size of informal economy will tend to decrease given the better job 
opportunities, fair labour regulations, and tax regimes (Kaufmann and 
Lobaton,1998; Dreher et al., 2005). In the same way, micro-insurance as a form of 
financial development and in compliment to good institutional quality may 
contribute in reducing the size of informal economy as well as improve the overall 
economic welfare of the poor. 
Sequel to this, this study is intended to investigate, how micro-insurance 
impacts the size of informal economy in SSA (i.e. can it assume an important role 
in driving back the informal economy, in contributing to the transformation from 
informal to formal economy) and how does the quality of institutions influence this 
impact of micro-insurance on the informal economy. Given the presentation of 
micro-insurance as a poverty-reducing tool, this study expects that the benign role 
of micro-insurance on the size of informal economy is counter-effected by weak 
institutions. This malign influence is expected to increase in weight with falling 
institutional quality. The rest of this study is organized as follows: Section two looks 
at the major theories of informal economy. Section three describes the data and 
methodology, followed by analysis and discussion of results in section four. The 
study is then concluded with some recommendations in Section five. 
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7.2 A theoretical review of Informal economy 
To understand how micro-insurance can provide a shield against materializing 
risks, extending financial services to the poor and as a tool to enlarge the role of the 
formal economy at the expense of the informal economy requires an understanding 
of how informal economy works. Even though there has been a different view on 
the exact definition or classification of the type of economic activity that falls into 
this sector, the work of Merina et al. (2017) shows that the African continent has one 
of the largest size of informal economy mostly dominated by low-income workers 
who barely survive. These include the young adult male carrying fare on his 
motorcycle, selling mobile phone recharge cards at traffic junctions or who owns a 
second-hand road-side shop for clothing materials, shoes or bags in major cities of 
Africa. The list also includes the herdsmen, the small scale farmers, and children 
hawkers whose economic activities are carried out outside the official markets of the 
economy. 
Other authors have looked and classified the sector in different ways but at the 
same time pointed out the huge contribution the sector makes to the overall 
performance in some of the poor countries. In fact, given the contribution of the 
sector and the fear of what would have been if the sector had not existed, the World 
Bank opines that the debate about workers in the informal sector have shifted 
considerably from a fairly negative connotation of powerlessness and vulnerability 
to a more positive depiction of entrepreneurs and innovation that requires 
complimentary effort from government and other formal institutions towards its 
formalization or betterment (World Bank, 2003). Theoretically speaking, the 
different view of the authors about informal economy can be grouped into three main 
approaches: the dualist, the structuralist, and the legalist/illegal/survivalist 
approaches. 
The dual approach which is considered the foremost theory of informal 
economy (ILO, 1972; Sethuraman 1988; Tokman, 1978) is propagated by authors 
who described an economy as consisting of two unlinked dual sectors. The various 
forms include traditional and modern sector (Boeke, 1953), upper and lower circuits 
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(Santos, 1973), modern and traditional economies (Sethuraman, 1976), formal and 
unofficial economies (Losby et al, 2002), formal and informal income opportunities 
(Hart, 1973) rich and poor (Sethuraman, 1981), and finally trade-service and 
industrial sector (Reynolds, 1969). Even though worded in different ways, these 
concepts are similar in their suggestion that an economy is made up of two distinct 
sectors in which relative advantages exist in one over the other. For the purpose of 
the focus on the informal economy, the dual concept describes an economy which 
operates at two extremes - periphery and mainstream and assumes that the informal 
economy, operating on the periphery is destined to disappear once a sufficient level 
of development is attained (Igudia, et al. 2014). According to this approach, one part, 
the mainstream, is made up of the formal economy (also known as the official 
economy) and operates under the purview of the state. By contrast, the other part is 
the informal or unofficial economy which exists as an alternative for the poor, but at 
the same time represents a systematic flaw and failure in the economic model of a 
country (Bureau and Fendt, 2011; Chen, 2007; Becker, 2004). The informal 
economy leads to a high level of corruption, results in inadequate jobs for the people, 
and locks an economy into a state of underdevelopment. The way out is assumed to 
be a shift from the informal to the formal economy. However, the dualistic view has 
been contested for its interpretation of the informal economy as a temporary, 
survival-oriented sector that will automatically fizzle out over time.  
In contrast to dualism, the structuralist theory, popularised by Moser (1978) 
and Castells and Portes (1989), argues that formal and informal economies are 
interconnected and interdependent, and the latter exists due to the structured 
development within the capitalist mode of production. They reject the assumed 
temporal character in the dualist theory but rather insist that the informal economy 
is a necessary complement for the continual survival of the formal economy 
(Dell’Anno and Halicioglu, 2010; Moser, 1978). For instance, they see the informal 
economy as the result of formal firms’ attempts to reduce the cost of labour, increase 
competitiveness, reduce the power of labour unions, avoid or limit state regulations, 
and respond to global competition and industrialization (Castells and Portes, 1989; 
Becker, 2004; Chen, 2007). Part of the claim by the structuralist theory is that firm 
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owners engage in a power struggle with the state in response to the latter’s legislation 
on taxes and social security, and as a result, uses the informal economy to reduce the 
cost of starting up and running their businesses in the formal sector. 
The third approach recognizes the informal economy as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon that consists of a variety of organizational arrangements and 
motivations. Among this approach are the legalist (De Soto 1989; Chen 2012), the 
voluntarist (Maloney, 2004; Chen, 2012) and illegal theories (WIEGO, 2011).  Both 
legalist and voluntarist theories hold that some economic actors opt for the informal 
economy in an attempt to do everything within their means to avoid costs, time and 
hostile legal system set by the state for operations in the formal system (De Soto 
1989; Chen 2012). On the other hand, the illegal thrust appears to be on the 
experiences of transitional and advanced countries, as it views informal economic 
activities as illegal, hidden or underground and effecting cost for the whole 
economy.  Part of these costs, according to WEIGO (2011), include avoidance of 
tax payments and infringements of labour laws, absence of property rights, inability 
to enforce contracts, avoidance of fees and penalties, which of course results in the 
inability to receive benefits from the formal sector. 
The different views about the informal economy testify for its heterogeneous 
and complex nature. While some market participants operate in the informal 
economy to avoid cost and regulations prevalent in the formal economy, others turn 
to the informal sector to survive after being excluded from the formal economy for 
no fault of theirs. Also, while some are there to avoid entry barriers into the formal 
economy, others will be happy to formalize their businesses if these barriers are 
reduced. Regardless of the preferred theory, in terms of the responsibility of the state, 
its policies have to be guided towards complementing the efforts of those who seek 
for survival in the formal sector, while at the same time facilitating a sufficiently 
low-cost formalization process for others who want to move into the formal 
economy. 
It is precisely here, where the quality of institutions and the instrument of micro-
insurance come into play to effect their twofold role related to risk coverage for low-
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income workers and at the same time serving as a luring factor to formalize 
businesses. 
7.3 Theoretical and conceptual review 
The analysis of this study is based on the framework of discrimination theory 
of Becker (1957).  In his opinion, Becker states that discrimination (e.g. against 
certain groups of customers) is cheaper when there is little competition between 
suppliers of goods or services for customers, but this possibility is competed away 
if the entry barriers for new firms are sufficiently low. In relation to micro-insurance, 
the discrimination against poor customers that cannot afford the traditional insurance 
policies is cheaper when there is little competition between insurers, but 
discriminating against potential customers of micro-insurance policies turns into a 
loss of business opportunities, if the entry barriers for new insurance firms is 
sufficiently low. Therefore, reforms in the insurance sector that intensify 
competition among insurance providers will reduce discrimination and expand both 
the micro-insurance coverage ratio and the economic security of the disadvantaged 
group, thereby reducing the size of informal economy. Hence these theories (this 
theory) predicts that an improvement in the institutional quality, in particular an 
increase in intensity of competition will lead to a better performing micro-insurance 
sector and help in the inclusion of more people into the mainstream economy (formal 
economy) and thereby reduce the size of the informal economy. With the countries 
of SSA being particularly burdened with low institutional quality, these benign 
effects can be assumed to be particularly strong here. 
7.4 Data 
This study investigates a panel data of 34 Sub-Saharan African countries over 
the period of 2000 to 2014 with data from multiple sources. The choice of the 
selected countries and the time frame for the study was mainly dictated by the 
availability of reliable data. The full description of the data is as follows: the 
dependent variable is the size of the informal economy obtained from Medina and 
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what extent the state is controlled by the few elites at the expense of the poor 
majority in an economy. 
(ii) Rule of Law (ROL): It captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. In particular, it emphasizes the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
(iii) Regulatory Quality (RQ): Captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote both private sector development and other forms of business in an 
economy. 
(iv) Government Effectiveness (GE): This sub-component captures perceptions 
of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures. It also captures the quality of policy 
formulation/implementation and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies. 
(v) Voice and accountability (VA): It measures the extent to which citizens in 
a country can take part in political processes and hence their willingness to support 
their leaders through the payment of tax as well as other levies from which the 
system is sustained. 
(vi) Political stability (PA): This sub-component combines indicators about 
perceptions of the likelihood that existing governments will be overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means. 



)LJXUH3ORWRIVL]HVRILQIRUPDOHFRQRPLHVDJDLQVWWKHTXDOLWLHVRILQVWLWXWLRQV
LQWKH6XE6DKDUDQFRXQWULHV
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VFRPSXWDWLRQXVLQJ:RUOG%DQNGDWD6WDWD
$VFDQEHREVHUYHGIURPILJXUHRQDYHUDJHDOOWKHFRXQWULHVLQWKHVWXG\IDOO
EHORZWKHUDQNRIZLWKLQWKHWREUDFNHWRIWKHLQGLFDWRUV,QIDFWRQO\
RIWKHFRXQWULHVLQRXUVWXG\UHDFKHGWKHPLGSRLQWRIDOORWKHUVIDOOLQWRWKH
DUHDRIEDG LQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\7KHVLPSOHUHJUHVVLRQ OLQHUHGVORSHIURPJRRG
TXDOLW\LQVWLWXWLRQVWRSOHIWWRKLJKVKDUHVRIWKHLQIRUPDOVHFWRUERWWRPULJKW
DOVR VXSSRUWV RXU DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW KLJK LQVWLWXWLRQDO TXDOLW\ZLOO KDYH D QHJDWLYH
HIIHFWRQWKHVL]HRIWKHLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\)RULQVWDQFH0DXULWLXVZKLFKKDVWKH
VPDOOHVW VL]H RI WKH LQIRUPDO HFRQRP\ DOVR HQMR\V WKH EHVW LQVWLWXWLRQDO UDQNLQJ
DPRQJWKHFRXQWULHVXQGHULQYHVWLJDWLRQ2QWKHRWKHUKDQG1LJHULDZLWKDQDYHUDJH
LQVWLWXWLRQDOUDQNRILVWKHVHFRQGKLJKHVWLQWHUPVRIWKHVL]HRIWKHLQIRUPDO
HFRQRP\



)XUWKHUZHLQFOXGHGWZRDGGLWLRQDOYDULDEOHVWKDWDUHRIWHQFRQVLGHUHGLQWKH
UHOHYDQWOLWHUDWXUHDVFRQWUROYDULDEOHVLQDQDO\VHVRIWKHVL]HRILQIRUPDOHFRQRP\
7KH\LQFOXGHSRSXODWLRQJURZWKDQGODERXUIRUFHSDUWLFLSDWLRQUDWH
3RSXODWLRQJURZWK7KH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ WKHSRSXODWLRQJURZWKDQG WKH
LQIRUPDOHFRQRP\LVHVWDEOLVKHGWKURXJKWKHVL]HRIXQHPSOR\PHQWLQDQHFRQRP\
,Q FRXQWULHV ZLWK DOUHDG\ KLJK XQHPSOR\PHQW UDWHV DQG PLVVLQJ RU LQVXIILFLHQW
XQHPSOR\PHQW EHQHILWV DV LV WKH FDVH LQ PRVW $IULFDQ FRXQWULHV JURZWK LQ
SRSXODWLRQ LV H[SHFWHG WR LQFUHDVH WKH XQHPSOR\PHQW UDWH DV ZHOO DV WKH UDWLR
EHWZHHQWKRVHZKRGRQRWKDYHHPSOR\PHQWDQGKHQFHGHSHQGRQWKRVHZKRGR
+HQFHDVORQJDVJURZWKLQSRSXODWLRQLVQRWPDWFKHGE\HPSOR\PHQWJURZWKWKH
VRFDOOHGMREJHQHUDWLQJJURZWKPRUHSHRSOHZLOOUHVRUWWRWKHLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\
DVDSODWIRUPIURPZKLFKWKH\VHHNIRUVXUYLYDO

)LJXUH3ORWRIVL]HVRILQIRUPDOHFRQRPLHVDJDLQVWSRSXODWLRQVL]H$IULFD
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VFRPSXWDWLRQXVLQJ:RUOG%DQNGDWD6WDWD
)RULQVWDQFH1LJHULDZLWKDSRSXODWLRQRIRYHUPLOOLRQSHRSOHDQGDKLJK
UDWH RI XQHPSOR\PHQW VKDUH RI SHRSOH DWZRUNLQJ DJH WKDW DUH QRW HPSOR\HGRI
DURXQGSHUFHQWLQVHH,/2HVWLPDWLRQVLVOLNHO\WRH[SHULHQFHDQLQFUHDVH
LQWKHLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\ZLWKIXUWKHUSRSXODWLRQJURZWKVHHILJXUH
193 
 
Labour force participation rates: Many authors such as Contini (1981) have 
linked the size of the informal economy to the rate of labour force participation7. 
Just like the population growth, it is expected that the more people are willing to be 
economically active without however sufficient employment opportunities, the more 
likely the size of the informal economy will grow. It is also important to point out 
the possibility of reverse causation given that a decline in the rate of labour force 
participation may result in a movement of the workforce vice versa. However, the 
fitted slope of the below figure #6 suggests that, on the average, the rate of labour 
participation has a positive correlation with the size of the informal economy for 
most of the 34 countries under investigation. 
 
 
Figure#7.6: Plot of sizes of informal economies against labour force participation 
rate in the SSA 
Source: Author’s computation using World Bank data (Stata 14) 
                                                 
7 It is the sum of all persons in working age who furnish the supply of labour for the production 
of goods and services devided by the sum of all people in working age. 
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exists between the dependent and independent variables.  However, the OLS model 
does not account for country fixed-effects and may suffer from omitted variables 
bias or exhibit a nonzero correlation between the covariate and the lagged 
idiosyncratic errors, such that E(εit|xit) ≠ 0, thereby violating a basic assumption of 
the model. To counter these potential problems, the application of a fixed-effect 
model (FE) will not be sufficient, because while such a specification would be able 
to correct the country fixed effect problem, the other problems (in particular of 
course the correlation of a dependent variable with the error-term are still present, 
Nickell, 1981). 
Sequel to the problems associated with the FE model, where endogeneity exists 
between micro-insurance coverage ratio and the size of informal economy, the 
System of Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) is applied. GMM model, 
according to Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991),, is suitable for 
a panel data that has a number of cross-section (in this case, 34 Sub-Saharan 
countries) larger than the time variable (15 years). Blundell and Bond, (1998) 
defined GMM as a dynamic panel data estimator that controls for the endogeneity 
of the lagged dependent variable in a dynamic panel model i.e. when there is a 
correlation between the dependent variable and the error term in a model. Other 
regression problems that a GMM model specification controls for includes a 
potential omitted variable bias, the possibility of unobserved panel heterogeneity or 
measurement errors in the raw data. Within the family of GMM models, the analysis 
here decided to use system GMM instead of the difference GMM  because, while 
difference GMM corrects for endogeneity and removes FE, it subtracts the previous 
observation from the existing one to thereby magnify data-gaps in unbalanced 
databases.  
System GMM corrects endogeneity by introducing more instruments to 
improve efficiency and transforms the instruments to make them uncorrelated 
(exogenous) with the FE (Bond, 1998). It builds a system of two equations (the 
original and the transformed one) and uses the orthogonal deviation (subtracts the 
average of all available observations of a variable). No matter how many gaps, it is 
computable for all observations except the last one for each individual, so it 
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minimizes data loss (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The decision to apply system GMM 
is in line with the two rules of thumb for the application of GMM. In the first rule of 
thumb, Blundell-Bond (1998) states that if the dependent variable in an equation like 
the one above was persistent and close to being a random walk (i.e. parameter of the 
lagged dependent variable is tilting towards one), the application of the difference 
GMM estimator yields both a biased and inefficient estimate of the parameter in 
finite samples due to the use of poor instruments, and this is particularly acute when 
the time span is short as in our case (2000 – 2014). In such a situation, system GMM 
estimator should be used (Blundell-Bond, 1998). The second rule of thumb by Bond 
(2001) states that the autoregressive model should be initially estimated by pooled 
OLS and fixed effect approach. The pooled OLS estimate for the parameter should 
be considered an upper-bound estimate, while the corresponding fixed effects 
estimate should be considered a lower-bound estimate. If the difference GMM 
estimate obtained is close to or below the fixed effects estimate, this suggests that 
the former estimate is downward biased because of weak instrumentation and a 
system GMM estimator should be preferred instead. The consistency of the system 
GMM estimator is assessed by two specification tests. The Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions tests for the overall validity of the instruments, while the 
Arellano-Bond auto-correlation AR (2) test examines the null hypotheses that the 
error term is not serially correlated. Failure to reject both null hypotheses gives 
support to the model (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell 
and Bond 1998). 
This study applies the optimal weighting matrices of the two-step system GMM 
to investigate the effect of micro-insurance coverage ratio on the size of informal 
economy because it has been proven to be more efficient than the one-step estimator 
(Law et al. 2014). Also, to limit the proliferation of instruments, this estimation uses 
forward orthogonal deviation in place of first differences (Balgati, 2008). 
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7.7 Empirical Results 
This study begins by regressing the individual sizes of the informal economies 
for the period 2000 - 2014 against the individual sizes of the micro-insurance 
coverage ratio and the quality of institutions for a cross-section of 34 Sub-Saharan 
countries. As additional controls,  population growth, and labour force are included 
in the regression. In the first step, the results of the pooled OLS model is reported, 
and no attempt is made at this stage to control for the above-discussed problems with 
panel data as yet. 
The results in table#3 below show that the previous year’s size of the informal 
economy is a strong predictor of its current level. This suggests path dependency of 
the size of the informal sector, which is an expected result given that the 
determinants of the informal economy tend to be rather stable over time. However, 
the micro-insurance coverage ratio shows an unexpected insignificant impact on the 
size of informal economies. At this (admittedly premature) stage, the analysis 
suggests that the changes in the sizes of micro-insurance industries were, on their 
own, too small to have a significant impact on changes in the sizes of informal 
economies in those Sub Saharan African countries during this time period. On the 
other hand, as expected and in conformity with other similar studies, the institutional 
variable has a significant negative impact on the size of informal economy in this 
sample: a unit increase in the quality of institutions is predicted to lead to a 0.56-unit 
reduction in the size of the informal economy. A further test of an interaction term 
between micro-insurance and quality of institution turns out to be equally 
insignificant for the size of informal economy. 
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Table#7.3: Pooled OLS regression. 
 
Source: Author’s computation using Stata 14 
For For the other variables, while population growth shows a negative 
correlation with the size of informal economy, that of labour participation indicates 
a positive impact: a one-percentage-point increase in the population growth is 
predicted to cause the size of informal economy to decrease by roughly 2 percentage 
points. On the other hand, a one-point increase in the rate of labour force 
participation causes the size of informal economy to increase by roughly 6.27 
percent. 
Before the decision to use a system GMM model specification is followed, a 
difference GMM is applied to the data. Table#4 presents the obtained coefficient for 
lag of informal economy (0.96 for the pooled OLS, see table#3 for the full table), as 
well as that of the FE model (0.84, see appendix#1 for full table) which are higher 
than both the first (see appendix#2 for full table) and second (see appendix#3 for 
full table) step difference GMM estimates (0.38 and -0.48 respectively). Therefore, 
a model specification with system GMM is applied. 
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informal economy increases to 0.08 percent ceteris paribus. This indicates that on 
it's own, micro-insurance industry does not reduce, but rather increases the size of 
informal economy in sub-Saharan Africa. 
On the other hand, the variable for institutional quality across model 
specifications 1 and 2 indicates a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
size of the informal economy. A one-unit increase in the quality of institutions 
reduces the size of informal economy by 7.8 and 9.3 percent, respectively across the 
two specifications. This result is consistent with other similar studies (such as 
Johnson et al.,1998; Friedman et al., 2000; Krakowsky, 2005; Dreher and 
Schneider,2006; Loayza et al., 2005). When the institutional variable interacts with 
the micro-insurance variable, it shows an even more negative effect on the size of 
the informal economy. In the second model specification, the interactive variable 
indicates that the size of informal economy is decreased by 0.19 percent when micro-
insurance and the institutional quality interactive dummy increase by one unit ceteris 
paribus. For the control variables, as expected, across the model specifications 1 and 
2, the labour participation variable shows a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the size of informal economy, while population growth surprisingly is 
predicted to have a negative and statistically significant effect on the size of informal 
economy. Given the choice of a one-year lag length, with values of 0.395 and 0.502 
for column one and two respectively, the specification test results of the AR(2) 
reveal that the models do not suffer from second-order serial correlation, and the 
Hansen test results show that the instruments used are not over-identified. Thus well-
conjectured inferences can be made from these results. 
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Some salient points can be deduced from the results. Firstly, the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for the measure of micro-insurance development 
across the two model specifications is likely an indication of the state of under-
development of the micro-insurance sector in most Sub Saharan African countries. 
It shows that the present arrangement in the sector is not a contributory driver 
towards reducing the size of informal economy, but rather encourages it. A plausible 
explanation of this can be found in the various substandard, government-sponsored 
micro-insurance products, especially health-related programmes, that encourage 
people to hide their sources of income to benefit from such sponsorship. The 
introduction of these programmes without the necessary complementary institutions 
leads to biased selections and encourages people with formal employment to present 
themselves as poor and unemployed just to benefit from such programmes. A second 
explanation lies in the interaction of micro-insurance development and quality of 
institutions: this term receives a negative coefficient for the size of the informal 
economy which suggests that if the quality of institutions is controlled for and given 
a positive increase in micro-insurance, then the size of informal economy will fall. 
That is, if such government programmes, as well as other forms of micro-insurance 
policies, are matched with good institutional arrangements, it will lead to the desired 
effect of offering a path to formality for those in informal economy. 
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appendix#6 for detailed table) reinforces the previous findings in column (1) and 
(2): the institutional quality proxy, the population measure, as well as the interaction 
term between institutional quality and micro-insurance persist in their negative and 
statistically significant effects on the size of informal economy. Also, the measures 
of micro-insurance coverage ratio and labour participation still show a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the size of informal economy. The result of the 
specification test shows that the models are also well specified which again can be 
interpreted that the results are robust and can be relied upon for useful inference. In 
comparison to the system GMM specification in column (2), the successful addition 
of additional variables here shows that both model specifications satisfy the 
empirical assumptions of consistency and efficiency, each on their own terms. The 
addition of more variables does not improve the quality of the first model, and it 
remains at the discretion of the reader to choose the preferred version. In terms of 
the hypothesis testing, both equally, signal the same result. 
Another robustness check is carried out on the lag limits of the estimation. Since 
the system GMM is fragile to arbitrary lag limits, a test for 2 lags was carried out 
(see Column 4 of table#5 and appendix#7 for full table). From the result obtained, 
the only notable difference is that the estimation suffers from second-order 
autocorrelation with a significant statistical AR (2) and should hence be rejected.  
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7.10 Conclusion 
Does the development of micro-insurance help in reducing the size of the 
informal economy? And what is the role of the institutional quality in the size of the 
informal economy in Sub Saharan Africa in the time period analysed here? Using 
balanced panel data of 34 countries from 2000 to 2014, this study applies a variety 
of econometric methods of analysis and invests more tests to test for the robustness 
of results.  This study contributes to the informal economy literature by providing 
support for the hypothesis that, by controlling institutional quality, (by controlling 
for institutional quality) a positive development of the institution of micro-insurance 
contributes to reducing the size of the general informal economy. Even though 
micro-insurance showed a positive and significant correlation with the size of 
informal economy, an interactive variable between micro-insurance and the quality 
of institutions results in a negative and significant correlation with the size of 
informal economy. Support is also found for the time-persistence of informal 
economy for the case of SSA, given the positive coefficient of the lagged informal 
economy.  However, given that only one of the 10 indicators of micro-insurance 
development offered by the relevant literature was used for this study (even though 
the attempt was made to use the one that turned out to be most robust in the current 
state of the art in the academic community), it is possible that the results will be 
different when other indicators of the development of micro-insurance are added to 
the experiment. Evidence is also provided on the persistence of informal economy 
in SSA given the positive coefficient of the lagged informal economy. The measure 
of institutional quality also turns out to be negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that a better institutional framework will lead to a reduction in the size of 
informal economy in SSA. It is, therefore, a recommendation that emanates from 
this study that any meaningful reform should be centred on the institutions in the 
country. When such is done, every other effort, including micro-insurance 
development, will achieve the targeted objectives. 
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Appendix#7.2: One-step difference GMM estimation. 
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Appendix#7.3: Two-step difference GMM estimation. 
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Appendix#7.4: Two-step system GMM estimation. 
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Appendix#7.5: Two-step system estimation with interactive variable (mic*iq). 
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Appendix#7.6: Two-step system GMM estimation – Robustness check 1. 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(26)   =  30.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.231
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(26)   =  33.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.150
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.67  Pr > z =  0.502
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.31  Pr > z =  0.001
                                                                              
    D.(inf_econs_lag mic) collapsed
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)
    _cons
    pop mic labour year
  Standard
Instruments for levels equation
    L(1/14).(inf_econs_lag mic) collapsed
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)
    FOD.(pop mic labour year)
  Standard
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation
Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable.
                                                                               
        _cons     856.1625   78.21298    10.95   0.000      697.037    1015.288
         year    -.4186852   .0385003   -10.87   0.000    -.4970146   -.3403559
          pop    -1.51e-07   4.53e-08    -3.33   0.002    -2.43e-07   -5.89e-08
       labour     4.78e-07   1.22e-07     3.91   0.000     2.30e-07    7.27e-07
       mic_iq     -.188225   .0269555    -6.98   0.000    -.2430664   -.1333836
           iq    -9.297821   .7397115   -12.57   0.000    -10.80277   -7.792866
          mic     .0756132   .0090493     8.36   0.000     .0572022    .0940241
inf_econs_lag     .4070455   .0473229     8.60   0.000     .3107663    .5033247
                                                                               
    inf_econs        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        14
F(7, 33)      =   2736.79                                      avg =     14.00
Number of instruments = 34                      Obs per group: min =        14
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        34
Group variable: c_id                            Number of obs      =       476
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
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Appendix#7.7: Two-step system GMM estimation – Robustness check 2. 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(25)   =  26.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.375
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(25)   =  27.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.327
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.91  Pr > z =  0.363
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.63  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
    D.(inf_econs_lag mic) collapsed
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)
    _cons
    gdpgr pop mic labour year
  Standard
Instruments for levels equation
    L(1/14).(inf_econs_lag mic) collapsed
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)
    FOD.(gdpgr pop mic labour year)
  Standard
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation
Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable.
                                                                               
        _cons     709.7787   107.4501     6.61   0.000       490.91    928.6474
         year     -.347341   .0527396    -6.59   0.000    -.4547682   -.2399139
          pop    -1.81e-07   6.07e-08    -2.97   0.006    -3.04e-07   -5.69e-08
       labour     5.83e-07   1.66e-07     3.51   0.001     2.44e-07    9.21e-07
        infln     -.043962   .0088143    -4.99   0.000    -.0619163   -.0260078
        gdpgr    -.0990244   .0304769    -3.25   0.003    -.1611038   -.0369449
       mic_iq    -.1018626   .0495871    -2.05   0.048    -.2028682    -.000857
           iq    -7.205385   1.403557    -5.13   0.000    -10.06434   -4.346433
          mic     .0530858   .0130087     4.08   0.000     .0265881    .0795836
inf_econs_lag     .5362302   .0776958     6.90   0.000     .3779691    .6944913
                                                                               
    inf_econs        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        14
F(9, 32)      =    971.27                                      avg =     13.97
Number of instruments = 35                      Obs per group: min =        13
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33
Group variable: c_id                            Number of obs      =       461
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
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Chapter 8 
8. How does micro-insurance impact the economic growth of 
Nigeria? 
8.1 Introduction 
The field of micro-insurance has received increased attention in recent decades 
with micro-finance units, communities, government agencies, and private insurance 
companies starting to serve as providers. Concerning growth and development, the 
attention received is well placed, because, many scholars describe micro-insurance 
to be a vital instrument in the fight against poverty. In both the literature reviews of 
chapter 2 and 3 as well as the empirical studies carried out in chapters 6 and 7, this 
thesis tried to show micro-insurance as an alternative form of conventional insurance 
services targeted at the poor, and hence able to provide the much-needed risk 
coverage, as well as empowerment of the un- and underserved poor to make a 
sustainable exit from poverty (see also Siegel et al., 2001, Churchill 2002; Dercon 
et al., 2008; Jenzen and Carter, 2013). This findings presents a somewhat answer to 
the concerns of some policymakers in governments, national and international 
development agencies, economists and civil societies on how effective this micro-
insurance is as welfare and growth-enhancing tool.  
However, I am aware that the studies carried out in these chapters focused on 
specific aspects of the economic life of the poor and does not satisfy the question as 
to the impact of micro-insurance on the overall economic growth in less-developed 
nations. I am also aware that any attempt to answer that question is a tall order given 
that micro-insurance, unlike conventional insurance or even micro-finance (that has 
received considerable number of impact assessment studies (such as Swein and 
Wallentin 2009; Maldonando and Gonzalez-Vega, 2008; Kondo et al., 2008; 
Hartarzka and Nadolnyak, 2007 and; Brau and Woller, 2004)), is still very new and 
hence not many studies have been carried out on its overall economic impact. 
Among the few available evaluations, health micro-insurance has received most 
attention especially the numerous mutual health schemes in Africa, as can be seen 
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in Jutting ( 2004); Ranson (2001); Preker et al. (2002); Mosley (2003), Ekman 
(2004); Wagsraff and Pradhan (2005); Diop et al. (2006); Dror et al. (2006); Asfaw 
and Jutting (2007), Schneider and Hanson (2007); Wagstaff et al. (2007). The main 
emphasis of these evaluations has been on the economic and household impact of 
different types of health insurance schemes on health care utilization, out of pocket 
expenditure, or social inclusion (Chankova et al., 2008; Gumber, 2001; Jowett et al., 
2004). This is in line with the consideration that health is the most demanded and 
the most donor-supported segment of micro-insurance. On the other hand, life 
insurance and non-life insurance such as property, livestock and weather insurance 
have received little attention (Dercon and Kirchberger 2008). 
In Nigeria, most of the studies on the performance of micro-insurance have been 
done analyzing micro-insurance schemes under the umbrella of different forms of 
conventional insurance such as health, life and other mandatory insurance services. 
This is because the idea of micro-insurance is still mainly unpopular to most people, 
including insurance operatives even though most of the available insurance policies 
are technically micro-insurance in the way they operate. In fact, it was just recently 
in December 2013 that the Nigerian insurance commission (NAICOM) officially 
launched the micro-insurance business as part of an attempt to increase the insurance 
penetration ratio of about 1% of the over 180 million people in Nigeria. In Nigeria 
as well as in most less-developed countries, the different forms of insurance targeted 
at the poor such as universal health schemes, group agricultural insurance schemes, 
and life insurance schemes are most times evaluated against the size of premiums 
they generate. While some researchers use total premiums (e.g. Ward and 
Zurbruegg, 2000; Adams et al., 2009), others distinguish between life- and non-life 
insurance in their analyse (e.g. Webb et al., 2002; Haiss and Sumegi, 2008; Arena, 
2008). Yet, the design and mode of operation of these policies suggest that simple 
measurement via premium may not be the best method to measure its impact on the 
economy. In Nigeria, for instance, there are many agricultural micro-insurance 
policies where the insured are expected to pay for the coverage with farm products. 
These kinds of policies need more than a simple aggregation of premiums to capture 
their impact.  
223 
 
To this effect, many organizations, such as the ILO Micro-insurance or, the 
micro-insurance academy (MIA), have invested considerable resources in micro-
insurance impact research. (ILO/GTZ 2016). For instance, Insurers organized in the 
Microinsurance Network have initiated the development of 10 micro-insurance 
performance ratios that are summarized in performance indicators handbook (Wipf 
and Garand, 2008).  The 10 indicators include: (1) net income ratio, (2) incurred 
expense ratio, (3) renewal ratio, (4) incurred claim ratio, (5) promptness of claims 
settlement, (6) claims rejection ratio, (7) growth ratio, (8) coverage ratio (9) liquidity 
ratio, and (10) solvency ratio. They provide potent benchmarks that address some of 
the potentials and weaknesses of the present offers of micro-insurance. However, 
getting data for these indicators is still a tall order given their infant nature as well 
as the fact that most micro-insurance policies are new with insufficient data both at 
firm and country level.  
 
However, there is significant data on one of the indicators of micro-insurance, 
namely the coverage ratio, which can contribute towards better measurement of the 
impact of micro-insurance. It is the proportion of the target population enrolled into 
micro-insurance policies in a defined region and its inclusion in the study can 
contribute, more than aggregated premiums, to assess the impact of micro-insurance 
on the welfare of the people and overall economic growth.  As a form of conclusion 
of this thesis, this chapter will make use of this micro-insurance indicator to 
investigate its overall economic impact in Nigeria, which is the focus of this thesis.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follow: the next section provides the literature 
review and describes a theoretical framework conducive to the analysis of the impact 
of micro-insurance on economic growth. The research data and modelling procedure 
used is explained in the following section, followed by a description and a discussion 
of empirical results. 
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8.2 The conceptual and theoretical framework 
In the field of development economics, as reviewed in chapter 2, the concept of 
micro-insurance fulfils two distinct objectives: (i) to provide the needed financial 
and social services to the low-income households and (ii) as well as tap from the 
enormous economic potentials deposited in the ‘bottom billions’. This follows the 
theoretical position that insurance services are a cardinal part of the needed financial 
system necessary for efficient channelling of savings to investments and 
implementing innovations towards substantial economic growth. (Solow, 1956, 
Merton, 2004).    
 
 Hence, in countries with a substandard financial system and a large population 
of uninsured poor, a functional micro-insurance system is expected to play the six 
cardinal insurance roles, which includes:  
     “provision of means for clearing and settling payments to facilitate exchange 
of goods and services; provision of mechanism for pooling resources; resource 
allocation; risk management; provision of price information to help in coordinating 
decentralized decision making in various sectors of the economy and provision of 
means to tackle the problem of moral hazard, physical hazard and information 
asymmetry”. (Ukpong and Acha, 2017, pg 30 ). 
Following the Solow model of economic growth and previous studies into the 
role of insurance for growth that typically adopted the indicator of insurance 
premium and assets as proxies of the state of development of the insurance industry 
(with its effect to increase capital productivity), this study uses the indicator of 
micro-insurance coverage ratio8 in the estimation of an empirical growth model. For 
instance as participation in micro-insurance policy opens the possibility for those in 
the informal sector to formalize their activities (see chapter 7), an increase in the 
micro-insurance coverage ratio is expected to impact on capital productivity because 
                                                 
8 The Microinsurance Network defined micro-insurance coverage ratio as the proportion of the 
target population participating in different forms of micro-insurance policies (Wipf and Garand, 
2008). 
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it includes more people as active participants into the financial system. Also, 
assuming that the coverage ratio signifies the number of people benefiting from 
better risk tool, such as better health care, it will have a positive relationship with 
the quality of labour and economic productivity. (Anderson 1997; Slade 1997). The 
use of the micro-insurance coverage ratio provides a generic estimation of the 
economic impact of different forms of micro-insurance policies operated by 
government, non-governmental organizations as well as insurance firms. The ratio 
is available in the sufficiently reliable form of official statistics for the case of 
Nigeria.  
8.3 Literature review 
Studies on the impact of micro-insurance on economic growth are documented 
in diverse forms. These include investigation on micro-insurance impact as a 
financial protection mechanism, its impact on the health status of the individuals as 
well as the distributional impacts. (ILO/GTZ 2016). However, very few conceptual 
and empirical studies are available for the case of Nigeria (Gustafsson-Wright, 
2013).  
Radermacher et al. (2009) is among the many studies carried out on the impact 
of micro-insurance on financial protection. He pointed out that, assuming rational 
behaviour, risk coping strategies that weaken the productive capacity of the 
households and reduce the likelihood of incurring damaging payments in the face of 
a health shock are being limited for those being covered by formal insurance 
contracts. This leads to more profitable investments and an increase in the economic 
growth of a nation. For instance, micro-insurance helps to better allocate the 
resources available to households which also leads to increased (steady-state) 
economic growth, because the capital-intensive alternatives of self-insurance 
decisions (or informal mechanisms) to mitigate risks or smooth consumption such 
as diversification of the crop or to engage in different substandard income-
generating activities are not needed anymore. Dercon et al. (2008) find a positive 
effect of micro-insurance on both the ex-post and ex-ante behaviours and decisions 
of households. He concludes that enrolment into micro-insurance enables 
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individuals and small businesses to maintain a stable consumption pattern and avoid 
asset loss. Another study with similar findings is Janzen and Carter (2013). With the 
use of difference-in-difference, matching, Heckman sample selection, and 
instrumental variables techniques, they investigated the impact of micro-insurance 
on households’ asset accumulation and human capital investment in Kenya. Their 
findings show that micro-insurance can protect households against the liquidation of 
production assets and malnutrition, which will lead to increased human capital and 
economic growth.  Other studies with similar findings (such as Ekman, 2004; Pham 
and Pham, 2012; Dercon et al. 2012; Gustafsson-Wright, 2013), conclude that micro 
health insurance provides some financial protection by reducing out-of-pocket 
spending and improving savings.  
 
Micro-insurance has also been shown to improve individual/household health 
in households with coverage, especially amongst the poor who would not, otherwise, 
be able to afford such medical treatment. According to these studies, such a positive 
impact on health helps an economy to maximize the available labour force in the 
production process, which leads to beneficial socio-economic performance. In terms 
of growth theory, this refers to the availability of human capital as a production 
factor for the economy, both in terms of quantity (e.g. in less days of absence from 
work due to better health and faster recovery from injuries and illnesses) and in terms 
of quality (higher labour productivity of workers that are fit and fully recovered from 
injuries and illnesses). Such positive impact includes increased access to medical 
treatment (De Brock and Ontiveros, 2013); favourable height/weight for age and on 
body mass index (Wagstaff and Pradhan, 2005); and reduced probability of taking 
sick leave from work (Sheth, 2013). On the other hand, Binagwaho et al. (2012), in 
their study of the effect of mutual health insurance on the health status of  Rwandan 
children, find mixed results. According to their findings, the program contributed to 
improvement in stunting and reduction in the rate of mortality at the critical ages but 
had a weak effect on overall health outcomes. In their study of the impact of a health 
insurance program in Kenya, Dercon et al. (2012) find no significant difference 
between individuals with and without an insurance policy. There is no final verdict 
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on this matter, but it seems that micro health has more positive than negative impact 
on health. Another effect of micro-insurance that is less controversial is its 
externality impact at the community level. For example, health insurance can 
produce positive information externalities through improved preventive behaviour 
so that individuals who are not insured can also benefit.  
On the other hand, Morduch (2006) points towards a possible negative price 
effect of insurance during times of shocks when insured individuals drive up the 
price of goods such as food, and further diminish the lot of the uninsured. In such a 
situation, the welfare of the uninsured is worse off relative to a world where no one 
is insured. Also, there is the possibility that enrolment into insurance will induce the 
insured to take more risks and add more burden on the existing weak national 
measures for crises prevention (John and Knedlik, 2011). 
As far as the Nigerian economy is concerned, only very few studies have tried 
to carry out investigations on how micro-insurance is performing. This is surprising 
given that insurance schemes for the poor have existed for some time in Nigeria, 
even if not under the proper name of micro-insurance.  Eze and Okoye (2013) in 
their investigation of the effect of insurance practices on the economic growth of 
Nigeria from 1980 to 2011 reported a significant impact on economic growth. With 
the use of unit root test, Johansen co-integration tests, and error correction models 
in data analysis, they observed that insurance premium, as well as insurance 
investment, has led to better performance of the Nigerian economy. Other studies 
with similar findings include Oke (2012) and Shittu (2012) who both connected 
micro-insurance to better technological advancement and saving rates, respectively. 
To specify the search for the impact of different forms of micro-insurance on 
the economic growth of Nigeria, we shall introduce micro-insurance coverage rate 
as a new variable in the conventional insurance study model. The expectation is that 
such an introduction in the existing body of knowledge will give a better insight into 
the effect of micro-insurance on both the lives of the low-income households as well 
as on the economic growth.  
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8.4 Theoretical model and empirical analysis 
Based on the economic growth model of Solow (1956), this tests a Log-Linear 
model modified from models used by Marijuana et al. (2009) and Oke (2012). It 
selects GDP as a measure of economic growth, while the list of independent 
variables representing the development indicators for micro-insurance development 
includes: micro-insurance coverage ratio; Gross insurance premium (which is 
measured by the total sum of premium income from life and non-life policies); and 
insurance asset. The theoretical form of the hypothesis-testing model is hence: 
Yi=β0+β1Xt+β2Xt+β3Xt +μt     (1) 
where 
   Y = Gross domestic product, (GDP) 
 β0  = constant parameter 
   X = micro-insurance coverage rate (MIC) 
   X = Gross premiums (Grossprem) 
   X = Total insurance assets (InsAsset)  
     β1-4 = Explanatory variables 
   t  = time 
μ    = Error term 
I would change this immediately into the empirical form: 
LnGDPt = F(LnMICt-1, LnGrosspremt-1, LnIns_assett-1, T, et ) (2)  
Data used is taken from central bank of Nigeria (CBN) Bureau of Statistics 
Database, Micro-insurance Network website and NAICOM website covering the 
year 2000 to 2016 for a time series regression analysis and an estimation of the 
relative effects of correlates using Stata. The nomination is in Naira (N), the national 
currency of Nigeria. As a way of checking efficiency and unbiasedness of estimates, 
the following steps were included in the analytical framework: data description, 
stationarity test, co-integration test, vector error correction model (VECM), and 
finally the model-estimation with its usual diagnostic test: 
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mean and has a flat surface. The same applies to micro-insurance coverage ratio 
(MIC) with a skewness value of .59 and a kurtosis value of 1.7. 
The below correlation matrix displays the strength and direction of the bilateral 
relationships between the variables table#2): GDP is highly and positively correlated 
with MIC (9.4)  and mildly correlated with insurance asset (ins_asset) 0.36. On the 
other hand, with -0.87, GDP shows a negative correlation with the gross insurance 
premium. Two of the independent variables (mic -0,83 and ins_asset -0.18) also 
show a negative correlation with the third independent variable (grossprem).  A 
further correlation test (see appendix 1a), shows that the correlation of insurance 
asset with GDP is not significant. 
Table #8.2: Correlation matrix 
 
Source: Table computed by the author using stata 
8.5.2 Stationarity test 
To estimate a good model of co-integration, it is indispensable to check whether 
all the time series used are stationary (of the same integration order) or whether they 
contain trends. This is necessary because the assumptions of OLS posit this; 
otherwise, OLS would not be possible. This is done by running several stationarity 
tests on the series, such as simple inspection of the graphical representation of our 
variables, Engler-Granger rule of thumb, Dicky-Fuller/ Augmented Dicky-Fuller 
(DF/ADF) or Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. These tests help to control trends in the 
variables (most importantly upward movement over time) which can compromise 
the OLS regression and may not allow distinguishing between spurious effects and 
a positive test of the hypothesized role of the determinant.  
   ins_asset     0.3551   0.2664  -0.1812   1.0000
   grossprem    -0.8682  -0.8284   1.0000
         mic     0.9430   1.0000
         gdp     1.0000
                                                  
                    gdp      mic grossp~m ins_as~t
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differences. At each of the levels, both the p-values and the absolute values of the 
statistical tests for the two methods (DF and PP) cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the series contains a unit root which indicates that the variables may be non-
stationary. The result is also the same for the logged variables at level values (line 
5(a-b) to 8(a-b)).  However, at first-order difference (line 5(c-d) to 8(c-d)), the p-values of 
the obtained results for both logged GDP and the three logged independent variables 
are all significant as well as higher than the 5% critical values in absolute terms. 
Hence the conclusion is that the series is stationary at first-order difference. A 
pictorial observation of the series at first-order of difference (see appendix #3) 
confirms this stationarity. Sequel to the result from the first order differencing, it is 
now possible to estimate the statistical co-integration model.   
8.5.3 Co-integration test 
Having established stationarity of time series through first-order differences of 
both DF and PP tests, the next step of analysis has to investigate the order of co-
integration to determine the type of relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables. This is done by using the two prominent cointegration tests 
– Johansen cointegration and Engle-Granger cointegration test. In other words, now 
that possible trends or auto-regressional problems in the time series were removed, 
the analysis now tries to establish whether there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between economic growth and micro-insurance coverage ratio as well 
as gross insurance premium and asset accumulation. The presence of co-integration 
vector implies the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
variables. In such a case, and regardless of fluctuations (such as temporal economic 
recession or expansion), there is a tendency that economic growth and the 
independent variables (which include the micro-insurance coverage ratio) will return 
to the equilibrium path in the long run. On the other hand, no evidence of co-
integration shows that no long-run equilibrium relationship between economic 
growth and micro-insurance coverage ratio (or gross insurance premium and assets 
can be established (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). 
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Having determined the optimal lag of the variables to be 2 (see appendix #4), 
the below figure #2 contains the result of the co-integration test with the null 
hypothesis that there is no co-integration. We can reject this null hypothesis in each 
of the ranks (or maximum equations) at the 5 percent level of significance if the 
values of Trace and Max statistics are higher than the 5 percent critical values. 
In the below co-integration test (see figure #2), the null hypothesis that there is 
no co-integration is rejected. While the trace statistical values for rank 0 to rank 3 
are 133.2, 50.7, 21.9 and 6.2 resp., that of 5 percent critical values from rank 0 to 3 
are 47.2, 29.7, 15.4, and 3.8.  As can be observed in the Max statistical values for 
rank 0 to 3, this rejection of no co-integration is supported by the Max statistical 
values. This simply means that there are more than three (3) co-integration 
relationships between the dependent and the independent variables, which permit 
the estimation of a long-run equilibrium relationship between economic growth and 
micro-insurance coverage ratio as well as gross insurance premium and asset.10  
 
Figure #8.2: Johansen test for co-integration 
Source: Table computed by the author using stata 
                                                 
10 Of course, the number of observations is rather low for any kind of time-series analysis and 
cointegration tests. This is however, reminiscent of the general lack of data that is sufficiently reliable 
to warrant analysis. The results are hence to be interpreted with some extent of caution. 
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asset -0.76 (0.29) have a short-run causal effect on GDP at a 5% level of significance. 
MIC 0.05 (0.346) and Grossprem 0.65 (0.154) does not have short-run causal impact 
on our model because both coefficients are not statistically significant.  
This long term relationship between micro-insurance and economic growth 
confirms that development of the micro-insurance industry will not only help the 
low income poor to mitigate their risks but also contribute to the economic growth 
of Nigeria. This finding is consistent with the findings of several scholars who saw 
micro-insurance as both a developmental and an economy building tool (Churchill, 
2002).  Nevertheless, the result also shows that gross premium will at long last 
continue to exhibit a negative effect on the economy. While this is not the expected 
result, given the theoretical position that insurance premium increases savings or 
investment capital, other authors (Cristea et al. 2014; Zouhaier, 2014; Kjosevski, 
2011) have reported similar findings concerning gross premium.  
8.6 Diagnostic test on VEC Model (robustness of the model) 
To authenticate the result from our VEC model, it is important to perform some 
diagnostic test on the model. Three main diagnostic tests of the VEC model were 
carried out, which includes testing for autocorrelation problems, the normality test 
(of the error distribution) and the model stability test (Wooldridge, 2002). The 
autocorrelation test (see Appendix #6) confirms that the VEC model does not have 
autocorrelation even at the second lag of the variables. By imposing 3 unit moduli, 
the stability test (see Appendix #7) also confirms that the model is stable. This 
finding is supported by the result of the Jarque-Bera error normality test (see 
Appendix #8). With values of 0.67409 for the main equation (LGDP) as well as 
0.07 for the whole equation, the errors of the equation, as well as the overall 
equation, are normally distributed: the normality hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
These robustness tests confirm the authenticity of the model that explains the impact 
of micro-insurance coverage ratio, as well as gross insurance premium and assets to 
determine the economic growth through GDP. 
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8.7 Conclusion and recommendation 
This study used 17 years’ data to confirm the important role of micro-insurance 
in the economic growth of Nigeria. This lends support to the call for relevant 
stakeholders such as government, NGOs, and insurance companies to increase their 
efforts towards the development of this industry. Among the most important findings 
of the analysis, there are the following: 
First, micro-insurance coverage ratio had a significant long term positive impact 
on the economic growth of Nigeria during the 17 years between 2000 and 2016. That 
is, an increase in the number of people that enrol for, or are covered by, different 
forms of micro-insurance in Nigeria have resulted in economic growth. Quite 
independent of economic shocks, which might disrupt this relationship, the 
equilibrium of micro-insurance coverage and economic growth is predicted by the 
empirical model to readjust over time. This result is consistent with other findings 
(see, e.g. Swiss Re, 2010; Siegel et al., 2001; ILO-STEP 2006; Schmidt et al., 2005) 
that considers micro-insurance a formalized risk management solution to poverty 
and a key driver of economic growth and entrepreneurial development in low-
income countries. This particularly applies to countries like Nigeria, which currently 
is the world’s capital nation for poverty. In fact, considering the poor micro-
insurance coverage ratio as well as the vast number of low-income people in Nigeria, 
there is a convincing argument that micro-insurance can significantly contribute to 
economic growth and poverty alleviation by expanding the industry beyond the 
current minimal reach (the upper class and formal employed market) to the middle 
and poor market (De Vos et al., 2011). It is only when such is done that the enormous 
potentials in the low-income market can be harnessed for increased economic 
growth. To achieve this, and in line with the finding of chapters 5, 6 and 7, insurance 
providers, as well as the state, must make explicit efforts to design micro-insurance 
policies that match the demand of the poor as well as create the necessary 
institutional platform that can increase trust and participation of the low-income 
people in the sector. This will include innovative distribution channels that ally with 
the social norms and values of the target market, and also includes an effective 
regulatory framework with effective enforcement of rules.  
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Second, the total insurance asset has a significant long term positive impact on 
the economic growth of Nigeria. The significant long term adjustment of the model 
also implies that regardless of economic shocks (recession or expansion), the 
positive relationship between insurance assets and economic growth will be adjusted 
over time. This finding is consistent with that of Boon (2005) who also concluded 
from his study that insurance asset affects both capital formation and GDP growth 
in the short run and long run and by implication economic growth (Solow,1956 and 
Merton,2004). Therefore, the more the insurance sector is developed, the more assets 
will accumulate, and the more investment will be made by insurance players with its 
resulting positive impact on the whole economy. To achieve this, both the state and 
the insurance firms must play their roles in ensuring the formation of strong 
institutional environment that will curtail some of the already identified problems 
(see chapter 5) militating against the sector. This will lead to an increase in trust by 
citizens and subsequently more willingness of the people to participate in the 
industry thereby increasing the insurance asset which can be directed into efficient 
investments for increased capital formation, productivity and overall economic 
growth. 
Third, gross premium (both non-life and life premiums) has a significant 
negative impact on the economic growth of Nigeria. That is, an increase in the gross 
premium will lead to a decrease in the growth of the economy. This result is 
consistent with several studies that aggregated the insurance premium, such as 
(Cristea et al. 2014; Zouhaier, 2014; Kjosevski, 2011). One plausible explanation of 
this result is that the insurance sector in Nigeria is not yet positioned to make a 
significant economic contribution in Nigeria given the many problems that inhibit 
the, as yet underdeveloped industry. Such inhibiting factors as was discussed in 
chapter 5 include problems of products selling rather than marketing, limited 
underwriting capacity, limitations in expertise, asymmetries of information between 
sellers of insurances and (potential) customers, the weak market research capacity 
of the insurance firms, remaining inconsistencies and gaps in the institutional 
framework. The list also involves lack of proper infrastructure, the still frequent 
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denial of genuine claims, lopsided office distribution, lack of adequate education 
and awareness creation, fraudulent behaviour of insurance intermediaries, fraudulent 
claims syndrome, unfavourable macro-economic environment, religious 
antagonism, lack of reliable information communication technology (ICT), limited 
retention capacity among others. These problems ensure that mere premium 
accumulation does not translate into economic growth. Similar to the finding of 
Ozuomba (2013), the results generated in the model here also call for the reduction 
in the cost of premiums to achieve an increase in the number of participants in the 
sector. 
In conclusion, the analysis holds that an increase in micro-insurance activities 
in Nigeria is likely to lead to an acceleration of economic growth, and hence provides 
an answer to the overarching research question of this thesis, which includes ‘..what 
is the role of micro-insurance for economic growth in less-developed countries?  
This finding, therefore, calls for increased efforts of relevant stakeholders in the 
insurance to harness the development of the insurance sector for the low-income 
people of Nigeria. 
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Appendix #8.7: the stability test table 
 
Appendix #8.8: Jarque-Bera error normality test table 
   The VECM specification imposes 3 unit moduli.
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Chapter 9 
9. The conclusion and policy recommendations  
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter summarises the research results and presents the main conclusions and 
implications arising from the study. In addition, the chapter highlights the contribution of the 
research to the existing body of knowledge as well as the kind of limitations of the study that 
were beyond the realm of the research that led to this thesis. This of course leads directly into 
a discussion of potential areas for future research on the topic of micro-insurance in developing 
countries. 
9.2 Summary of the study 
The specific subject of this study is on the development of the insurance sector in less 
developed countries through an innovative form of insurance products – micro-insurance; and 
how such a product can contribute in the economic growth of less-developed countries by 
providing a way out of poverty trap for the low-income households who are entrapped in 
poverty partly due to lack of risk mechanisms.  The research addressed the overarching question 
as to what the determinants of micro-insurance development in less-developed countries are 
and what its role for the economic development of such countries is or can be.  The research 
perspective is based on the theoretical concept of the new institutional economic approach 
(NIE). The purpose of this is to make use of rich insights generated in academic research of the 
NIE on (i) why well designed institutions are needed for a positive path of economic 
development, (ii) on how such institutions are being built around the existing fabric of informal 
institutions that already exist in the recipient country, in other words: what conditions need to 
be fulfilled to empower such institutions to provide a strong basis for a market-based and 
economically sustainable process of economic development. Given the multi-facetted nature of 
the problems militating against the development of the insurance sector in most less-developed 
countries, the theory creates the opportunity to look at the different institutional and market 
problems that have impeded the development of the sector in such countries. Hence, NIE 
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becomes a suitable economic paradigm to form the basis for the analysis into institutional gaps 
in the insurance sector of less developed countries.  
To provide the needed foundation for the research, chapters 2 and 3 critically reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature related to micro-insurance and new institutional economics. 
In particular, chapter 2 examines the relationship between the poor and risk; the origin, 
definition and perspectives of micro-insurance; the differences between micro-insurance and 
conventional insurance. It also looks at the demand and supply of micro-insurance as well as 
the delivery of micro-insurance. The literature on transaction costs, property right, information 
asymmetry, agency theories, which informed the empirical investigations (especially in chapter 
6) are critically reviewed in chapter 3. The main focus of chapter 4 is on the research methods 
adopted for the study. It discusses where the questions emanate from and describes in detail and 
in a structured way, where qualitative or quantitative methods were used, for what purpose, and 
what kind of, as well as sources of data (primary and secondary) used. This includes own 
fieldwork conducted in line with strict scientific criteria (sampling and stratification, structured 
questionnaire derived from theory and previous research, pre-testing of instruments, etc.) so as 
to get exactly the kind of information that is needed for the analysis. Chapter 5 lays out the 
point of departure for the empirical analysis by highlighting how the incremental and path-
dependent characteristics of institutional change reflect on the reformation policies. 
Specifically, it looks at the reformations that have happened in Nigerian (micro) insurance 
industry and how such reforms have impacted both the perception of people and the 
development of the sector over the years. 
The main analytical weight of the thesis lies with chapters 6, 7 and 8. The three chapters 
each present an own empirical analysis, each adding their own value to the objectives of this 
thesis: chapter 6 answers to the first research question on the roots of lack of development of 
micro-insurance at the micro-level. Using self-generated data and by analysing this by use of 
probit model regressions, it investigates the effects of societal norms as well as formal 
institutions and personal characteristics on the decision of an individual to enrol into different 
forms of insurance policies. Building on the result from chapter 6, chapter 7 looks at the role of 
micro-insurance for promoting economic growth and development. Specifically, with data from 
34 African countries and a system GMM modelling approach, it singles out the impact of micro-
insurance development on reducing the size of informal economy. The results, even though 
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with an own method and different sets of data and countries assessed, remain strikingly in line 
with the findings in the existing body of literature (see in particular Tokman, 2001 on the nature 
of formal and formal economy relationship;  Dreher et al., 2005 on the effect of institutions on 
corruption in OECD countries; Bureau and Fendt, 2011on impact of shadow economy in UK; 
Chen, 2007 on the relationship of the informal economy to the formal economy and the formal 
regulatory environment; Becker, 2004; and Medina et al. 2017 on the size of shadow economy 
in Sub Saharan African countries and EU countries) The most common methods in these 
analyses are based on correlations between the size of the informal economy and 
underdevelopment, thereby remaining quite about the direction of causality.  Finally, chapter 8 
takes the investigation one step further by investigating the long term nature of this growth and 
developmental impact of micro-insurance development. Using vector error correction model, it 
tests the impact of sudden deviations (as a result of economic or environmental shocks) in the 
relationship between micro-insurance development and economic growth.  
9.3 Research conclusions and implications 
This research makes use of the theory of NIE to analyze micro-insurance development in 
less developed countries. Even though geared towards the central question on why the poor do 
not take out insurance and how the development of the sector will lead to better economic 
performance of economies concerned, the different studies carried out in this research all have 
distinct conclusions, which is discussed below: 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from chapter 2 is that the poor have most of the risks 
in terms of monetary value: livelihood in danger and climate risks loom large in less-developed 
countries because the households rely heavily on agriculture without the same level of risk-
management mechanisms or portfolios that are available in developed nations. It follows that 
the poor are the ones who need insurance most, and yet have the least offers. As a result, most 
of them are left with no other option but to operate in, as well as make use of the informal risk 
mechanisms available in the informal economy. Given the ineffectiveness of these mechanisms, 
they are trapped in a vicious circle which makes it impossible to break away from poverty. 
Also, micro-insurance in less developed countries is a meaningful complement to the traditional 
insurance sector. This is because micro-insurance contracts are more than just small and less 
costly traditional insurance schemes, they are characterised by special product features, 
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distribution channels, policy administration, and targeted customers. In line with the top-down, 
bottom-up, and linkage methods proposed by Loewe (2006), chapter 2 also suggests for the 
corroborations of different entities (such as formal insurers, NGOs, the state, communities and 
religious bodies) in the provision of micro-insurance. The support should always be determined 
by the peculiarities of the target market as well as the entities’ level of visibility and acceptance 
in such markets. 
Chapter 3 provides enough evidence in favour of the suitability of new institutional 
economic theory as a basis for empirical analysis of the insufficient development of a sector in 
a less developed market economy like Nigeria. Part of the evidence unearthed in this thesis is 
the different institutions of the theory, which are needed to enable the market to fulfil its role 
as an efficient allocator of scarce resources. Hence, the approach assists the study of the impact 
of societal norms, such as trust as well as formal institutions of property right and transaction 
costs the decision of individuals enrol into micro insurance policies., on ???. Given the multi-
facetted nature of the topic at hand, chapter 4 concludes that the subject of analysis cannot be 
captured fully with existing statistics or any easily measurable data, but rather requires a mixed 
method of research so as to capture some subjectivity and qualitative criteria which otherwise 
tends to escape meaningful empirical analysis. Despite the disadvantage of the subjectivity of 
individual data generated in fieldwork, the study in chapter 6 allows to target, by hypotheses 
testing, the exact determinants related to micro-insurance enrolment. The result of the study 
that informal institutions, formal institutions and as well as personal characteristics of 
individuals significantly determine the decision of individuals to enrol into micro-insurance, 
suggests that for any meaningful increase in the enrolment ratio of micro-insurance, insurance 
actors (insurance firms and state) must ensure that the design of micro-insurance matches the 
specific institutions existing in the target market. 
The first conclusion drawn from chapter 7 is the time persistence of informal economy in 
less developed countries which explains the poverty trap inhibiting the welfare of the poor in 
such economies. Also, the chapter concludes that the size of the informal economy is larger in 
less-developed countries compared to developed countries. It reiterates what Medina et al. 
(2017) have found out for the developed and developing countries, especially sub Saharan 
African countries for the period of 2001 to 2014). The result of the chapter also highlights the 
importance of a strong institutional framework for the realization of the promises of micro-
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insurance development. Based on these conclusions, the result of the investigation suggests that 
micro-insurance, when organized in a good institutionalized environment leads to the reduction 
of the size of informal economy and by implication positive impacts on the economic growth 
of less-developed economies.  
Following the result of chapter 7, the study in chapter 8 highlights the consistency of the 
economic gains from enrolment into micro-insurance product. Through the vector error 
correction model, the analysis concludes that micro-insurance development can be expected to 
lead to long term economic gains, and that even regardless of occasional deviations caused by 
economic setbacks in the set-up of the institutional environment setbacks. The inclusion of 
different test-models in the design of the empirical research in this chapter helps to eliminate 
the fear of otherwise overly generalizing results generated to other less-developed countries 
that did not form part of the analysis explicitly.  
9.4 Contributions of the research 
The present study provides new and potentially important insights regarding the factors 
that drive the development of micro-insurance in less developed countries and how micro-
insurance can be used as a tool for economic growth and development. Therefore, the present 
study is considered to contribute to the existing literature in various these ways, amongst which 
may be listed the following: 
First, this research makes a theoretical contribution in applying NIE to the analysis of the 
development of micro-insurance development in less developed countries. By using Oliver 
Williamson’s framework, it describes the full range of relevant institutions for insurance 
development, the relationship between them, as well as the subset of institutions upon which 
the development of the sector can be built on. This holistic approach represents a new approach 
to the study of micro-insurance development which has previously focused on different features 
of the institution (see in particular on this aspect: Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Yusuf, 2006; 
Hintz, 2009; McCord et al.,2006). This result suggests to policy and economic experts to build 
a comprehensive institutional matrix in the analysis of problems inhibiting the development of 
insurance industry. It also outlines the blueprint of the holistic approach insurance firms must 
consider in the construction of their marketing mix. 
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Second, the study posits that given the realities in less developed countries, the assumption 
of rationality as well as perfect markets typically does not hold, adhering to this assumption 
would either divert attention of the researcher away from important research questions, or 
hypothesis to be tested. It then follows that the insurance market in less developed countries is 
insufficiently developed and requires policy-intervention, at least at the earlier stage of the 
development, before its potentials for economic growth and economic development can be 
realized. This suggests that the state still has an important role to play as the providers of the 
needed infrastructures in the development of the sector. Such infrastructure may include the 
provision of subsidies and tax reductions for the poor prospective micro-insurance customers 
as well as the insurance firms, respectively. The objective of this policy is not to generate 
proactively a service that the market would otherwise not provide – the objective of such a 
policy is to overcome a market failure that roots in institutional gaps, information asymmetries 
and cultural norms that prove to become a hindrance to the opportunities that individuals do not 
follow even though they may help to propel themselves out of poverty. Importantly, such 
provisions of government intervention must be preceded by stable institutional arrangement 
without which the fruits of the intervention may not be realized. 
Third, the research proposes that different agents cooperate (in line with the top-down, 
bottom-up and linkage methods) in the distribution of micro-insurance policies so as to mitigate 
lack of trust and high transaction cost that appear to inhibit the development of the sector. This 
method allows for the design of micro-insurance in line with the dominant institutions and 
organizations in target markets and derives from the new institutional approach. This result 
suggests innovative channels of insurance distribution, which in particular includes the use of 
unconventional distribution means such as mobile networks, post offices and banks. This 
suggests that the provision of micro-insurance should not be the sole responsibility of 
insurance-providing firms, but must include their cooperation with informal organizations and 
institutions, such as religious groups, NGOs, local communities, etc., the civil society at large. 
Fourth, the study proposes the use of micro-insurance development as an innovative means 
of reducing the size of informal economy. It adds a new insight to what previous studies found 
(such as Njangang, 2018), which have focused on the role of other forms of financial 
development (such as banking) on reducing informal economy and builds on the study by 
Medina and Schneider (2017) on the connection between the size of informal economy and 
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economic performance. This suggests that micro-insurance, when properly developed, can be 
used by government to incentivise the poor who operate in the informal sector to formalize their 
business activities. For instance, governments can use subsidized micro-insurance products to 
incentivize the poor to legalize their business so as to become able to benefit from the micro-
insurance programs. Again, micro-insurance introduces the poor to the financial sector which 
can metamorphose into access to loans, if important complementary steps are fulfilled, such as 
full business registration and submission of proof of tax payment. In line with the lessons 
learned from micro-finance development, which highlighted the poor people’s ability to pay 
back their loans, and hence intensified inclusion by commercial banks, enrolment into micro-
insurance can also initiate a new relationship between the state, insurance firms and the poor, 
which will in turn lead to an increase in the societies’ level of mutual trust, which eventually 
can be expected to bring about more and deeper business interactions.  
Fifth, the study also introduces micro-insurance coverage ratio in the study of insurance 
development or economic growth. Previous studies have focused on the use of gross insurance 
premiums, insurance assets, as well as other formal institutional factors. The addition of micro-
insurance coverage ratio in the equation provides a better insight into the effect of micro-
insurance on both the lives of the low-income households as well as on the economic growth. 
Finally, going by the ineffectiveness of different reforms in the Nigerian insurance sector, 
the study emphasizes that it is the quality of law enforcement rather than mere existence of 
reform policies that will lead to the development of the sector. In other words, both laws and 
their reliable enforcement are needed to augment the effectiveness and efficiency (efficacy) of 
the market in less developed countries. It follows then that the judiciary should be properly 
positioned to dispense timely and impartial justices on all the claim issues and other cases that 
may arise from the sector, between the insurers and the insured. 
9.5 Research limitations 
The inferences drawn from the research findings should be interpreted by acknowledging 
the inherent limitations of the study. As far as possible, corrective actions have been taken to 
minimise the effects of such shortcomings. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning some 
limitations that could not be overcome in the study. The subjectivity of individual data 
generated in fieldwork means that caution must be applied in the generalization of the result as 
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they are a product of the perceptions of the respondents and hence can at best be close to the 
determinants that are suggested by theories. However, the rigour in the method and instruments 
used for the field study was strongly informed on theoretical principles. The questionnaire was 
extensively tested prior to the field study in order to ensure that the instrument provides the 
expected results. Also, the sample for the study was carefully selected in line with the 
demographical characteristics of Nigeria to ensure that the product of the instrument represents 
the opinion of the entire economy, that results generated are as close as possible representative. 
Secondly, there are ten performance and development indicators of micro-insurance and 
only one of them (insurance coverage ratio) has accessible data due to the infant stage of micro-
insurance development. This signifies that the result of the study could be further improved, 
once the data on the other nine indicators can be accessed and included in such a study.  
9.6 Direction for future research 
It would be interesting to expand the study on the development of micro-insurance when 
data from the following indicators can be secured: incurred expense ratio, incurred claim ratio, 
net income ratio, renewal ratio, growth ratio, promptness of claim settlements, claim rejection 
ratio, solvency ratio, and liquidity ratio. Secondly it would be interesting, once the data becomes 
available, to carry out the study on the size of informal economy for the whole African continent 
instead of the 34 countries that were used for this study. 
Another possible direction for future research could be to look at the role of foreign direct 
investment on the development of micro-insurance or the impact of different micro-insurance 
policies on households’ welfare/economic growth.  
Given the continuous increase and correlation between migration from less development 
to development and their remittances sent back home, it would also be interesting to see how 
micro-insurance can be developed with such remittances.  
This study briefly discussed how micro-insurance can be organized. It would be interesting 
to look in more detail what roles the different agents and institutions can have in the design and 
distribution of micro-insurance policies. For instance, what is the role of the state? Who should 
be involved in the design and distribution of micro-insurance? How can modern technologies, 
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like the internet be used in the distribution of micro-insurance without falling into traps of 
internet fraudsters or the abuse of personalised data (data protection)? 
The subject of analysis of this thesis, micro-insurance, has a rather short history in the 
country, it was analysed for, Nigeria. With more time, more experience will be generated and 
more information and data will be generated so as to warrant an extension of the research 
presented here. 
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